February 24, 2011: 174 organizations worldwide sent a letter to the Prime Minister of Japan and key Cabinet officials warning that funding for the South Texas project from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation would be an extraordinary financial risk. Sign-on letter to Japanese Prime Minister and Cabinet.

NIRS press release:
http://www.nirs.org/nukerelapse/stexas/jbicpr22411.pdf

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February 24, 2011

Mr Naoto Kan

Prime Minister of Japan

Honorable Prime Minister,

We are writing to urge you to prevent a loan guarantee from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) for the proposed atomic reactor project at the South Texas site in the U.S. state of Texas. Such a loan would entail extraordinary financial and social risk for the JBIC and the Japanese people.

All currently proposed reactor projects in the United States face a challenging economic environment caused by unfavorable market conditions; escalating projected construction costs; decreased electricity demand growth; low natural gas prices and increased competition from safe, clean renewable energy sources. With a deregulated, competitive power market and some of the lowest wholesale electricity prices in the country, Texas is a particularly risky U.S. state in which to invest in expensive new reactors.

The projected cost for the two South Texas reactors has increased from $5.6 billion in 2006 to as much as $18 billion today.¹ Last year, the City of San Antonio reduced its investment in the project by 85 percent because of the rising cost estimates. San Antonio’s municipal utility, CPS Energy, sued their partner NRG Energy (the loan guarantee applicant) for $32 billion, alleging fraud, illegal conduct, and conspiracy over cost estimates and citing NRG’s deals with outside partners. NRG has been desperately pursuing other municipal utilities to commit to purchase electricity from the proposed reactors by promising fixed priced energy and other incentives that would further undermine the economic viability of the project.

New nuclear reactors in Texas would produce energy at far higher costs than the market price of power in the state. An independent assessment conducted for Texas’ main grid operator ERCOT (Electric Reliability Council of Texas) found that the cost of the South Texas reactors would exceed the revenue they would generate in the market by 33 to 52 percent.²

Texas has a host of lower-cost alternatives, especially wind and natural gas, that will continue to meet the need for electricity. Texas is the number one wind market in the United States with more than 8,000MW in service. Natural gas reserves are adequate for 100 years, thus assuring low-cost energy for a long time. A 2010 analysis done for ERCOT projects per kilowatt capital costs for solar power to already be cheaper than nuclear power in Texas―a cost advantage that is projected to grow wider under every possible scenario envisioned.³ Currently, the average wholesale cost for electricity in Texas is 3.7 cents per kilowatt-hour, while electricity from new reactors with capital costs in South Texas’ range is estimated to cost between 12 cents to 20 cents per kilowatt-hour. Moreover, the large projected increases in electricity demand made just a few years ago – which served as the basis for many new reactor proposals – are now highly unlikely to be reached for another decade or more. This is partly due to the U.S. recession, of course, but also due to increasing energy efficiency throughout the U.S. economy.

Due to Japanese corporate involvement in the proposed South Texas reactor project, it might appear that it would make a good investment. The reality, however, is that the projects involving Japanese companies will suffer the same delays, design problems, financial difficulties and determined public opposition as other proposed nuclear projects.

Moreover, the history of U.S. nuclear reactor construction does not provide room for optimism. According to a 1986 study from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA), the average cost overrun of the first 75 U.S. nuclear reactor projects was 207 percent – or more than triple the original estimated cost.⁴ The cost overruns of the last 50 reactors built in the U.S. were even higher, reaching as much as 800% over-budget. Such extraordinary cost overruns led to multi-billion-dollar bond defaults, utility bankruptcy, and significant financial losses by utilities. Nothing in the U.S. experience suggests that new reactor projects will be any more successful at containing costs than past projects.

Just as we have warned American taxpayers and elected officials about these very serious financial risks, we also urge you to very carefully consider these risks before deciding to invest in new reactors in the United States. We respectfully suggest that Japanese taxpayers would not want to lose money on a U.S. reactor project. Nor would U.S. taxpayers want to bail out JBIC when the predictable losses occur. Such outcomes would obviously be uncomfortable on both sides of the Pacific.

cc:

Mr Banri Kaieda
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry

Mr Yoshihiko Noda
Minister of Finance

Mr Koichiro Gemba
Minister for National Policy

For a list of signatories, please see PDF:
http://www.greenaction-japan.org/internal/110224_japanstexasletter.pdf

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References

1. Nuclear Expansion could cost $18.2 billon, San Antonio Express-News, December 23, 2009

2. Potomac Economics, LTD., Independent Market Monitor for the ERCOT Wholesale Market, 2009 State of the Market Report for the ERCOT Wholesale Electricity Markets, July 2010,
http://www.puc.state.tx.us/wmo/documents/annual_reports/2009annualreport.pdf.

3. ERCOT Scenario Development Working Group, Scenario Assumptions Spreadsheet, , September 2010.
http://www.ercot.com/calendar/2010/09/20100910-SDWG

4. An Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Construction Costs, January 1, 1986, Energy Information Administration, Technical Report DOE/EIA-0485

23 January 2011

Statement by Minamata Victims and Supporter Groups
Addressing the Government of Japan’s Proposal to
Call the Mercury Treaty the “Minamata Convention”

ta disease is an ongoing tragedy. As the global community negotiates the mercury treaty, the Japanese government must first confront the Minamata disease issue at home. After fifty-five years of struggling with the disaster, we are opposed to naming the mercury treaty the “Minamata Convention” until the tragedy is faced head on and a road map created for its genuine resolution. The Government of Japan must make clear what was learned from Minamata, implement the lessons learned and, before the diplomatic conference in 2013, reexamine its policies and make concrete progress toward a genuine resolution of the elements described below.

The Government of Japan must implement the following with integrity:

1. Clarify the full extent of damage caused by Minamata disease

Although it has been 55 years since the official discovery of Minamata disease, the full extent of the actual damage is yet to be clarified. Not only is it absolutely necessary to undertake health studies of the entire contaminated region of the Shiranui Sea, follow up studies must continue for the residents living in this contaminated area. Recently, research has shown that children are affected by mercury contamination even at low levels of exposure. Therefore, it is also necessary to implement studies and measures based on these findings.

2. Compensate all victims

The Supreme Court verdict of October 2004 established the legal responsibility of the Government of Japan and Kumamoto prefecture for spreading Minamata disease. The Osaka District Court verdict found that the criteria established by the Government of Japan in 1977 to certify victims of Minamata disease “had no medical basis.” The Government of Japan must respect these legal decisions and recognize all victims as Minamata disease victims, and, compensate them.

3. Instead of protecting the polluting company, ensure full implementation of the “Polluter Pays Principle”

Under the Minamata Disease Victim Relief Law enacted in July 2009, the polluting company Chisso Corporation has been allowed to split into two companies, and this process is moving forward. The polluting company must not be allowed to escape its legal responsibility. The offender must be made to fulfill its responsibilities as the polluting company.

4. Clean up the Minamata Bay and Shiranui Sea mercury contamination

Minamata Bay and the Shiranui Sea were contaminated as a result of several hundred tons of mercury emitted by the Chisso Corporation’s Minamata factory. There are numerous contaminated areas existing within the city of Minamata. Thorough decontamination of these contaminated areas is essential. Also, the existing landfill of part of Minamata Bay is only a temporary storage area for the toxic methylmercury and cannot be considered final decontamination of the area. It would be a travesty to hold the ceremony for a “Minamata Convention” at the very place where massive mercury contamination is being ignored.

5. Establish a health and welfare system so that victims can live secure lives within their society

There are so many victims, including congenital Minamata disease victims, who are living their daily lives in anxiety, worrying about the situation concerning the health and welfare system in the areas where they live. Monetary compensation alone does not solve the problems victims encounter. It is absolutely necessary to have a health and welfare system that victims battling with their own illness and victims continuing to nurse seriously ill victims can feel secure about.

Implementation of the above is not just an issue for Minamata alone. Beginning with Niigata, Japan, which fell victim to the second Minamata disease, there are innumerable locations around the world contaminated with mercury, and even more in the process of being contaminated. We believe that if the mercury treaty learns the lessons of Minamata, then it will indeed be a treaty of great significance. The tragedy of Minamata was the result of eating fish contaminated with mercury. We the undersigned fervently hope for a strong global treaty, which will significantly decrease mercury contamination worldwide so that fish are once again safe to eat.

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Signatures

• Minamata Disease Mutual Aid Society
• Association of Minamata Disease Victims “SHIRANUI”
• Minamata Disease Victimsʼ Mutual Aid Society
• The Collaboration Center for Minamata Disease Victims (NPO)
• Solidarity Network Asia and Minamata
• Green Action
• Organizing Committee “Symposium Addressing Chisso and Government of Japanʼs Minamata Disease Responsibility”
• Tokyo Association to Indict [Those Responsible for] Minamata Disease
• Editorial Office of “Support for Minamata” Magazine
• Minamata Disease Tokai Association
• Tokai Region Minamata Disease Victims and Familiesʼ Mutual Aid Society
• Nagoya Association to Indict [Those Responsible for] Minamata Disease
• Pacific Asia Resource Center (PARC)

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Contact Information

Association of Minamata Disease Victims “SHIRANUI”
2-2-20 Sakurai-cho, Minamata City, Kumamoto 867-0045 Japan,
Tel/Fax +81-966-62-7502
Email: mdshiranui-v@friend.ocn.ne.jp

Minamata Disease Victims’ Mutual Aid Society
108 Nanpukuji, Minamata, Kumamoto 867-0023 Japan,
Tel/Fax +81-966-63-8779
Email: ezg01444@nifty.ne.jp

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Honoring Minamata – International Solidarity Statement In Support of Minamata Victims’ Groups

Japan Civil Network for the CBD
“A Nuclear Plant in Biodiversity Hotspot”

http://webcast.cop10.go.jp/player.asp?id=1919&type=ondemand

COP 10 Convention on Biological Diversity (Nagoya, Japan)

This is the English original of a PowerPoint presentation by Mycle Schneider* to Japanese Diet members and staff. The briefing was held in the House of Councillors Office Building (Tokyo, Japan) on 13 October 2010.

The meeting was organized by Green Action, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, and Gensuikin.

See Green Action Japanese site for Japanese translation:
URL: http://www.greenaction-japan.org/modules/japanese/index.php?id=27

*Mycle Schneider Consulting—Independent Analysis on Energy and Nuclear Policy

Lessons from System Analysis of Energy Policy
in the US, France and Germany
Is Pursuing both
Renewables and Nuclear Feasible?
Download PDF version (4.5 MB)

Press Release

August 11, 2010

Beware of Investing in New US Nukes
Visiting Expert Warns Japanese Government

Tuesday, August 11 (Tokyo): US nuclear expert Kevin Kamps, who is currently visiting Japan, today sent a letter to the Japanese Government warning them to carefully consider the very serious financial risks of investing in new atomic reactors in the United States. The letter, which was endorsed by over 70 US NGOs, was addressed to Prime Minister Naoto Kan, Minister of Finance Yoshihiko Noda and Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Masayuki Naoshima.

Kamps is a member of US NGO Beyond Nuclear. He campaigns on a wide range of nuclear issues, including radioactive waste and US Government funding for new nuclear reactors.

Japanese government and industry hope to export nuclear reactors to countries in Asia, including Vietnam, and to countries in the Middle East, but their first priority is to participate in the construction of proposed new reactors in the United States. However, Kamps points out that the long-awaited US nuclear renaissance might not materialize.

The last order for a new reactor to actually be built was placed in October 1973. To rescue the moribund nuclear industry, the US government is offering various incentives, including loan guarantees, which shift the risk from investors to taxpayers. This means that if companies which receive loan guarantees default on their payments, the government will pick up the tab. The U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has predicted that over half of new reactor project will default, based upon the past history of the nuclear power industry.

So far, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has received applications to build 26 new nuclear reactors, all of which are so-called third generation designs, although the new designs are not significantly innovative compared to currently operating reactors. But, as Kamps points out, None of these applications has been approved by the NRC yet. Until they receive a Construction and Operating License (COL) they cannot receive a loan guarantee.

In February this year, President Obama announced the first loan guarantee for two proposed reactors (AP1000 – AP stands for Advanced Passive) at Southern Company’s Vogtle nuclear power station in Georgia. However, the Westinghouse (owned by Toshiba) AP1000 design being considered has not even received a final NRC design certification. NRC cannot approve a COL until the design is certified, so the loan guarantee cannot be finalized.

Kamps says, The fact that loan guarantees are being announced before designs are approved and licenses issued shows that the whole program is in a state of confusion.

Most of the proposed reactors have Japanese involvement, but the most direct involvement is in two proposed ABWRs (General Electric-Hitachi Advanced Boiling Water Reactors) at the South Texas Project nuclear power station. Toshiba and Tokyo Electric Power Company have both invested in Nuclear Innovation North America (NINA), which plans to build the reactors.

NINA hopes that the involvement of Japanese companies will enable it to win support from the Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC) and Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI). However the project is in deep trouble due to escalating costs and delays in the announcement of loan guarantees. NINA’s owners, NRG Energy and Toshiba, recently announced that they are paring back spending on the proposed plant expansion because of uncertainty surrounding a federal loan guarantee for the project. (See notes attached to the NGO letter for more information about this and other projects.)

U.S. federal taxpayer loan guarantees would cover up to 80% of project costs. New reactor proponents could seek the remaining 20% of financing from Japanese government agencies.

The Japanese Government’s New Growth Strategy proposes an expansion in the range of NEXI’s export and investment insurance to cover the risk of policy changes by the government of the importing country and in an interview with the Asahi Shimbun the Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry Masayuki Naoshima proposed using pension funds as a source of long-term investment finance for nuclear export projects (Asahi Globe, August 2, 2010).

However, when Kamps visited JBIC and NEXI on August 4, he warned them, It is dangerous to view nuclear projects in the United States as less risky than in developing countries. If you want to invest, it would be wiser to invest in highly competitive renewable energy and energy efficiency projects.

Contacts in Japan
Philip White, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, Tel: 03-3357-3800
Aileen Mioko Smith, Green Action, Tel: 075-701-7223
Noriko Shimizu, FoE Japan, Tel: 03-6907-7217

Contact in the US
Kevin Kamps, Beyond Nuclear, Tel: 301-270-2209

30 June 2010

STATEMENT
We Protest MOX Fuel Arrival at Takahama Nuclear Power Plant Units 3 and 4

To Makoto YAGI, President of Kansai Electric
Issued by: Green Action (Kyoto, Japan) and Mihama-no-Kai (Osaka, Japan)

For immediate release.
Contact: +81-90-3620-9251 (Smith)

Today, 30 June, Kansai Electric, ignoring the many voices of protest, brought MOX (mixed oxide) fuel into the Takahama Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3 and Unit 4. Many countries around the world have expressed their concern and protest against the numerous Japanese plutonium shipments from France. However, Kansai Electric, totally ignored these voices of concern, forced through this shipment. We strongly protest this shipment and the arrival of MOX fuel at Takahama.

The MOX fuel that was fabricated at the AREVA Melox plant is of inferior quality, containing impurity levels that would not even pass safety standards for uranium fuel. Burning plutonium in this way at nuclear power reactors that are designed to burn uranium fuel will only further increase the probability of an accident.

Moreover, the spent MOX fuel waste that will be produced as a result of Kansai Electric burning this fuel will be nuclear waste that will have nowhere to go. This ultra-hazardous nuclear waste will remain indefinitely, over an extremely long period of time, at the Takahama Nuclear Power Plant spent fuel pools.

The Japanese government has stated that policy measures deciding on how this fuel will be managed will be deliberated from “sometime around 2010.” However, commercial operation of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, a prerequisite for this deliberation, is not moving forward. Active tests at Rokkasho are at a complete standstill due to intractable problems at its vitrification facility. Another prerequisite for deliberation of policy measures for spent MOX fuel is operation of Monju. Although Monju was restarted after being shut down for over 14 years due to a sodium leak and fire accident in 1995, repeated problems occurred immediately after this May’s restart. The prerequisites for starting deliberations on spent MOX fuel are now even further out of reach. If Kansai Electric’s pluthermal program (MOX fuel use program) goes ahead in full force under these circumstances, the town of Takahama is destined to become a nuclear waste dump.

The pluthermal program producing spent nuclear fuel which has no where to go is, in the first place, in violation of the national government’s nuclear regulatory law.

Moreover, indefinite long term safe storage of spent MOX fuel in spent fuel pools is not guaranteed. In the USA, at the Indian Point nuclear power plant in 2005, and the Salem nuclear power plant in 2002, the environment around the plants were radioactively contaminated due to leakage from spent nuclear fuel pools at these plants. Small quantities leaked from the pools over a long period of time, as much as 5 years, contaminating the underground and groundwater. Levels of radioactive tritium reached as much as 126 times the federally allowed safety levels, becoming a serious social issue.

Kansai Electric’s monitoring of its spent fuel pools basically is only concerned with maintaining water levels within the pools, and there is danger that small quantities leaking from the pools could lead to underground contamination and contamination of the surrounding sea. In fact, in Japan, leaks have been detected from spent fuel pools at the Ikata nuclear power plant Unit 3 in Ehime prefecture, and at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant in Aomori Prefecture.

Extremely long-term storage of spent MOX fuel in the spent fuel pools of Fukui nuclear power plants will not only make these local areas de facto nuclear dumps, there is danger that leakage from these spent fuel pools could lead to the environment of the Wakasa region of Fukui prefecture being contaminated with radioactive materials. It will damage citizens hopes of leaving this rich and beautiful environment for generations to come.

　We are opposed to the loading of MOX fuel at the Takahama Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3 during the October outage. We will continue to stengthen the links between Fukui and Kansai citizens and work to stop implementation of the pluthermal (MOX fuel utilization) program at Takahama Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3.

“Has fast breeder Monju been good for Japan’s energy?”
Fast breeder’s electricity is expensive.

Download PDF version (266 KB)

To Delegates to the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Restart of Japan’s Monju Fast Breeder Reactor – Implications for Nuclear Proliferation, Nuclear Safety and Energy Supply

On May 6, Japan’s Monju Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor(1) was restarted, after being shut down for over 14 years due to an accident involving a sodium leak and a fire. It is a great irony that a plutonium-fueled fast breeder reactor was restarted at a time when unprecedented international attention is being given to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and security. We wish to draw your attention to some of the implications of the Monju restart, in particular in relation to nuclear proliferation, nuclear safety and energy supply.

Implications for Nuclear Proliferation
The key nuclear proliferation issue associated with fast breeder reactors is the use and production of plutonium, which can be used to build nuclear weapons. Japan’s fast reactor program uses plutonium as fuel and plans to “breed” more plutonium than it consumes.(2)

Although Japan’s nuclear power facilities are under IAEA safeguards, the bulk-handling facilities needed to support the operation of fast reactors like Monju (reprocessing plants and plutonium fuel fabrication plants) cannot be effectively safeguarded against diversion. Moreover, the IAEA cannot meet its inspection goals at such facilities through the use of material accountancy alone. In fact, the plant used to fabricate Monju’s initial core, the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility, lost track of 70 kilograms of plutonium, and the plant had to be shut down for several years to resolve the discrepancy.

Japan already has over 47 tons of separated plutonium, nearly 10 tons of which is stockpiled in Japan. The rest is held in Europe. If the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant ever operates to full capacity, a further 8 tons of plutonium will be separated each year from spent nuclear fuel. Japan plans to use some of this plutonium as MOX fuel in its fleet of light water reactors and in fast reactors Joyo and Monju. However, because Japan will continue to separate plutonium there is little prospect that Japan’s massive stockpile of weapons-usable plutonium will be eliminated, or even brought into line with consumption any time soon.

Use of plutonium in the civil nuclear fuel cycle also increases nuclear terrorism risks. The April 13, 2010 Communiqué of the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington recognized that “highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium require special precautions”. Both of these materials can be used to produce nuclear weapons, yet far more attention was paid to the risks associated with the use of highly enriched uranium than those of plutonium. In fact, as pointed out by Gareth Evans, Co-Chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, the Summit should have given more attention to the problems associated with plutonium.(3) The relatively limited attention given to plutonium was undoubtedly because some U.S. allies, including Japan, use plutonium in their nuclear power programs.

In addition to the direct proliferation risks associated with Japan’s program to separate and re-use plutonium, the example set by Japan encourages other countries to pursue plutonium-based nuclear power programs. However, widespread use of plutonium would dramatically increase the proliferation risks associated with the civil use of nuclear energy. As pointed out in the NGO presentation on nuclear energy, delivered to this NPT Review Conference on May 7,

“Separation of plutonium through reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and the creation of a global plutonium economy exacerbates the problem. It is fundamentally contrary and counterproductive to the NPT commitment to retire nuclear weapons, since it would put weapons-usable materials directly into global commerce.”(4)

Civil plutonium stockpiles create serious instabilities in the NPT regime. As noted above, separated plutonium cannot be effectively safeguarded. Any country that possesses separated “civil” plutonium could be only a short time away-days to weeks-from producing nuclear weapons should it choose to break out of its NPT obligations.

Implications for Nuclear Safety and Energy Supply
Fast breeder reactors, which use plutonium, are not needed to ensure the supply of energy. In fact, they have been highly unreliable in providing energy. The history of Japan’s plutonium fuel cycle program, and the plutonium fuel cycle programs of other countries clearly demonstrate that there are major safety and economic problems that will prevent fast reactors from being reliable producers of energy. Continuing to pour money into research and development will only prevent other safe, secure, and economically viable alternatives from being developed.

A recent report by the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) sums up the problems of fast breeder reactors as follows:

The problems described in the country case studies in the following chapters make it hard to dispute Admiral Hyman Rickover’s summation in 1956, based on his experience with a sodium-cooled reactor developed to power an early U.S. nuclear submarine, that such reactors are “expensive to build, complex to operate, susceptible to prolonged shutdown as a result of even minor malfunctions, and difficult and time-consuming to repair.”(5)

In the same IPFM report Tatsujiro Suzuki discusses Japan’s fast reactor program.

Japan remains officially committed to the fast breeder reactor and closed fuel cycle systems. However, the fast breeder reactor commercialization date has receded far into the future while the fast breeder reactor R&D budget has been shrinking. Japan’s continued commitment to the fast breeder reactor appears largely driven by socio-political factors affecting Japan’s management of the back-end of the light-water reactor fuel cycle and R&D management. (6)

There is considerable opposition to Monju within Japan. Attached is a statement that was signed by 29 Japanese scientists preceding the restart of Monju. In particular, the statement addresses problems associated with the safety and organizational culture of Monju’s owner and operator, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency. Fourteen years after the sodium accident in 1995, it is very doubtful that these problems have been rectified.

Conclusion
Japan’s fast reactor and reprocessing program will not help meet Japan’s energy needs. At the same time it complicates efforts to control the spread of weapons-usable materials and provides potential proliferators an excuse to justify their own programs. The restart of the Monju FBR undermines Japan’s claim to leadership in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Recommendations
In view of the problems outlined above, we urge delegates to the 2010 NPT Review Conference to:
1) Call upon the Government of Japan to abandon its fast-breeder and reprocessing program.
2) Support a Comprehensive Fissile Material Ban that includes civil plutonium programs.

New York, May 21, 2010

Notes
1. Monju is located in Tsuruga City in Fukui Prefecture on the Japan Sea side of Japan’s main island of Honshu. It has an electrical power output of 280MW.
2. When FBRs are used in “breeder” mode, plutonium is produced in a blanket of depleted uranium around the core. The plutonium produced in the blanket has a concentration of 98% plutonium-239, the most convenient plutonium isotope for nuclear weapons production. It is relatively easy to separate this plutonium, because the depleted uranium blanket is less contaminated with highly radioactive fission products than regular spent fuel.
3. Extract from “Nuclear summit seeks to boost protection without new treaties”, by Randy Woods and Rennie MacKenzie, published in Nucleonics Week (15-Apr-10).
Speaking April 12 in Washington, nonproliferation expert Gareth Evans cautioned that world leaders should not lose sight of plutonium’s importance. Evans, who is co-chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, was speaking at a nuclear security meeting in Washington hosted by the Fissile Materials Working Group, a coalition of more than 40 nonproliferation academics and advocates.
“At the same time that the use of HEU is diminishing – although not quickly enough – plutonium, particularly in the form of mixed oxides, is coming into more widespread use,” he said.
4. The NGO paper on nuclear energy and Article IV of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty delivered at the 2010 NPT Review Conference is available on the following link:
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/ngostatements/NuclearEnergy.pdf
5. Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status, A research report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, February 2010, page 3.
http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/rr08.pdf
6. ibid., page 60. Since writing the article Tatsujiro Suzuki has been appointed Vice-Chairman of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission.

Letter endorsed by the following groups

International
Greenpeace International
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

Japan
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center
Friends of the Earth Japan
Green Action
Greenpeace Japan
Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs (Gensuikin)
Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies
Peace Boat

Korea
Citizens’ Institute for Environmental Studies
Energy Justice Actions
Green Korea United
Korea Federation for Environmental Movements
Korean Women’s Association United
Korean Women’s Environmental Network
Peace Network
People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy
Uljin Social Policy Institute

Europe
Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment (UK)
Österreichisches Ökologie-Institut (Austrian Institute of Ecology)
Umweltinstitut München e.V. (Munich Environmental Institute) (Germany)
World Information Service on Energy (Netherlands)

USA
Friends of the Earth US
Greenpeace USA
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Nuclear Information and Resource Service
Physicians for Social Responsibility
Union of Concerned Scientists

Monju Restart: Appeal By Japanese Scientists
http://www.cnic.jp/modules/news/article.php?storyid=895

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PRESS RELEASE

NGOs Criticize Restart of Japan’s Monju Fast Breeder Reactor
Call on NPT Review Conference Delegates to Support an End
to Civil Use of Plutonium

New York, May 21, 2010: A letter criticizing the restart of Japan’s Monju Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor, endorsed by leading peace, non-proliferation and disarmament, and environmental NGOs from around the world, was delivered today to government officials at the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. The letter was endorsed by 29 NGOs from Japan, Korea, Europe and the USA, and international NGOs including International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

The letter highlighted the dangerous implications of the May 6 restart of Monju for nuclear proliferation, nuclear safety and energy supply, saying, “It is a great irony that a plutonium-fueled fast breeder reactor was restarted at a time when unprecedented international attention is being given to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and security.”

Implications for nuclear proliferation and nuclear security of Monju and Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle program include the following:

The bulk-handling facilities needed to support the operation of fast reactors like Monju (reprocessing plants and plutonium fuel fabrication plants) cannot be effectively safeguarded against diversion.

Japan has over 47 tons of separated plutonium. If the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant operates to plan, 8 tons will be added to this each year. There is little prospect that this stockpile of weapons-usable plutonium will be eliminated any time soon.

The example set by Japan encourages other countries to pursue plutonium-based nuclear power programs, but the use of plutonium in the civil nuclear fuel cycle increases nuclear terrorism and proliferation risks.

Any country that possesses separated “civil” plutonium could be only a short time away from producing nuclear weapons should it choose to break out of its NPT obligations.

In regard to nuclear safety and energy supply, the letter noted that fast reactors have been highly unreliable in providing energy and that continuing to pour money into research and development will only prevent other safe, secure, and economically viable alternatives from being developed.

The letter urged delegates to the 2010 NPT Review Conference to:

1) Call upon the Government of Japan to abandon its fast-breeder and reprocessing program.
2) Support a Comprehensive Fissile Material Ban that includes civil plutonium programs.

Contacts:
At the NPT in New York
Shaun Burnie
Phone: +1-646-249-9361, Email: burnie.shaun@googlemail.com
In Japan
Philip White, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (International Liaison Officer)
Phone: (office) +81-3-3357-3800, (home) +81-3-3708-2898, Email: white@cnic.jp
Aileen Smith, Green Action (Director)
Phone: (office)+81-75-701-7223, (cell) 090-3620-9251, Email: amsmith@gol.com

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Press Release:
NGOs Criticize Restart of Japan’s Monju Fast Breeder Reactor
Call on NPT Review Conference Delegates to Support an End
to Civil Use of Plutonium
Download PDF version (70KB)

The full letter, along with a list of endorsing groups
Restart of Japan’s Monju Fast Breeder Reactor – Implications for Nuclear
Proliferation, Nuclear Safety and Energy Supply
Download PDF version (82KB)

Dangerous shipment of Japanese High-Level
Radioactive Nuclear Waste Crossing Pacific Ocean
on Defective Vessel

08 February 2010 (Kyoto, Japan)
For more information contact: +81-90-3620-9251 (Smith)

For immediate release: A shipment of 28 canisters of highly toxic Japanese vitrified high level radioactive waste departed Sellafield, UK on 20 January aboard the Pacific Sandpiper bound for Japan. The cargo is today passing through the Panama Canal and will be entering the Pacific Ocean momentarily. The high level waste (HLW) has been produced by the reprocessing of spent reactor fuel from Japanese electric utilities. It is the first of this kind of shipment from the UK.

A press release issued 25 January by the Nuclear Free Local Authorities in the UK states:

“The Pacific Sandpiper has recently been issued with three Statutory Memos demanding the completion of work related to crew safety, Emergency Towing Procedures, and engine room fire extinguishing systems. The available evidence implies that this work has not yet been carried out.

During recent Port State Control Inspections in Europe and Japan, the Pacific Sandpiper has been shown to have a number of deficiencies including Fire Safety measures.

The Asia Pacific Port State Control Inspection (PSCI) organisation’s website currently reports that the Pacific Sandpiper has a Target Factor of 81 and a High Risk Level.

If this vessel was an oil or chemical tanker, seeking to carry a full cargo of oil or toxic chemicals across two major oceans and through the globally identified Marine High Risk Areas between the UK and Japan, it would be considered as a pariah ship and a potential toxic time bomb. ”

The Pacific Sandpiper is still operating despite having been built to the same design and construction standards as predecessor vessels decommissioned or scrapped following discovery of “run away” corrosion.

Findings of a report* issued April 2009 and commissioned by NFLA (Nuclear Free Local Authorities), a coalition of more than 70 local authorities in Ireland and the UK, found this fleet to be:

Vulnerable to build-up of gas or moisture in their double-skinned hulls, “run away corrosion.”

40% only single-skinned hull

Claims ships are unsinkable “lack scientific and technical credibility.”

Emergency plans for coping with accidents non-existent.

*Report by independent marine pollution consultant, Tim Deere-Jones.(April 2009)

“It is unconscionable that Japan and the UK are engaging in this dangerous transport with an old, defective ship, passing it across the Pacific with no viable emergency plan in place” stated Aileen Mioko Smith, executive director of Green Action based in Japan.

Martin Forwood of CORE (Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment) is quoted as saying, “The high security surrounding today’s shipment is testament to the dangers posed by this highly radioactive material and the unwholesome global trade in which the nuclear industry is immersed. Sellafield needs to wake up to the harsh reality that today’s world and its oceans are a significantly more dangerous place than they were 30 years ago when the contracts were signed.”

This shipment is the first of many such transports scheduled for return to Japan. It is expected that Japan will receive a total of up to 1000 HLW canisters at the rate of around one shipment (4 transport flasks) from Sellafield each year.

According to the press release issued by CORE (Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment) on 20 January, future shipments will be not be made on the Pacific Sandpiper (launched1985) which, as the oldest ship of the Pacific Nuclear Transport (PNTL) fleet and already at its 25 year sell-by date, is due for retirement.