IAEA “does not differenciate between different isotopic grades of plutonium”
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Press Release on Joint Appeal issued by Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (Tokyo), Green Action (Kyoto), and Greenpeace Japan

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Joint Appeal issued by Citizens’Nuclear Information Center (Tokyo),Green Action (Kyoto), and Greenpeace Japan

NGOs in Japan Call for Japanese Government and Utilities to Terminate Plutonium Fuel (MOX) Shipments from Europe to Japan,
Call for En Route Countries to Join in Ending Shipments

Contact: Green Action (Aileen Mioko Smith) +81-90-3620-9251, CNIC (Philip White) +81-3-3357-3800

The appeal can be downloaded at:http://www.greenaction-japan.org/modules/wordpress0/index.php?p=64

For immediate release.

5 March 2009, Tokyo/Kyoto, Japan—- Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, Green Action, and Greenpeace Japan appealed to the Japanese Government to stop the world’s largest ever shipment of weapons-useable plutonium due to leave France for Japan on 6 March 2009.

The shipment, due to depart from the port of Cherbourg on British-flagged vessels, contains approximately 1.7 metric tons of plutonium contained in 65 assemblies of MOX (mixed plutonium and uranium oxide) fuel. The fuel, made from plutonium separated from Japanese spent fuel, which was shipped to the French state-owned Areva NC1 for reprocessing, is destined for nuclear power plants of three Japanese electric utilities, Kyushu, Chubu, and Shikoku Electric Power Companies.

This shipment is part of Japan’s failed attempt to utilize plutonium in its nuclear power program2. The program, originally designed to commercialize plutonium-producing fast breeder reactors, has been in development for over 50 years costing trillions of yen and yet Japan’s plutonium program today produces no electricity, lights not a single light bulb.

Today, after more than 50 years of development and a waste of vast sums of money, Japan’s plutonium program produces no electricity, lights not a single light bulb. Millions of signatures have been gathered in Japan to date opposing this unsafe, uneconomic, and failed program.

Japanese electric utilities hope the fuel to be shipped will start its troubled MOX fuel utilization program. If begun, many more shipments will follow as Japan holds about 38 tons of plutonium in Europe, continuing to put the en route countries at risk.

“This shipment is a threat to the security, safety, and environment of countries on the route of the shipment. There is no emergency contingency plan made in consultation with maritime authorities of en route states. The shipment lacks an adequate liability and compensation regime, and there is no commitment to salvage the material if it goes overboard," the NGO group stated in their appeal. "We appeal to countries potentially on the route of this and future MOX fuel shipments to join us in calling for the termination of these shipments, which put en route countries’ safety and security at risk.”

In 1992, 1999 and 2001, shipments between Europe and Japan containing plutonium were heavily protested by en route countries and ignored by the Japanese Government. Not one atom of the plutonium in those shipments has been used in Japan due to nuclear power plant accidents, data falsification scandals, and Japanese local opposition to MOX fuel use.

According to the Japanese Government and the Ministry of Land, Transport, Infrastructure and Tourism (MLIT), the utilities are responsible for safety of the MOX fuel transport; "We’ve told [the Japanese electric utilities] time and time again that they should put more effort into the safety of sea transports, just like they put into the safety of their nuclear power plants." (Section Chief Masato Mori, 13 February 2009 at Diet member briefing. Mr. Mori is the official responsible for the transport cask safety at MLIT.) MLIT says the
effort by Japanese electric utilities is not sufficient.

Security for the journey from Europe to Japan will be considerably less extensive than the security provided for the plutonium fuel over the two nights of 4 and 5 March for the 20-kilometer land trip between the Areva reprocessing site in La Hague and the Cherbourg port.

The MOX shipment’s transport casks are only required to withstand the following in sequence: a 9-meter drop, 800 degree Celsius fire for 30 minutes, immersion underwater at 15 meters for 8 hours, followed by immersion under water for 200 meters for 1 hour, without a nuclear chain reaction ("criticality") occurring.

Twenty Japanese national Diet members, including prominent members of the leading opposition party signed a letter addressed to MLIT on 26 January 2009, stating that the shipment should not go forward without meeting Japanese Government regulations. At issue was insufficient testing to assure the MOX fuel will not "go critical" under accident conditions. Disregarding Diet members’ concerns and the Ministry’s own concerns, MLIT rushed through the approval just hours after the initial 15 Diet signatures were submitted.

Notes to Editors:

1. The state-owned French nuclear company Areva, which fabricated the MOX fuel to be transported has misrepresented the proliferation threat posed by commercial plutonium contained in this and other MOX fuel. On 2 March, the Platts trade newsletter reported our letter sent to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei calling on ElBaradei to "remind Areva and the governments involved in the upcoming shipment of the security risks their nuclear programs pose to the world." (Platts Nuclear News Flashes, Monday, March 2, 2009).
2. To date, commercialization of the fast breeder has been delayed 10 times (a total delay of 80 years) with the target date for commercialization set back to 2050. Commercial start up of the recently constructed 2.3 trillion yen Rokkasho reprocessing plant has been delayed 16 times and its future is uncertain due to serious technical problems with the plant. The MOX program planned to start in 1999 has been delayed due to nuclear accidents, data falsification scandals, and local citizen opposition.

Citizens Nuclear Information Center
3F Kotobuki Building, 1-58-15 Higashi-nakano Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003
Tel:+81-3-3357-3800 Fax:+81-3-3357-3801 E-mail:cnic@nifty.com

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8203
Tel:+81-75-701-7223 Fax:+81-75-702-1952 E-mail:amsmith@gol.com

Greenpeace Japan
NF bldg 2F 8-13-11 Nishi-Shinjuku Shinjuku Tokyo 160-0023

Japan Should Terminate its Plutonium Fuel (MOX) Shipments from Europe to Japan and Cease Placing En Route Countries at Risk

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Japan’s Plutonium Program is Uneconomic, Unsafe, is a Detriment to Japan’s Energy Program, and Fosters Proliferation

Japan Should Terminate its Plutonium Fuel (MOX) Shipments from Europe to Japan and Cease Placing En Route Countries at Risk

5 March 2009

APPEAL

On March 6 2009, a shipment of approximately 1.7 metric tons of weapons-usable plutonium contained in 65 assemblies of MOX (mixed plutonium and uranium oxide) fuel is scheduled to depart the port of Cherbourg, France bound for Japan on British-flagged vessels. This will be the world’s largest transport of plutonium ever undertaken. The fuel, made from plutonium separated from Japanese spent fuel, which was shipped to France for reprocessing, is to be used at the nuclear power plants of three Japanese electric utilities, Kyushu, Chubu, and Shikoku Electric Power Companies.

Japan’s unsafe, uneconomic and failed plutonium program

This shipment is part of Japan’s failed attempt to utilize plutonium in its nuclear power program. The original program was to commercialize plutonium-producing fast breeder reactors around 1970, operate a full commercial-scale reprocessing plant, and use MOX fuel in commercial nuclear power plants designed originally to use uranium fuel.

However, to date, commercialization of the fast breeder has been delayed 10 times (a total delay of 80 years) with target date for commercialization set back to 2050. The commercial start up of the recently constructed 2.3 trillion yen Rokkasho reprocessing plant has been delayed 16 times so far, and its future is uncertain due to serious technical problems with the plant. The MOX program, which was supposed to have begun a decade ago in 1999 has been chronically delayed.

Today, after more than 50 years of development and a waste of vast sums of money, Japan’s plutonium program produces no electricity, lights not a single light bulb. Millions of signatures have been gathered in Japan to date opposing this unsafe, uneconomic, and failed program.

Shipment threatens the security, safety, and environment of en route countries

Japanese electric utilities persist in pursuing its troubled MOX fuel utilization program. If begun, many more shipments will follow as Japan holds about 38 tons of plutonium in Europe, continuing to put en route countries at risk.

The Japanese ministry in charge of the safety of this MOX fuel transport (MLIT) states, "The Japanese Ministry of Transport, Land, and Infrastructure is not the party which is fully in charge of this transport." It goes on to say, "The primary party responsible is the [Japanese] electric utilities. We’ve told them time and time again that they should put more effort into the safety of sea transports, just like they put into the safety of their nuclear power plants." MLIT concludes that the effort by Japanese electric utilities is not sufficient. (Quote: Section Chief Masato Mori, 13 February 2009 at Diet member briefing. Mr. Mori is the official responsible for the transport cask safety at MLIT.)

In 1992, 1.5 metric tons of plutonium was transported from France to Japan for use in Japan’s prototype fast breeder reactor, Monju. Dozens of countries raised concerns about this shipment and were ignored. Two MOX fuel shipments from Europe to Japan which followed in 1999 and 2001 were also heavily protested by en route States, but the protests were ignored. Not one atom of the plutonium in those shipments has been used in Japan due to nuclear power plant accidents, data falsification scandals, and Japanese local opposition to MOX fuel use.

Twenty Japanese national Diet members, including prominent members of the leading opposition party signed a letter addressed to MLIT on 26 January 2009, stating that the shipment should not go forward without meeting Japanese government regulations. Disregarding this and the Ministry’s own concerns, MLIT rushed through the approval that night (26th) just hours after the initial 15 signatures were submitted.

Now in 2009, the en route countries face the same concerns and remain unaddressed by France and Japan:

• There is no emergency contingency plan made in consultation with maritime authorities of en route states. The shipment lacks an adequate liability and compensation regime, and there is no commitment to salvage the material if it goes overboard.
• The MOX shipment’s transport casks are only required to withstand the following in sequence: a 9-meter drop, 800 degree Celsius fire for 30 minutes, immersion underwater at 15 meters for 8 hours, followed by immersion under water for 200 meters for 1 hour, without a nuclear chain reaction ("criticality") occurring (Regulations Concerning Sea Transport and Storage of Hazardous Materials, Clause 81). The Japanese government’s standards are based on the IAEA’s Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. They do not envisage long-distance sea transport. If an accident were to occur en route, considering the nature of past accidents, these standards would not be expected to ensure the safety of the cargo. Much hotter fires of much longer duration than 30 minutes could occur. Further, much of the journey will be through seas deeper than 2,000 meters.
• The MOX fuel, fabricated by the state owned French company Areva NC, will be transported by two lightly armed British-flagged cargo ships, the Pacific Heron and Pacific Pintail. Escorting each other from France to Japan over thousands of kilometers of open sea, security for the journey will be considerably less extensive than that provided for the plutonium fuel over the two nights of March 4 and 5 for the 20-kilometer land trip between the reprocessing site in La Hague and the Cherbourg port.

The plutonium and uranium in the MOX fuel are US-obligated material, having been separated from fresh fuel supplied by the US and irradiated in Japanese reactors. The United States government undertook a secret review of the security plan for this transport. For future shipments en route countries should request the Obama administration to review the security plan in a more transparent manner, with full Congressional oversight. This will reveal that it is deficient from a safety and security perspective and that subsequent shipments should not be undertaken.

Proliferation

The IAEA uses a figure of 8kg plutonium as capable of being used for a nuclear weapon and IAEA safeguards define fresh MOX fuel as “direct use” material for nuclear weapons, with accompanying necessity for stringent physical-protection
measures.

Areva is misrepresenting the proliferation threat posed by commercial plutonium contained in this shipment . On 2 March, the Platts trade newsletter reported our letter sent to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei calling on ElBaradei to “remind Areva and the governments involved in the upcoming shipment of the security risks their nuclear programs pose to the world (Platts Nuclear News Flashes, Monday, March 2, 2009) .

APPEAL

Japan’s Plutonium Program is Uneconomic, Unsafe, is a Detriment to Japan’s Energy Program, and Fosters Proliferation.

We call on the Japanese Government and Electric Utilities to Terminate this and Future Plutonium (MOX) shipments and Cease from Placing En Route Countries at Risk.

We Appeal to Countries Potentially on the Route of this and Future MOX Fuel Shipments to Join Us in Calling for the Termination of these Shipments which Put en Route Countries’ Safety and Security at Risk.

Hideyuki
Ban
Co-Director
Citizens Nuclear Information Center
3F Kotobuki Building, 1-58-15 Higashi-nakano
Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003
Tel：+81-3-3357-3800 Fax：+81-3-3357-3801
cnic@nifty.com

HOSHIKAWA
Jun
Executive Director
Greenpeace Japan
NF bldg 2F 8-13-11 Nishi-Shinjuku
Shinjuku Tokyo 160-0023
Tel：+81-3-5338-9800 Fax：+81-3-5338-9817

Aileen
Mioko SMITH
Executive Director
Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho
Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8203
Tel：+81-75-701-7223 Fax：+81-75-702-1952
amsmith@gol.com

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The three possible routes for the shipment are around the Cape of Good Hope and through the South Pacific, around South America, or, through the Panama Canal.

Regional organizations which have protested past Japanese nuclear shipments include CARICOM (Caribbean Community), ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of states, SIDS( Small Island Developing States), and PIF (Pacific Islands Forum), and South American Countries

Letter sent by Greenpeace, Green Action, and Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center concerning the plutonium of Japanese MOX fuel shipment
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Open Letter to Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
International Atomic Energy Agency

2 March 2009
Dear Dr. ElBaradei,

We are writing to warn you that the French state nuclear company, Areva, is actively denying the proliferation risks posed by reactor-grade plutonium contained in Mixed Oxide Fuel. The matter is an urgent one, as on March 6th 2009 a shipment of approximately 1.8 metric tons of plutonium contained in 65 assemblies of MOX fuel is scheduled to depart the port of Cherbourg bound for Japan.1

Our specific concerns are Areva’s misrepresentation of the proliferation threat posed by commercial plutonium contained in this and other MOX fuel. They appear dangerously confused or deliberately denying the inherent proliferation risks of the Japanese plutonium MOX fuel. Specifically they went on record March 1st,

It is impossible to make a nuclear weapon as suggested by Greenpeace. Here you must be clear, this MOX does not have any interest for any people to make a nuclear weapon from it. There is no interest in the diversion of this material. We have this level of protection, because the MOX fuel contains plutonium. Everything that contains plutonium must have a protective measure, Henri Jacques Neau, Director of Transport, Areva. 2

Late last week following an interview with French news agency, AFP, an industrial source3 was cited in the article stating that,

To make a bomb out of MOX,you would first need an installation in order to separate the plutonium from the uranium. And still, the result would only be plutonium of civil quality and not military quality,affirmed this source. 4

These statements are clearly misleading, stating as it does there is a distinction between civil and military grade plutonium. This, as you are aware is not the formal position of the IAEA, which classifies commercial plutonium MOX fuel as Category 1 nuclear material, requiring the highest level of security protection.As the IAEA safeguards glossary states, conversion of MOX fuel or powder to finished plutonium (metal) is of the order of 1-3 weeks.5

Greenpeace is long used to Japanese nuclear industry denials that reactor-grade plutonium is a proliferation threat, and that it cannot be used to make nuclear weapons. However, you will be aware that as long ago as 1990 your predecessor Hans Blix confirmed to the Nuclear Control Institute that the IAEA does not dispute that reactor-grade plutonium can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.6 Both you and your predecessor would surely agree that,

The proliferation activities required to obtain weapon-usable plutonium from fabricated [mixed oxide] fuel assemblies would be essentially the same, (as for oxide) with addition of a simple sawing operation.7 U.S.Department of Energy,1980.

After decades of being aware of the reality of plutonium Japan’s denial neither impresses us, nor the governments in North-east Asia which view its growing plutonium stockpile program with increasing suspicion.

Now we have denials by the nuclear industry including an explicit denial by Areva, which we believe is in defiance of both the IAEA classification of reactor grade plutonium and MOX fuel, as well as senior nuclear weapons scientists and U.S. government departments, including the Department of Energy. We have attached a list of key statements made by leading U.S. nuclear agencies and weapons designers.

You will be aware that the U.S. Department of Energy first briefed Japan and other states on the proliferation risks from commercial reprocessing, reactor grade plutonium and MOX fuel more than 30 years ago.

When we decided a couple of years ago to convince the world community that it (the construction of nuclear explosives out of low-grade plutonium) could be done, we did not bother to explain how we knew. But we knew from calculations from this (test…) When it became clear that we had to convince the international community that we knew what the hell we were talking about -that plutonium is plutonium -we just decided to classify it.8

Since the 1970’s when Japan, France and others were warned about the proliferation dangers inherent within commercial plutonium, the global stockpile of commercial plutonium has risen to in excess of 250 metric tons. Sufficient for tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. In the case of Japan, its stockpile of plutonium has increased from 6 metric tons in 1993 to over 43 tons today. This is despite warnings from former Deputy Director of the IAEA William Dircks made in 1992 that there was a growing threat from commercial plutonium stocks and there was an urgent need to review once again our policies regarding plutonium and its use.9

Ten years ago, on the eve of the first plutonium MOX shipment to Japan, the Nuclear Control Institute, Green Action Japan, the Citizens Nuclear Information Centre, Tokyo and ourselves wrote to you calling for IAEA support for an immediate cessation of weapons-usable plutonium separation, whether for stated military or civil use, and its stockpiling will help to reduce the threat that this material poses.10

Tragically no such cessation has occurred. While plutonium MOX programs have failed to reduce stocks of the fissile material, new facilities in Japan (Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant) and in the UK (Sellafield MOX plant) have been commissioned. As warned by Greenpeace and others both have failed to operate as intended – and yet vested interests – political and commercial – continue to seek to sustain these and other facilities.

Beyond this, Japan and France are now actively supporting the further development of global trade in bomb material through the President George W. Bush initiated Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). The justification given for these programs is that due to finite uranium resources, the operation of breeder reactors and reprocessing, are essential for combating climate change. In reality they will not make any significant contribution to greenhouse gas mitigation and will dramatically increase proliferation dangers.

Discriminatory application of the non-proliferation regime, whereby certain states get full access to weapons usable materials under the guise of peaceful use, is clearly failing. New programs, such as GNEP and the IAEA led International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), will only further destroy the international non-proliferation regime. The negotiation of a comprehensive fissile material treaty by the parties to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is both urgent and long overdue. This treaty must not make the same mistake as current international norms whereby distinction is made between good plutonium and bad plutonium11.

On the eve of the largest plutonium MOX shipment in history, we urge you once again to accept that commercial plutonium programs are unacceptable and must be terminated. We call on the IAEA to recognize the dangers in such programs and to make every effort to secure all weapons-usable fissile materials and end commercial programs utilising these materials.

In view of the inherent proliferation and security threats of this plutonium MOX transport and Areva’s mispresentation of it, we urge you to prevent this dangerous cargo from leaving France and remind Areva and the governments involved of the security risks their nuclear programs pose to the world.

Yours sincerely,

Dr.Rianne Teule
Nuclear Campaigner
Greenpeace International
Ottho Heldringstraat 5
1066 AZ Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Tel. +316 5064 0961
rianne.teule@greenpeace.org

Hideyuki Ban
Co-Director
Citizens Nuclear Information Center
3F Kotobuki Building, 1-58-15 Higashi-nakano
Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003
Japan
cnic-jp@po.iijnet.or.jp

Aileen Mioko Smith
Director
Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho
Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8203
Japan
Tel. 81-75-701-7223
amsmith@gol.com

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1 Greenpeace understands that the 65 assemblies of plutonium MOX fuel contained in TN12 flasks will be transported during the nights of March 3rd/4th and 4th/5th. The Pacific Heron and Pacific Pintail will then proceed to load the plutonium MOX during the night of March 5th/6th, with departure expected during the evening of Friday 6th.

2 Translated from an interview on France Inter, available at
www.france-info.com/spip.php?article259152&theme=29&sous_theme=31.
Original text: On ne peut pas en faire d’armes nucleaires contrairement a ce qu’affirme Greenpeace, hein, et la faut etre tres clair, ce mox n’interesse absolument pas qui que ce soit pour fabriquer des armes nucleaires. (…) c’est que ces matieres nucleaires n’ont aucun interet pour le detournement. On applique ces mesures de protection parce que le combustible MOX contient du plutonium,et qu’au titre de la reglementation internationale, tout ce qui contient du plutonium doit faire l’objet de mesures particulieres de protection.

3 This quote is possibly from Areva, since it is the key player in the industry, most directly involved in this MOX-transport

4 Translated from Areva prépare le départ d’un important convoi radioactif pour le Japon AFP, Cherbourg, February 26th 2009. Original text:Pour fabriquer une bombe à partir du MOX,il faudrait d’abord avoir une installation pour séparer le plutonium de l’uranium.Et encore il n’en résulterait que du plutonium de qualité civile et non pas militaire a affirmé cette source.

5 IAEA Safeguards Glossary, IAEA/SG/INF/1, Vienna, IAEA 1990.

6 The confirmation from Hans Blix came after challenged by Paul Leventhal, President of the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), and the analysis of J Carson Mark, Exlosive Properties of Reactor Grade Plutonium, commissioned by NCI. J. Carson Mark was a member of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, and former division leader of Los Alamos National Laboratories Theoretical Division, see www.NCI.org and “Blix says IAEA does not dispute utility of reactor grade plutonium for weapons,” Nuclear Fuel, November, 12th 1990.

7 U.S.
Department of Energy, NASAP, Vol: Nuclear Proliferation and Civilian Nuclear Power, Report of the Non-
Proliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program, Vol 2, Proliferation resistance, DOE/NE-0001/2 June 1980.

8 See, Gillete, R. Impure plutonium used in the 1962 A-test” Los Angelese Times, September 16th 1977.

9 See, William
J. Dircks, addressed the 1992 Japan Atomic Industrial Forum Annual Meeting on the matter of Nuclear Fuel Recycling – the IAEA Perspective.

10 Letter from Paul Leventhal, NCI, Aileen Mioko Smith, Green Action, Hideyuki Ban, CNIC and Shaun Burnie, Greenpeace International, April 13,1999.

11 A model Comprehensive Fissile Materials Treaty as proposed by Greenpeace can by found at
http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/international/press/reports/comprehensive-fissile-material.pdf

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For further information contact:
Aileen Mioko Smith, Cell: +81-90-3620-9251, Email: amsmith@gol.com

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Secret preparations are underway in Britain and France for shipping 1.8 tons of plutonium, the largest quantity of plutonium every shipped by sea.

The plutonium is contained in 65 assemblies of MOX (mixed plutonium and uranium oxide) fuel and is being shipped to Japan for use in the nuclear power plants of three Japanese electric utilities. No details have been revealed, but it is reported that the fuel will be transported by two British-flagged vessels, escorting each other.

The vessels are to depart Europe anytime on or after March 1st. Neither the hour of departure nor the maritime route to be used will be revealed before the ships depart. The United States must approve the transport plan before the shipment can proceed.

The MOX fuel to be transported has been fabricated in France by Areva NC.

AREVA NC statement on the shipment:
http://www.lahague.areva-nc.fr/scripts/areva-nc/publigen/content/templates/Show.asp?P=8317&L=EN

The three possible routes for the shipment are around the Cape of Good Hope and through the South Pacific, around South America, or, through the Panama Canal.

Japanese electric utilities hope the fuel to be shipped will start its troubled MOX fuel utilization program which was to begin a decade ago in 1999. Many more shipments are scheduled to follow and could take different routes.

The shipment is a threat to the security, safety, and environment of countries en route. It lacks adequate security to protect against terrorists, and there is no emergency contingency plan made in consultation with maritime authorities of en route states. The shipment lacks an adequate liability and compensation regime, and there is no commitment to salvage the material if it goes overboard.

Aileen Mioko Smith, executive director of Green Action based in Kyoto, Japan stated, “Countries potentially on the route of this shipment should seek a moratorium on such nuclear shipments because neither the Japanese government nor electric utilities are giving countries the proper assurance that the plutonium can be shipped safely.”

The hazard of shipping radioactive material by sea is very real. Eleven years ago in 1997, a ship, the MSC Carla, carrying highly radioactive cesium was split in two in a storm in the Atlantic Ocean. The radioactive cargo sank 3,000 meters to the bottom of the ocean. French regulatory authorities acknowledged the containers would rupture but said they would not salvage them.

The MOX shipment’s transport casks are only required to withstand emersion underwater at 15 meters for 8 hours (or 200 meters for 30 minutes). The cask must withstand a 9-meter drop. The material must not distort to the extent it leads to an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction. Japanese electric utilities have not undertaken the drop-test experiment in accordance to Japanese government regulations. Japanese Diet members are objecting to this.

Section Chief Masato Mori, the MLIT (ministry of transport) official in charge of the MOX shipment’s transport cask safety stated on 13 February, “The Japanese transport ministry is not the party which is fully in charge of this transport. The primary party responsible is the [Japanese] electric utilities. We’ve told them time and time again that they should put more effort into the safety of sea transports, just like they put into the safety of their nuclear power plants. As far as we are concerned, they can put much, much more effort into the safety of the sea transports.”

Japanese government authorities, nevertheless state the shipment can go forward.

Plutonium is an essential ingredient of nuclear weapons. Less than 8 kilograms is enough to construct a nuclear bomb. IAEA safeguards define fresh MOX fuel as plutonium and therefore stringent physical-protection measures must apply.

In 1992, the Akatsuki Maru transported 1.7 tons of plutonium from France to Japan for use in Japan’s prototype fast breeder reactor, Monju. Dozens of countries raised concerns about this shipment. Two MOX fuel shipments from Europe to Japan followed in 1999 and 2001, also heavily protested by en route States. Not one atom of the plutonium shipped in 1992, 1999 and 2001 has been used in Japan due to nuclear power plant accidents, data falsification scandals, and Japanese local opposition to MOX fuel use.

Regional organizations which have protested past Japanese nuclear shipments include CARICOM (Caribbean Community), ACP(African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, SIDS (Small Island Developing States), and PIF (Pacific Islands Forum).

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Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho
Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
Tel: +81-75-701-7223
Fax: +81-75-702-1952
Cell:+81-90-3620-9251
email: amsmith@gol.com
URL: http://www.greenaction-japan.org/

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Press release sent to countries on the route of imminent plutonium (MOX fuel) shipment

language：English
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language：Spanish
Download PDF(80KB)

Three Mile Island: The People’s Testament
Article by Aileen M. Smith, written in March 1989 for the 10th anniversary of the TMI accident.

Download PDF (200KB)

Interviews of people’s experiences during and after the Three Mile
Island accident of March 28, 1979.

The TMI accident was the most significant accident in the history of US commercial nuclear power, a partial core meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania (USA) near Harrisburg.

Aomori City, Japan
June 7–8, 2008

Download PDF (29 K)

 

Rokkasho, a massive commercial reprocessing plant for radioactive spent fuel, is about to start commercial operation this summer in Aomori Prefecture, northern Japan, in spite of recent front-page headlines in Japanese newspapers reporting the discovery of an active earthquake fault directly under the plant site.

Rokkasho is part of Japan’s national nuclear fuel cycle program, which has nuclear cooperation agreements with the USA and Euratom, and, through the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), with Canada, Italy, and the U.K. as well.

On May 21st we delivered an appeal to the G8 environment ministers concerning the massive quantities of radioactive releases from Rokkasho into the Pacific Ocean. (These releases would be absolutely illegal under the London Convention if disposal took place from a ship at sea.)

We appeal to you, the G8 energy ministers, to reject Japanese endeavors to promote nuclear fuel cycle cooperation among G8 countries for the following reasons: it is very poor energy policy, it contaminates the environment, it will waste public resources of the countries involved, and it severely obstructs vital work at hand: the fight against global warming.

Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle (plutonium) program has been under development for over half a century. It is not producing a single kilowatt of electricity today. Commercialization of the fast breeder reactor has been delayed 8 times and is now planned “by 2050”. 1 Because of this the plutonium extracted at Rokkasho will be stockpiled on site. Shunsuke Kondo, head of Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission admits that “tens of tons of plutonium” will accumulate at Rokkasho over the next several years. 2

The Japanese government may not be informing G8 energy ministers that there is a great deal of opposition in Japan to legalization of the wanton radioactive pollution from Rokkasho and to development of the fast breeder reactor. 3

Cities, towns, and villages in northern Japan have petitioned the national government to pass a law making it illegal for radioactive materials to be released from Rokkasho into the marine environment. A petition organized by consumer organizations, food cooperatives and fishery unions demanding a ban on radioactive releases from Rokkasho, signed by more than 810,000 people, was submitted to the Japanese government in February. More than one-third of the adult population of Fukui prefecture, where Japan’s prototype fast breeder reactor, Monju, is located, has signed a petition asking that the reactor never be operated again. Monju has been shut down since December 1995 due to a sodium leak and fire accident.

On May 25th, in Osaka, citizens and consumer organizations from central Japan (Hyogo, Osaka, Kyoto, Shiga, Nara, and Wakayama prefectures) held a public meeting to demand that Rokkasho be prevented from operating. Japanese citizens want to protect northern Japan’s agricultural and marine products of from radioactive contamination. We represent the network that emerged from this meeting.

References:

1 Japan Atomic Energy Commission , “Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy”

2 If Rokkasho operates as planned, 7 tons of plutonium will be extracted annually.

3 To date about 1 trillion yen (more than $9 billion U.S.) of taxpayer and ratepayer money has been spent on the fast breeder reactor development program.

the reprocessing option and operating the Rokkasho reprocessing plant will cost at least 19 trillion yen (about $180 billion U.S.), far more than disposing without reprocessing.

Presentation given to Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan as part of a press briefing titled, “The G8 and Japan: More Hot Air Over Global Warming?”
May 29, 2008

Global Warming: Nuclear Power Is Not the Answer, Aileen Mioko Smith, Green Action
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Appeal from Citizens and Consumer Organizations in Central Japan to the G8 Environment Ministers Meeting
Kobe, Japan, May 24-26, 2008

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Rokkasho, a massive commercial reprocessing plant for radioactive spent fuel, is about to start commercial operation this summer in Aomori Prefecture, northern Japan.

The radioactive releases from Rokkasho into the Pacific Ocean would be illegal under the London Convention if disposal took place from a ship at sea. But a loophole in international law allows what would be illegal at sea, in the case of a land-based pipe extending into the ocean.

Aerial releases of radioactive gases (krypton) from Rokkasho will also circulate around the world.

The Japanese government is allowing Rokkasho to release 1.8 x 10ˆ16 becquerels of radioactive waste — equivalent to the lethal dose for 47,000 human beings — annually into the Pacific Ocean from a pipe extending 3 kilometers from land into the sea. The Japanese government’s argument to legally sanction this environmental pollution is that the radioactive material will “dilute” sufficiently in the Pacific Ocean.

In the case of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, the Japanese government has eliminated the regulatory requirement placed on nuclear facilities in Japan that limits the concentration of radioactive materials that can be legally released into the marine environment.

The Japanese government may not be informing G8 environment ministers that there is a great deal of opposition in Japan to legalization of this wanton radioactive pollution.

Cities, towns, and villages in northern Japan have petitioned the national government to pass a law making it illegal for radioactive materials to be released from Rokkasho into the marine environment. A petition organized by consumer organizations, food cooperatives and fishery unions demanding a ban on radioactive releases from Rokkasho, signed by more than 810,000 people, was submitted to the Japanese government in February. Questionnaires to large supermarket chains by consumer and citizen organizations have already shown that some large supermarket chains do not want to purchase agricultural and marine products from northern Japan if and when they become contaminated with radioactive materials from Rokkasho.

Government demands to halt radioactive emissions into the marine environment are already well-established internationally. Twelve nations in Europe have condemned these emissions from reprocessing plants in the UK and France and are demanding that emissions be eliminated by 2020 under the OSPAR Convention.

On May 25th, in Osaka, citizens and consumer organizations from central Japan (Hyogo, Osaka, Kyoto, Shiga, Nara, and Wakayama prefectures) are holding a public meeting to demand that Rokkasho be prevented from operating. Japanese citizens want to protect agricultural and marine products of northern Japan from radioactive contamination.

Notes:

London Convention: “Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972.” International Maritime Organization (IMO), UN. The 1993 amendments adoption in 12 November 1993 which entered into force on 20 February 1994 bans the dumping into sea of low-level radioactive wastes.

OSPAR: The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic. The convention is the current instrument guiding international cooperation on the protection of the marine environment of the North-East Atlantic.

On 29 June 2000, a legally-binding decision adopted by OSPAR says “that the current authorisations for discharges or releases of radioactive substances from nuclear reprocessing facilities shall be reviewed as a matter of priority… with a view to… implementing the non-reprocessing option (for example, dry storage) for spent nuclear fuel management at appropriate facilities.”

NGO briefing to media organizations covering the Japanese Nuclear Industry’s International Symposium on Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Safety, February 26th-27th (Kashiwazaki City, Niigata Prefecture, Japan)

Green Action has compiled a media briefing from publicly available documents issued in English and Japanese by scientists and engineers, Kashiwazaki and Kariwa residents and legislators, and NGOs in Japan calling for closure of Tokyo Electric’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant.

Read the facts the Japanese nuclear industry may not reveal to the international community.

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“Japanese Nuclear Power Industry Covers Up Its Dirty Laundry: Will the International Community Have Wool Pulled Over its Eyes?”

On February 26th–27th in Kashiwazaki City, Niigata Prefecture, the Japan Industrial Atomic Forum (JAIF) is co-hosting “The International Symposium on Seismic Safety of Nuclear Power Plants and Lessons Learned from the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake.”

Fifty-five nuclear power plants operate in seismically active Japan. The Japanese nuclear industry is eager to make it appear as though “business as usual” can continue at Japanese nuclear power plants in spite of the 16 July 2007 Chuetsu-oki Earthquake (6.8 on the Richter scale) that rocked Tokyo Electric’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant in Niigata, Japan.