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“Nuclear Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing”

May 23, 2007
CAN TV
Community Forum
[29 minutes 15 seconds]

Aileen Mioko Smith, Director
Green Action, Kyoto, Japan

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A 23-page Green Action presentation prepared for the anti-GNEP (Global Nuclear Energy Partnership) tour organized by Public Citizen in Washington, D.C. (May 2007)

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[Japanese version]

26 April 2007

Dear Professor James Lovelock,

We wish to express our deep respect for your keen insight in sounding the alarm from a very early stage concerning the threat of global warming to human society and the ecosystem of the planet, and for explaining through your “Gaia Theory” how the planet behaves as one being.

At the same time, however, we cannot agree with your view that maximizing the use of nuclear fission energy 1 is an appropriate way to address global warming.

At the 43rd anniversary symposium commemorating Nuclear Energy Day organized by the Japan Atomic Energy Relations Organization (JAERO) on 25 October 2006, you gave a keynote speech entitled “The Revenge of Gaia”. Shortly thereafter, on 29 October, JAERO published full-page advertisements in Japan’s major national newspapers, featuring your keynote speech as a promotion for nuclear power2. In 2004 also, you appeared in a newspaper advertisement taken out by this same organization 3.

As you are aware, this organization is an organ created by the national government to promote nuclear power to the Japanese public. We find it very regrettable that Japan’s nuclear program is being promoted by you in this manner.

We believe, for the reasons elaborated below, that the expansion of nuclear power is not an effective way of preventing global warming. We believe that, instead of promoting nuclear power, we should actively encourage the introduction of safer and more reliable alternatives.

On this 21st anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, we convey to you our views and, at the same time, sincerely ask you to reply to the questions listed below. We are addressing this open letter and questions to you, and, at the same time we are making the letter available to the public.

Signatory Organizations

Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC)

Consumers Union of Japan

Global Peace Campaign

Green Action

Greenpeace Japan

Group of Ten Thousand Plaintiffs for the Lawsuit to Stop the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies (ISEP)

Japan Congress Against A-and H- Bombs (GENSUIKIN)

Kiko (climate) Network

Osaka Citizens against the Mihama,, Ohi and Takahama Nuclear Power Plants

Peace Boat

Peace food action net. ILFA (International life & food association)

Sun & Wind Power Trust for Citizens

Women’s Democratic Club

(The attached is an initial list of signatory organizations. There will be additional organizations signing on to this letter)

＊ ＊ ＊

When the Japanese government promotes nuclear power, it quotes your views as follows4:

“Nuclear energy would pose an insignificant threat. Renewable energy sounds good, but so far it is inefficient and expensive. It has a future, but we have no time now to experiment with visionary energy sources. I see nuclear energy as the only effective medicine we have now.”

1) In your view how many nuclear power plants will be needed worldwide and by when in order for nuclear power to become an effective medicine to combat global warming?

Our View:

1. Nuclear power is not an effective medicine for the problem of global warming.

You advocate switching from fossil fuels to nuclear power.

Even if carbon dioxide emissions were to be immediately reduced to zero, due to human-induced CO2 emissions to date, it seems certain that we will still not be able to avoid a rise in the earth’s mean temperature5. According to the most up-to-date scientific information, in order to avoid a catastrophic impact from climate change, it will be necessary to limit the rise in the earth’s mean temperature to within 2 degrees of pre-industrial times (pre-1850). In order to accomplish this, within the next 10 years we will need to switch from increasing global CO2 emissions to decreasing them, and by 2050 attain a 50 percent reduction from 1990 emission levels.

As we explain below, at a time when urgent action is required, nuclear energy cannot be a realistic means of combating global warming.

At the end of 2003, there were 434 nuclear reactors worldwide producing electricity. These reactors produced only 16 percent of total electricity supplied and 6 percent of total primary energy6. Assuming the life-span of a reactor to be 40 years, by 2025 more than half, and by 2050 all of the reactors presently operating will have ended their operating lives7.

At present fossil fuels produce 66 percent of all electricity8. If nuclear power plants were to replace all fossil fuel plants and all the current nuclear power plants which will be decommissioned, about 2,230 new nuclear reactors (1000 MW(e) reactors operating at 70 percent capacity) would have to be built, even if future electricity demand is assumed to be flat. If this increase is to be accomplished by 2025, two new reactors will have to go on line every week, or if the increase is to be accomplished by 2050, then one new reactor must go on line every week.

　At present there are 55 nuclear power reactors operating in Japan. These reactors produce approximately 30 percent of total electricity and 10 percent of total primary energy. About 145 new reactors will be required in Japan if the same conditions indicated above prevail, where new reactors replace old ones and additional reactors are built to replace fossil fuel plants which currently produce about 60 percent of electricity. This is assuming that electricity demand remains flat. If this is to be accomplished by 2050, then every 3 – 4 months, a new reactor will need to go on line.

If worldwide electricity demand were to increase, then the rate at which new reactors would need to be built would increase proportionally. If one considers the cost of bringing a nuclear reactor on line (several billion US dollar per reactor), the time taken from planning to actual operation (approximately 10 years), and – depending on the country – the infrastructure needed (such as high voltage lines), it is for all practical purposes impossible for nuclear power to solve the problem of global warming during this coming crucial decade, during which time we must go from increasing CO2 emissions to decreasing them.

2. Conservation and Energy Efficiency are Paramount

The most effective measures for reducing greenhouse gases are energy conservation and increased energy efficiency. The International Energy Agency (IEA), Japan’s National Institute for Environmental Studies and others state likewise in their reports9. Considering that the electricity sector, which is responsible for nearly 40 percent of world CO2 emissions, wastes a large portion of its energy, it is vitally important that this sector’s energy efficiency be improved.

In Japan, approximately 40 percent of primary energy is used to generate electricity. The efficiency of nuclear power plants does not exceed 35 percent. Even electricity production efficiency of the most up-to-date fossil fuel plants is only around 50 percent.

At present a large portion of the heat produced by electricity generation is thrown into the environment as waste heat. In other words, the majority of the energy used to produce electricity is wasted. In the case of nuclear power, the plants are by necessity built in locations far from areas with high electricity consumption. Therefore, there are also large transmission losses.

Compared to this type of massive, centralized electricity system, decentralized systems supply electricity on-site where it is needed. Energy losses in production and transmission can be minimized. If, in addition, cogeneration systems are employed, maximum use can be made of “waste heat” for heating, cooling, hot water and steam. The end result is that total energy efficiency is increased to over 80 percent. Thus energy conservation and significant CO2 emissions reductions can be achieved. In Denmark, already 50 percent of electricity and 80 percent of district heat is supplied by cogeneration plants10.

On the other hand, as we state below, because of its inherent nature, nuclear power actually impedes development of the most important measures to prevent global warming – energy conservation and energy efficiency – by entrenching a society which is wasteful in its use of energy.

3. Nuclear Power Runs Counter to Energy Conservation

Because nuclear reactors cannot adjust output readily, they cannot deal with the constantly fluctuating demand for electricity. Fossil fuel plants are the main means of dealing with these fluctuations. Hence, nuclear power plants and fossil fuel plants come in tandem.

Nuclear power also has structural problems stemming from the large amounts of electricity produced per unit. When demand is low, either seasonally or during the late night hours, electricity production exceeds demand. In order to consume this surplus electricity, in Japan additional facilities (for example pumped storage generation stations, which consume more electricity than they produce) and systems (such as late night lower electricity rates) have been put in place. The effect of these measures is to in fact increase electricity demand.

With nuclear power, because output per unit is very large, if a reactor is shutdown due to an accident or a scandal, this has an adverse effect on the stability of supply. Because electricity from nuclear power plants supplies large metropolitan and industrial areas, sudden shutdowns can cause economic and social disruption. Fossil fuel plants are built in order to assure an immediate supply of large quantities of replacement electricity.

As a result, in order to deal with fluctuations in demand and to supply back-up energy, if more nuclear power plants are installed, additional fossil fuel plants and other types of power plants will also be required. Since power companies are reluctant to waste these investments in additional facilities by keeping them closed or operating them below capacity, they promote schemes to increase demand for electricity, such as the “all electric” campaign for residential buildings.

For the above reasons, nuclear power does not help to conserve energy.

4. It is Impossible to Ensure the Reduction of CO2 Emissions with Nuclear Power

The capacity factor of Japan’s nuclear power plants is about 70 percent. However, the Japanese government calculates CO2 emissions reduction estimate based on the assumption that the capacity factor will rise to 88 percent11.

Nuclear power carries with it the latent risk of serious accidents. Therefore, if there is some kind of problem or accident at one reactor, it may be necessary for other reactors of the same model to be shutdown simultaneously for inspections12. The risk of accidents also increases if nuclear reactors are pushed to continue operation in order to achieve production efficiency targets13.

Because electricity supply shortages resulting from the shutdown of nuclear reactors are, for the most part, managed using fossil fuel plants, emissions of CO2 shoot up every time as an accident or incident takes place at any plant and the plant is shut 14. This actually happened between 2002 and 2003 in Japan, when a scandal involving falsification of inspection data at several of Tokyo Electric’s nuclear power plant units resulted in the shutdown of all of the utility’s 17 nuclear reactors. As a result, greenhouse gas emissions in Japan increased 4.8% during this period. Such unscheduled, long-term shutdowns have occurred time and again, and with the further aging of nuclear reactors, the frequency of such unscheduled shutdowns will no doubt increase15.

It now appears unlikely that Japan will be able to meet its commitment of decreasing its annual CO2 emissions by 6 percent, as promised under the Kyoto Protocol. Japan will not be able to attain a steady decrease in CO2 emissions as long as it depends on nuclear power in a major way to accomplish this reduction.

5. Expansion of Nuclear Power Aggravates Global Warming

According to an opinion poll undertaken in 2005 by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 76 percent of the Japanese public is opposed to building more nuclear power plants in Japan16. Because of the difficulties of building more nuclear reactors domestically, the Japanese nuclear industry is planning to go abroad to build nuclear reactors in developing countries, including countries in Asia. The Japanese government is actively supporting this by stating that it is “a response to global warming”17.

Under the Kyoto Protocol, reductions of CO2 emissions resulting from projects undertaken abroad can be counted as reductions in the emissions of the country investing in the project. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of the mechanisms adopted under the Kyoto Protocol. Nuclear power, however, is not regarded as a part of the CDM.

The Japanese government has decided on a policy to push for the inclusion of nuclear power projects under the CDM in the next round of the Kyoto framework18. By doing so, it hopes to encourage the domestic companies to invest in infrastructure for the export of nuclear power plants so as to create a favourable environment for nuclear industry to enter foreign markets.

However, the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries is nothing but the export of an inefficient energy system. Since nuclear power requires planning decades into the future, if energy policies that include nuclear power go ahead, it will be difficult to change this path, thus societies based on massive energy consumption will be created. This is exactly what Japan and other nations with nuclear power plants have already experienced. Also, as mentioned above, more adjustment and backup fossil fuel plants will have to be built.

The introduction of nuclear power to developing countries will not help to reduce greenhouse gases. What should be developed and disseminated instead are decentralized systems based on renewable energy sources.

2) Do you believe that accidents like the Chernobyl Accident (1986) and the Tokai Criticality Accident (1999) will never happen again?

Our View:

Even conservative risk assessments estimate that the probability of a core meltdown occurring is once every 4,000 reactor years19. Such a risk means that if there were 2,000 operating reactors in the world, there would be one core meltdown accident every two years. Of course, past accidents demonstrate that Probabilistic Risk Assessment is incapable of accurately assessing the risk of accidents20.

The big difference between accidents at nuclear facilities and other types of accidents is that the former involve the release of radioactivity. In general, the core of operating reactors can accumulate as much as 1,000 times the fission products released by the Hiroshima bomb.

Therefore, if an accident involving the release of large quantities of radioactivity were to occur, the damage that would be inflicted on people, the environment, society and the economy would be orders of magnitude larger.

The whole of the Northern Hemisphere was contaminated with radioactivity from the Chernobyl accident. It is thought that the number of people who suffered as a result of the accident exceeded 7 million21, but there is considerable variation in estimates of the number of cancer deaths22. The Chernobyl Forum estimated that only 4,000 people would die of cancer as a result of the accident23. One reason for this very low estimate was the extremely restricted target population. Greenpeace, for example, estimated that 93,000 would die of cancer as a result of the Chernobyl accident24.

In regard to the damage caused by this accident, you said, “If the dam burst, perhaps as many as a million people would be killed in the wave of water … Many think that tens of thousands if not millions died as a result of the Chernobyl accident. As we will see, it was no more than seventy-five.”25 In the first place, comparing the number of deaths resulting from the breach of a dam with the number resulting from a nuclear accident goes against scientific common sense. Secondly, it is not possible to assess the damage from an accident involving radioactivity from the number of cancer deaths alone. An increase in the rate of thyroid cancer amongst young people has been confirmed in the affected regions and a wide range of other physical and psychological impacts has been reported26. Furthermore, the survivors suffer from direct and indirect effects, which they will have to live with for the rest of their lives.

If there is an expansion of nuclear power, the risk of a serious accident like this occurring again somewhere in the world will increase. This is especially true for earthquake prone countries like Japan. To prevent ever more people becoming nuclear victims, we believe that energy policies must be changed. Policies must be chosen which do not make us dependent on nuclear energy.

3) How do you propose that low, medium and high-level radioactive waste, accumulated as a result of the operation of nuclear reactors, should be disposed of?

Our View:

Many developing countries will soon begin building up their energy systems in earnest. On the other hand, developed countries are approaching a period when they will have to replace aging buildings and power plants. Hence, the choices of energy systems and energy sources that are made now have great significance in the context of our response to global warming.

One of our reasons for not supporting nuclear energy as a viable energy choice is that the waste it produces is radioactive. When nuclear power plants end their operating lives, the buildings and equipment, including but not limited to the reactor itself, become huge piles of radioactive waste.

All countries that have introduced nuclear energy have postponed the problem of dealing with radioactive waste to a future date. For most countries there is no prospect that they will establish a disposal site for high-level waste (spent nuclear fuel and vitrified high-level waste) anytime soon. The method proposed in existing plans is geological disposal, but it will be millions of years before the radioactivity contained in the waste will decrease to the point where it can be said to be harmless. During that period, the possibility that massive earthquakes and upheavals will cause changes in the earth’s crust cannot be eliminated. There are also other dangers posed by contamination of ground water and the possibility of terrorism27.

Expanding nuclear power means generating more and more radioactive waste, which will be handed down as a legacy to future generations. We cannot consent to such an irresponsible “response to global warming”.

You have proposed disposing of high-level radioactive waste in tropical forests28. Tropical forests are the most biologically diverse places on earth and their ecosystems are extremely fragile. By absorbing carbon dioxide, they also help maintain the balance of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. It is inconceivable that a huge radioactive waste disposal facility could be built without destroying the surrounding forest. The destruction of the forest would probably actually exacerbate global warming.

4) What is your view on the dangers of nuclear proliferation and terror?

Our View:

The expansion of nuclear energy is one of the biggest threats to global security. You claim that nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are different29. However, if one looks at the history of the development of nuclear weapons, one sees that nuclear energy was a bi-product of nuclear weapons production. The basic principles, the ingredients and the processes are the same. What will happen if lots of countries introduce technology and equipment for nuclear power, train nuclear scientists and engineers and obtain large quantities of nuclear material? It is impossible to deny that nations and sub-national groups with the necessary specialist knowledge and skills and access to such equipment and material could make a nuclear weapon. The history of nuclear proliferation is testimony to this fact.

Not only plutonium and highly enriched uranium, but also materials such as low, medium and high-level radioactive waste can be used as weapons ingredients. Explosive devices containing radioactive materials are called “radiological weapons” or “dirty bombs”. They use conventional explosives to disperse radioactivity. Thus there is an inextricable link between the spread of nuclear power and the proliferation of nuclear and radiological weapons.

If nuclear power is expanded, safeguards and protection of nuclear materials must also be strengthened. This costs money and uses up human resources. Furthermore, it will no doubt be necessary to constrain human freedoms. Above all, it will be necessary to maintain a continual state of alert throughout the whole world for military or terror attacks aimed at nuclear facilities and nuclear materials30.

5) Are you aware that the overwhelming favouritism towards nuclear power is holding back the development and introduction of other alternative energy sources?

Our View:

You have said, “The nuclear industry can hardly afford pro-nuclear demonstrations and advertisements”, whereas “….the true costs [of renewable energy] have been hidden from the public by subsidies and the distortion of market forces through legislation.” 31 This is far removed from the true situation.

Governments and nuclear industry in countries which have introduced nuclear power go to great lengths to promote public acceptance of nuclear energy. One example of the scale of these efforts are the advertisements placed by the Japan Atomic Energy Relations Organization (JAERO) in all the major Japanese newspapers, in particular the full-page advertisement featuring your photograph and lecture.

It is also well known that countries which have introduced nuclear power have given it extremely favourable treatment. The Japanese government has placed nuclear power as national energy policy, poured vast amounts of taxpayers’ money into its research and development, and granted subsidies to regions which accept nuclear facilities. At the same time it has also borne the economic risks associated with nuclear power. The title of a Japanese policy document published in 2006 translates as “Nuclear Energy Nation-Building Plan”. This plan and the Basic Energy Plan, as amended in March 2007, indicate that nuclear power will receive even more favourable treatment in future.

As mentioned above, nuclear power cannot exist without a long-term plan. For this reason the extreme favouritism towards nuclear energy deprives energy planning of any flexibility. Development of renewable energy and decentralized energy system, which should by rights be the pillars of our response to climate change, are overwhelmed by this favouritism towards nuclear energy.

In 2004, for example, 64 percent of Japan’s budget for energy research and development went to nuclear energy. By contrast, renewable energy (commonly referred to as “natural energy” in Japan, but referred to as “new energy” by the government) received a mere 8 percent32.

6) You see fission energy as a provisional power source until fusion energy becomes practical. When do you predict that electricity produced from nuclear fusion will be supplied to national electricity grids?

Our View:

Neither uranium nor fossil fuels are inexhaustible resources. Consequently, countries which introduced nuclear power originally planned to reprocess spent nuclear fuel, extract the plutonium and burn it in fast breeder reactors. In this way, it was claimed, energy from nuclear fission could be used for thousands of years.

However, most countries have withdrawn from the reprocessing and fast breeder reactor path. This is because problems such as cost, technical difficulties, radioactive contamination, radioactive waste, the risk of nuclear proliferation, and so on are incomparably greater than if only uranium fuel is used.

Japan alone, under the name of “response to global warming”, has continued to pour huge sums of public money into research and development for this program33. Nevertheless, according to government estimates, the fast breeder reactor cycle will not replace light water reactors until next century at the earliest34. In the first place, it has not even been established that it is possible to breed plutonium effectively.

You speak as if electricity produced from nuclear fusion will, in the near future, be supplied to national grids35. If human beings wish to use fusion energy, they must induce a fusion reaction between two hydrogen isotopes, deuterium (2H) and tritium (3H) (the so-called “D-T reaction”). However, there is at present no material on earth capable of withstanding for any length of time the intense neutron radiation which accompanies this reaction. For the foreseeable future it will be impossible to build commercial scale fusion reactors, so there is no possibility that fusion will become a major source of energy. The only conceivable large-scale use of fusion energy is in thermonuclear weapons.

You also claim that fusion energy does not produce significant amounts of radioactive waste. In fact, large quantities of radioactive waste contaminated with tritium and other radionuclides will be produced36.

Fusion reactors and fast breeder reactors are no more than desk-top schemes. Wasting huge amounts of time and money developing such technologies actually obstructs the introduction of the radical measures for climate change required now.

7) You say that renewable energy is impractical. Please tell us why you think so.

Our View:

You say, “almost every engineering development … took about forty years to pass from open enthusiasm to widespread application in the first world” and reject renewable energy as “a romantic, impractical dream” 37.

In fact, renewable energy is now one of the fastest growing industries. For example, wind power has grown at a rate of over 30 per year for the last few years38.

Germany is the leader in the field. In the 1990s it passed legislation to broaden the market penetration of sustainable energy. This led to a wind power boom and by 2006 wind power had grown to 5 percent of total electricity supplied39. By 2020 the German government aims to increase this to 20 percent and to increase total renewable energy to 26 percent40. Judging from the record to date, attainment of these targets seems assured. The Germany’s Atomic Act stipulates phase out of nuclear power (currently 30 percent of electricity supply), but it is reasonable to expect that renewable energy and energy conservation will amply make up for this.

Examples of other countries which have increased the use of wind power by adopting similar policies to Germany include USA, Denmark., Spain and India. Thanks to this rapid market expansion, costs of wind power have fallen 20 percent in the last few years and in some countries it is already competitive with conventional electricity sources41.

Germany also passed Japan in cumulative installed capacity of solar power to become number one in the world in 2005. This was a result of policies promoting the introduction of renewable energy.

The cost of solar electricity systems is coming down as a result of large-scale production. According to the leading Japanese photovoltaics maker, residential solar power systems today are one third of the price that they were ten years ago42. If policies promoting the spread of such systems are introduced, it can be expected that the cost will fall further.

In addition, if the use of fuel cells spreads, the growth of micro-power, a key element of decentralized energy systems, will jump.

In Japan, however, which places nuclear power at the center of its response to climate change, the renewable energy obligation is now a tiny 1.35 percent of total electricity sales and the target for 2014 is just 1.63 percent43.

It is clear from the above that renewable energy is not impractical. It is utterly practical. The expansion of renewable energy is not a technical problem. It is a policy problem.

8) A safer and more reliable climate change response exists. Do you nevertheless believe that nuclear power is essential?

Our View:

The most effective ways to minimize climate change are energy conservation and the spread of renewable energy. These can be achieved through distributed energy systems. Since climate change was recognized as a real threat, renewable energy has been growing rapidly throughout the world, particularly in Europe. This is largely due to the fact that these technologies emit essentially no carbon dioxide, but it is also because they are superior to nuclear power in terms of cost and the time required to install them. They also have many other benefits, including increasing energy independence and promoting the development of local industry and employment.

You say that the success or failure of responses to global warming depends on how appropriately we make use of science and technology44. However, as argued above, the science and technology which should be used are not the massive scale science and technology represented by nuclear energy.

---

Footnotes:

1. Yomiuri Newspaper, 29 October 2006. Japan Atomic Energy Relations Organization (JAERO) advertisement. The original source is a Japanese translation of a keynote speech by Professor Lovelock at the Nuclear Energy Day symposium in 2006.

2. Yomiuri Newspaper, 29 October 2006.

3. Mainichi Newspaper, 11 September 2004.

4. Nuclear Policy Issues and Responses: Nuclear Power Nation Plan, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), 2007. See website of document in Japanese

Click to access zenntai.pdf

5. Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Summary for Policymakers), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), February 2007.

6. Energy Technology Perspectives 2006, International Energy Agency (IEA), 2006.

7. Mycle Schneider et al., ‘The World Nuclear Industry Status Report’, 2004

8. IEA, op.cit.,

9. IEA, op.cit., ‘Japan 2050–Scenario for a Low-Carbon Society: Examining Possibilities for 70% Reduction of Global Warming Gases’, National Institute for Environmental Studies (Japan), 2007, Energy [r]evolution, Greenpeace & European Renewable Energy Council (EREC), 2007.

10. Greenpeace and EREC, op.cit.,p21

11. ‘State of progress of specific measures and policies under the Plan for Achieving Kyoto Protocol Targets’, METI, 26 March, 2007.

12. In 2002, voluntary safety inspection data were found to have been falsified at three nuclear reactors of Tokyo Electric’s Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant. As a result, all 17 of Tokyo Electric’s nuclear power plants where shut down until May 2003 in order to undergo comprehensive inspections.

13. In August 2004, an accident at Kansai Electric’s Mihama Nuclear Power Plant Unit killed 5 and injured 6 workers. The accident occurred when a carbon steel pipe carrying hot water under high pressure burst. The utility was aware the pipe had not been inspected since start-up of the plant 28 years earlier, but had chosen to delay inspection until the next outage.

14. The rise in green house gases emissions due to unscheduled shutdown of nuclear power plants was 4.8% in 2003 and 2.8% in 2004. Data from Ministry of Environment (MoE) Japan, Central Environmental Council, Global Environment Committee, June 2006, and MoE data published 17 October 2006.

15. In March 2007, it was discovered that Hokuriku Electric had, in June 1999, covered-up an uncontrolled criticality accident due to control rod slippage. The accident took place during a periodic inspection (outage) at the Shika Unit 1 nuclear power reactor. Subsequently it was found that similar cover-ups of control rod slippage during outages had also occurred at Tokyo Electric, Tohoku Electric and Chubu Electric.

16. Global Public Opinion on Nuclear Issues and the IAEA Final Report from18 Countries, prepared for the International Atomic Energy Agency, GlobeScan Incorporated, 2005.

17. Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy, Japan Atomic Energy Commission, 2005.

18. New National Energy Strategy, METI, 2006.

19. NUREG/CR2497, NRC,1982．”One reactor year” signifies operation of one reactor for one year.

20. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), USA, had calculated the probability of the Space Shuttle Challenger encountering an explosion accident upon launch to be 10,000 to 1. The explosion occurred on the 25th launch.

21. Tetsuji Imanaka and Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC) (eds) , Reconsidering Chernobyl, CNIC, 2006, p20. Between 1,000 and 2,000 plant workers and firefighters were onsite at the time of the accident and “liquidators” numbered between 600,000 and 800,000. About 120,000 people within a 30-kilometer radius of the reactor were evacuated and 250,000 to 300,000 people have left the “most contaminated areas”. There are still 6 million people living in contaminated areas (more than 1 Curie/km2).

22. See for example, the following estimates; World Health Organization (2006): 9,000; International Agency for Research on Cancer (2006): 16,000; “Chornobyl+20: Remembrance for the Future” Conference in Kyiv (2006): 30,000~60,000; Greenpeace (2006): 93,000.

23. Chernobyl Forum was made up of the IAEA, WHO, several UN agencies and the governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine. Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-economic Impacts and Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, Chernobyl Forum, IAEA, September 2005, p. 10. A target population cancer death assessment was about 600,000, including emergency workers, residents of the “most contaminated areas” and evacuees from a 30-kilometer area surrounding the plant. But 5 million people residing in “other contaminated areas” were neglected.

24. The Chernobyl Catastrophe – Consequences on Human Health, Greenpeace International, 2006.

25. James Lovelock, The Revenge of Gaia (Penguin Books:2007), p127-128

26. Tetsuji Imanaka et.al., Multi-sided Approach to the Realities of the Chernobyl NPP Accident: Summing-up of the Consequences of the Accident Twenty Years After, research supported from the Toyota Foundation, 2006．

27. Due to concerns about nuclear terrorism, the USA, UK, Germany, and France include vitrified high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel under nuclear material to be safeguarded. Japan is also planning to include vitrified high-level radioactive waste under the same category.

28. James Lovelock, op.cit., p117.

29. Mainichi Newspaper, 13 May 2006

30. In Japan, based on the Civil Protection Law, training assuming an attack on a nuclear power plant is carried out in host regions. Israel, Iran and Iraq have attacked each others’ nuclear facilities.

31. James Lovelock, op.cit., p107.

32. Energy Policies of IEA Countries 2004 Review, IEA, 2006.

33. Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy, Japan Atomic Energy Commission, 2005. India, Russia and China also have fast breeder programs, but, unlike Japan, fast breeders are not central to the energy policies of these countries. Japan’s FY2007 budget for its fast breeder program was 40 billion yen. The budget for the five-year period FY2006-FY2010 is 250 billion yen.

34. The government does not expect the fast breeder cycle to be in place and supplies of natural uranium to cease to be necessary until after 2100.

35. James Lovelock, op.cit., p115.

36. Petition by Masatoshi Koshiba (Nobel Laureate, Physics) and Akira Hasegawa (James Clerk Maxwell Prize for Plasma Physics Recipient, former chair of the American Physical Society Division of Plasma Physics) urging the Japanese government not to push for siting of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) in Japan, 2003.

37. James Lovelock, op.cit., p108

38. Wind Force 12: A blueprint to achieve 12% of the world’s electricity from wind power by 2020, Greenpeace International, June 2005

39. Entwicklung der erneuerbaren Energien im Jahr 2006 in Deutschland,BMU,2006

40. Themenpapier: Windenergie, BMU,2006

41. Energy [r]evolution, Greenpeace, 2007.

42. Kouji Tomita, ‘Solar Energy Market’, a chapter in Energy Market of Renewables, edited by Tetsunari Iida (Tsukiji Shokan: 2005)

43. Special Energy Measures Act, METI, 2007.

44. JAERO advertisement, Yomiuri Newspaper, op.cit.

[For international release: February 28, 2007]
[Word version: 76KB]

Today the prime ministers of Japan and Russia are meeting in Tokyo. According to media reports, part of the negotiations will focus on a new nuclear agreement allowing Japanese nuclear material to be sent to Russia. It is planned that uranium extracted from spent nuclear fuel reprocessed in the UK and France will be enriched in Russia for use as nuclear fuel for Japanese nuclear power plants. Earlier this month, the Yomiuri Shimbun (1) and various Russian media (2)(3) reported that “Japan has entered into final negotiations that would see Russia enriching Japan’s uranium.

It is clear that the Russian uranium enrichment plant in Angarsk will serve as the main enrichment plant for such a deal, because the Rosatom, Russian nuclear agency, has announced that it is establishing a so-called “international center” for uranium enrichment at Angarsk. The aim of the center is to provide a guaranteed supply of uranium fuel for countries which do not enrich uranium themselves, including for countries under international sanctions such as Iran, India and others. Although Japan has an enrichment plant, the plant’s capacity is only a fraction of Japan’s total demand.

If a deal is signed between Japan and Russia, uranium extracted from Japanese spent fuel will be transported nearly 10,000 km to the Angarsk uranium enrichment plant near lake Baikal, a UNESCO World Heritage site. Transportation over such a long distance may become a target for terrorist attack, or cause transport accidents leading to large releases of radioactivity.

Uranium enrichment and the production of nuclear fuel result in enormous amounts of radioactive waste, which has to be stored and isolated from the environment permanently. According to Russian environmental groups, there is over 100,000 tons of radioactive waste already stored in Angarsk. The Russian nuclear industry has no plan for disposal of that waste. The waste is stored under the open sky in partly corroded containers and poses a threat of radioactive leakages. Such leakages may reach lake Baikal, contaminating the largest reservoir of non-salt water on Earth.

There are also concerns that Japan’s proposal to send uranium to Russia for enrichment could further undermine the international non-proliferation regime. Japan cannot be confident that Japanese nuclear material will not be diverted to Iran, or to other countries suspected of developing nuclear weapons. Russia traditionally uses its own resources (including down-blending of highly enriched uranium to the enrichment level of uranium fuel for light-water reactors) to meet its own demand. Uranium sourced from other countries is more likely to be exported. The inadequacy of IAEA safeguards in nuclear weapons states and Russia’s avowed determination to supply fuel for Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant are grounds for serious concern.

Local residents are totally opposed to the plan of establishing an international center for uranium enrichment and new enrichment contracts. Since December 2006, protests have been happening on a weekly basis. People are demanding that authorities withdraw from new enrichment contracts in order to stop the growth of radioactive waste stockpiles near the highly sensitive Baikal ecosystem. Both Japan and Russia must uphold democratic values and respect the wishes of the local residents. We call on both governments to withdraw from negotiations over enriching Japanese uranium in Russia.

Contact information:

Green Action:
+ 81-75-701-7223 or + 81-90-3620-9251
(Aileen Mioko Smith)
email: amsmith@gol.com
web: http://www.greenaction-japan.org/

Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center:
+ 81-3-5330-9520
(Philip White)
email: cnic@nifty.com
web: http://cnic.jp/english/

Ecodefense (Moscow, Russia):
+ 7-985-7766281 or 903-2997584
(Vladimir Slivyak)
email: ecodefense@online.ru
web: http://www.ecodefense.ru

---

References:

(1) Yomiuri Shimbun ”Nuclear fuel agreement mixed blessing”, 22 February 2007

(2) RIA Novosti ”Atomic power will be the theme of visit of Fradkov to Tokyo” 27 February 2007

(3) Newspaper “Vedomosti (together with Financial Times and Wall Street Journal)”, article ”Atomic power will be the theme of visit of Fradkov to Tokyo”, 27 February 2007

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30 November 2006
Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
Director General
International Atomic Energy Agency

Dear Director General ElBaradei:

We in the Japanese movement against nuclear weapons appreciate your tireless efforts against nuclear proliferation. We welcome you to Japan!

We are writing you to call your attention to a statement made by the president of JNFL (Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited) about the “unrealistic” IAEA MOX fuel conversion concept and urge you to clarify the IAEA’s position on this issue.

JFNL president Isami Kojima stated at the JNFL press conference in Aomori on the 24th of November that it is practically impossible to separate plutonium again from MOX fuel.*1 (This was in reference to the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.)

Mr. Kojima’s statement was in response to a question concerning the conversion times in TABLE 1. ESTIMATED MATERIAL CONVERSION TIMES FOR FINISHED Pu OR U METAL COMPONENTS in 3.13 Conversion time of the IAEA SAFEGUARDS GLOSSARY, 2001 Edition.

Mr. Kojima stated at the press conference:

“It might be possible in theory to peel apart the MOX fuel product again physically, but, practically speaking, it is impossible. It would involve all the facilities and end up redoing the reprocessing. However, when one looks at the facilities and the process, practically speaking it is impossible to separate out [plutonium] again from MOX fuel.”*2

We would appreciate greatly if you could clarify the position of the IAEA on this issue:

• Is TABLE 1 of the IAEA Safeguards Glossary unrealistic?
• Should we NOT worry about possible diversion or theft of MOX fuel since, according to the president of JNFL, it is “in reality impossible” to separate plutonium from MOX?

Yours sincerely,

Shingo FUKUYAMA
Secretary General,
Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs
(Gensuikin)

Hideyuki BAN
Co-Director,
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center

Aileen Mioko SMITH
Director,
Green Action

Jun HOSHIKAWA
Executive Director,
Greenpeace Japan

Hideyuki KOYAMA
Director,
Mihama-no-Kai

Akira KAWASAKI
Executive Committee,
Peace Boat

Contact address:
Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs (GENSUIKIN)
5F Sohyo-kaikan, Kanda-Surugadai Chiyoda-ku Tokyo 101-0062, Japan TEL:+81-3-5289-8224 FAX:+81-3-5289-8223

cc IAEA Board of Governors

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*1: Tooh Nippo newspaper of Aomori Prefecture, 25 November 2006.

*2: Record obtained from reporters who attended the press conference.)ess conference.)

Lessons the G8 Can Learn from Japan: the Nuclear Fuel Cycle is an Economic Failure Providing No Energy

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For Immediate Release: 14 July 2006
Contact: Philip White (CNIC) 03-5330-9520

Tokyo and Kyoto, Japan—-Japan has opportunistically jumped on President George Bush’s Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) bandwagon in the hope of aiding its troubled nuclear fuel cycle program and gaining recognition for Japan’s unique position as the only Non Nuclear Weapons State (NNWS) member of the Non Proliferation Treaty with access to the full nuclear fuel cycle.

It is difficult to imagine, however, that Japan could play a significant role in GNEP seeing that its own nuclear waste problems at home are in a prolonged state of crisis, and its fast breeder reactor and MOX (mixed plutonium uranium oxide) fuel use programs are plagued with delays.

Nevertheless, Kenji Kosaka, Japan’s Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), presented presented a document to US Department of Energy Secretary Bodmon on May 5th outlining five areas of research and development cooperation including collaboration on the design of a US nuclear recycling facility and joint development utilizing Joyo and Monju reactors.

However, on July 6th, when CNIC asked MEXT representatives about the May 5th statement it was told, “nothing concrete has been decided”. It was also told that there is no budget set aside for this proposal.

“When the G8 discusses the nuclear fuel cycle, it should bear in mind the lessons from Japan’s experience. Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle program has been under development in the name of ‘energy independence’ for half a century. However, not a single watt of electricity is being generated by it today. Despite spending several trillion yen (tens of billions of U.S. dollars) of ratepayer and taxpayer money, closing the Japanese fuel cycle has been an economic failure and a detriment to public safety,” stated Aileen Mioko Smith, director of Green Action.

Japan’s Rokkasho reprocessing plant, located in Aomori Prefecture in the north of Japan, is now undergoing “active testing” leading up to commercial operation scheduled for August 2007. The plant is slated to separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel for use in Japan’s nuclear reactors. At a cost of 2.3 trillion yen (about 20 billion U.S.) to ratepayers, it is said to be the most expensive plant ever built in the history of the world.

The Japanese government and utilities estimate that the total bill for choosing the reprocessing option and operating the Rokkasho reprocessing plant will be 19 trillion yen (about $160 billion U.S.), far more than disposing without reprocessing. The calculations are highly optimistic since it assumes the reprocessing plant will operate at full capacity. A second reprocessing plant will be needed for the spent fuel that Rokkasho cannot handle.

Other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle program fare no better. Scheduled to have started in 1999, the use of mixed plutonium-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel in commercial nuclear reactors is yet to begin.

The third pillar of Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle program is its fast breeder reactor program, which after 50 years of development has produced a grand total of 1 hour of electricity. Future prospects appear no brighter. The government’s current nuclear energy policy has the fast breeder commercialized by 2050, an astonishing 70 years behind the original schedule set in 1961.

Since Japan does not now have the capacity to reprocess all the spent fuel from its own nuclear reactors, it is stretching the imagination to think that it will ever have the capacity, under the GNEP plan, to reprocess spent fuel from overseas. And given the difficulty of finding a repository for Japan’s own high-level waste, it is inconceivable that there will be any volunteers to accept foreign waste.

Anticipating this problem, the Japanese government has already indicated that it will not take back spent fuel from overseas. This undermines Japan’s aspirations to the status of “fuel supplier nation”. We believe GNEP’s chances of success are zero in any case, but when aspiring fuel supplier nations pick and choose in this way, GNEP is exposed for the fraud that it is.

With a record like this, one would have thought that, rather than jumping on the GNEP bandwagon, the Japanese government would be looking for a way out of its nuclear fuel cycle program. Pursuing the elusive dream of “closed” nuclear fuel cycles, such as those promised by GNEP, will mire Japan and the US in a quagmire of higher nuclear power costs, increased plutonium surplus, and snowballing nuclear waste headaches.

The government hopes that GNEP will provide a lifeline for Japan’s ailing nuclear industry. However, it is far less clear that electric power companies share this enthusiasm. They are the ones who will have to sell any electricity produced by the reactors envisaged under GNEP and they are under no illusions about the likely price.

It is important to note that somewhere in all of this, the Japanese government has lost site of the fact that it is highly unlikely that GNEP could help provide the Japanese public with any substantive source of energy in any reasonable length of time.

Not only will GNEP not contribute to meeting the world’s energy demand, GNEP will not reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. It will not reduce the burden of radioactive waste produced by nuclear power plants. The money wasted on GNEP would be far better spent on sustainable alternatives to fossil fuels and nuclear power.

The Japanese government is not in a position to make a substantial contribution to GNEP’s purported aims. Rather, the government’s offer to cooperate with GNEP is opportunistic, cynical, and impractical. Like its contribution to the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq, its contribution to GNEP will be purely symbolic.

Japan should not participate in GNEP. Rather, it should address the problems nuclear power and the nuclear fuel cycle have created at home, and invest in non-nuclear alternatives—energy conservation, efficiency, and sustainable, renewable energy.

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For a more detailed commentary see: Global Nuclear Energy Partnership and Japan

10 July 2006
Statement by Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center and Green Action

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Japan has opportunistically jumped on President George Bush’s Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) bandwagon. Just when doubts were being expressed about the proliferation dangers of separating plutonium at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant in Aomori Prefecture, GNEP was like a gift from Uncle George.

The government is treating GNEP as a great opportunity to gain recognition of Japan’s unique position as the only Non Nuclear Weapons State (NNWS) member of the Non Proliferation Treaty with access to the full nuclear fuel cycle. Japan is the only NNWS with industrial scale facilities for both uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.

The government also hopes that GNEP will provide a lifeline for Japan’s ailing nuclear industry. The nuclear research establishment can scarcely conceal its delight and nuclear manufacturers, faced with shrinking sales each year, will be only too happy to pick up any contracts that come their way. However, it is far less clear that electric power companies share this enthusiasm. They are the ones who will have to sell any electricity produced by the reactors envisaged under GNEP and they are under no illusions about the likely price.

Somewhere in all of this, the Japanese government has lost site of the fact that it is highly unlikely that GNEP could help provide the Japanese public with any substantive source of energy in any reasonable length of time.

Even if the government is not inclined to look the GNEP gift horse in the mouth, we believe that before Japan makes any firm promises and commits any money, a more balanced assessment is required. The following brief analysis highlights some major problems that the government has not addressed.

Key components of GNEP

Though the details are far from clear, GNEP promises to develop the following:

• proliferation-resistant spent nuclear fuel reprocessing technologies;
• “advanced burner reactors” that can use plutonium mixed with other radioactive wastes as fuel;
• small-scale reactors suitable for developing countries; and
• nuclear fuel supply arrangements whereby a limited number of “fuel supplier nations” provide fuel services to “user nations” which forego the right to fuel cycle technology.

Spent fuel would be returned to the supplier countries for reprocessing. This “cradle-to-grave” fuel leasing approach is supposed to reduce the risk of proliferation and reduce the radioactive waste going to geological repositories. Researchers and NGOs in the US have already debunked these promises*1, so here we restrict ourselves to stating a few of the reasons why GNEP will not achieve what it claims.

The proliferation-resistance of the proposed new reprocessing technologies is based on the idea that plutonium will not be separated in pure form. It is claimed that by including other radioactive elements (referred to variously as transuranics or actinides) in the final product their radioactivity will act as a barrier to people who might wish to divert the plutonium to nuclear weapons. However, as explained by Kang and von Hippel*2, the radioactivity of the product will be well below the level the International Atomic Energy Agency considers to be “self-protecting”. Hence, these new reprocessing technologies cannot be said to be proliferation-resistant. GNEP offers no solution to the proliferation problems of reprocessing. Rather, by highlighting the dangers of the separation process currently used, the so-called “PUREX” process, GNEP confirms that the Rokkasho reprocessing plant is dangerous from the perspective of nuclear proliferation.

The proposed advanced burner reactors and small-scale reactors don’t exist yet and there are huge technological, safety and economic obstacles to be overcome. They will not be commercially viable for decades, if ever, and in the meantime the plutonium stockpile and the radioactive waste mountain continue to grow.

As for the idea of establishing a group of authorized fuel supplier nations (the US Department of Energy referred to them as a “consortium”, but a more honest label would be a “cartel”), it is hard to believe that the rest of the world will willingly subject itself to eternal dependence on a handful of privileged countries.

Japan’s offer of cooperation

Clearly GNEP is far from being a practical proposal promising a solution to the current pressing problems associated with nuclear energy and the nuclear fuel cycle. Nevertheless, the Japanese government is falling over backwards to appear supportive. A May 5th Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology document*3 outlined five areas of research and development cooperation:

1. joint collaboration on the design of a US nuclear recycling facility.
2. joint development of FR/FBR fuel utilizing Joyo and Monju.
3. joint development of structural material for streamlined, compact reactors.
4. joint development of major components (such as steam generator) for sodium-cooled reactors.
5. joint development of safeguards concepts for nuclear fuel recycling facility based on Japan’s experience.

(Note: The English translation includes “FR/FBR” in item 2, although no corresponding words appear in the Japanese version.)

Japan is already doing research in all of these areas. Rather than offering anything new, the government is hoping to gain recognition for its existing programs and to be part of the action in the massive long-term spending program that GNEP will entail. However, besides being very expensive and totally impractical, GNEP has other features which will inevitably prove to be indigestible for Japan.

The issue that will attract the broadest opposition is the “cradle-to-grave” approach to fuel supply. GNEP envisages fuel supplier nations taking back the spent fuel, reprocessing it and burning the plutonium and minor actinides in advanced burner reactors. Japan does not now have the capacity to reprocess all the spent fuel from its own nuclear reactors and it is stretching the imagination to think that it will ever have the capacity to reprocess spent fuel from overseas. However, even if the capacity problem could be solved, prefectural and local governments are unlikely to agree to accept spent nuclear fuel from overseas. GNEP is vague about what will happen to the waste from reprocessing foreign spent fuel, but it implies that the fuel supplier nations will also end up providing the final waste repositories. Given the difficulty of finding a repository for Japan’s own high-level waste, it is inconceivable that there will be any volunteers to accept foreign waste.

Anticipating this problem, the Japanese government has already indicated that it will not take back spent fuel from overseas. This undermines Japan’s aspirations to the status of “fuel supplier nation”. We believe GNEP’s chances of success are zero in any case, but when aspiring fuel supplier nations pick and choose in this way, GNEP is exposed for the fraud that it is.

Japan is promoting its fast breeder reactor program as an area of potential GNEP cooperation. There is an inherent contradiction in this. GNEP does not propose the use of fast breeder reactors. It talks about fast burner reactors. Breeder reactors are designed to “breed” plutonium in a blanket of uranium around the core. The plutonium produced in this way is “super weapons grade”, because of the very high percentage of the isotope of plutonium-239. Breeder reactors are therefore completely incompatible with non-proliferation. Other than the breeding component, the basic technology for fast breeders and fast burners is the same, but if GNEP is really set up to address proliferation concerns, the Japanese government will have to abandon its dream of nuclear power based on breeder reactors.

The government’s offer of cooperation involving the sodium-cooled fast reactors Joyo and Monju, both of which were designed to be breeder reactors, is a good illustration of the cynical way it is approaching GNEP. No doubt it hopes the US will relent and expand the scope of GNEP to include breeders. It would have been encouraged by President Bush’s remarks at a press conference during Prime Minister Koizumi’s recent visit to the US:

“We discussed…our contributions to some research and development that will help speed up fast breeder reactors and new types of reprocessing so that we can help deal with the cost of globalization when it comes to energy…” (White House, 29 June 2006)

The President might not understand the difference between “fast burner reactors”, as originally proposed for GNEP, and “fast breeder reactors”. However, if he does, then his comment is an early indication that Japan’s involvement in GNEP, far from strengthening the non-proliferation system, is more likely to further undermine any spurious non-proliferation claims that might be made for GNEP.

There are also other ways in which Japan’s involvement in GNEP will undermine the non-proliferation system. The Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enshrines discrimination between Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). Japan adds a further level of discrimination between nuclear fuel cycle states (NFCS) and non nuclear fuel cycle states (NNFCS). Japan’s involvement in GNEP will reinforce this discrimination. However, as Mohamed ElBaradei has repeatedly pointed out, the discrimination between NWS and NNWS is unsustainable. Likewise, discrimination between NFCS and NNFCS will be unsustainable. Japan’s defacto status as a NFCS is already generating envy overseas and experts have warned that operation of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant could undermine international efforts to discourage other countries from building their own reprocessing and enrichment facilities. The whole framework of GNEP ignores these basic obstacles.

Costs

Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle program has been under development in the name of “energy independence” for half a century. Where has it gotten Japan? Despite spending several trillion yen (tens of billions of dollars) of ratepayer and taxpayer money, closing the Japanese fuel cycle has been an economic failure and a detriment to public safety.

Japan’s Rokkasho reprocessing plant, located in Aomori Prefecture in the north of Japan, is now undergoing “active testing” leading up to commercial operation scheduled for August 2007. The plant is slated to separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel for use in Japan’s nuclear reactors. At a cost of 2.3 trillion yen (about 20 billion U.S. dollars) to ratepayers, it is said to be the most expensive plant ever built in the history of the world. The Japanese government and utilities estimate that the total bill for choosing the reprocessing option and operating the Rokkasho reprocessing plant will be 19 trillion yen*4 (about $160 billion U.S.), far more than disposing without reprocessing. Critics say it will cost far more. A second reprocessing plant will be needed for the spent fuel that Rokkasho cannot handle. This is estimated to raise costs to 43 trillion yen (about $375 billion U.S.).

Other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle program fare no better. Scheduled to have started in 1999, the use of mixed plutonium-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel in commercial nuclear reactors is yet to begin. With the exception of minor testing undertaken years ago, the program has to date produced no electricity. The third pillar of Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle program is its fast breeder reactor program, which after 50 years of development has produced a grand total of 1 hour of electricity. Future prospects appear no brighter. The government’s current nuclear energy policy has the fast breeder commercialized by 2050, an astonishing 70 years behind the original schedule set in 1961.

With a record like this, one would have thought that, rather than jumping on the GNEP bandwagon, the Japanese government would be looking for a way out of its nuclear fuel cycle program. Pursuing the elusive dream of “closed” nuclear fuel cycles, such as those promised by GNEP, will mire Japan and the US in a quagmire of higher nuclear power costs, increased plutonium surplus, and snowballing nuclear waste headaches.

Conclusion

GNEP will not reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. It will not reduce the burden of radioactive waste produced by nuclear power plants. Nor will it contribute to meeting the world’s energy demand. The money wasted on GNEP would be far better spent on sustainable alternatives to fossil fuels and nuclear power.

The PUREX process of separating plutonium from spent nuclear fuel, used at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, gives rise to serious proliferation risks. Likewise, there are serious proliferation risks associated with fast breeder reactors, including the Monju prototype fast breeder reactor. These risks are in addition to the safety and radioactive waste risks associated with the Rokkasho reprocessing plant and Monju.

The Japanese government is not in a position to make a substantial contribution to GNEP’s purported aims. Rather, the government’s offer to cooperate with GNEP is opportunistic, cynical, and impractical. Like its contribution to the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq, its contribution to GNEP will be purely symbolic.

Demands

1. The Japanese government should withdraw its opportunistic, cynical, and impractical offer to cooperate with GNEP and engage in a public debate about the proliferation, safety and radioactive waste problems arising from its nuclear fuel cycle policies. Unlike the deliberations of the Atomic Energy Commission’s Nuclear Policy-Planning Council, which led to the production of the Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy, a process should be established in which serious problems are debated honestly and scientifically. Conclusions should not be reached on the basis of pre-rigged numbers on committees, but on the basis of the merits of the arguments.
2. Active testing of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant should be stopped.
3. Japan’s fast breeder program, including moves to restart the Monju prototype fast breeder reactor, should be stopped.

Hideyuki BAN
Co-Director,
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center

Aileen Mioko Smith
Director,
Green Action

Contacts:
Aileen Mioko Smith (Director, Green Action) 81-75-701-7223
Hideyuki Ban (Co-Director, CNIC) 81-3-5330-9520
Philip White (International Liaison Officer, CNIC) 81-3-5330-95220

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*1. The following is a selection of references debunking the claims of GNEP (including articles published before GNEP was announced).

“Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Reactors, Extracting Plutonium from Nuclear Reactor Spent Fuel Would Increase Risk of Terrorists Acquiring Nuclear Weapons and Exacerbate Nuclear Waste Problem”, Union of Concerned Scientists

“The limited proliferation-resistance benefits of the nuclear fuel cycles being researched by the Department of Energy’s Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative,” June 08, 2005, by Jungmin Kang and Frank von Hippel, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University

“Is U.S. Reprocessing Worth The Risk?” Arms Control Today, Steve Fetter and Frank N. von Hippel, September 2005

“Fast Reactors: Unsafe, Uneconomical, and Unable to Resolve the Problems of Nuclear Power”, Public Citizen

The Nuclear Alchemy Gamble: An Assessment of Transmutation as a Nuclear Waste Management Strategy, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, August 25, 2000
summary available at “Waste Transmutation: The Nuclear Alchemy Gamble”

*2 Ibid., Kang and von Hippel

*3 “MEXT’s Proposal of Cooperation areas in GNEP”, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, May 5, 2006

*4 “Japanese Nuclear Industry’s Back End Costs”

“In November [2003] the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan　stated that total back-end costs amount to about 19 trillion yen (18.8　trillion). This includes the construction, operation, repair, dismantling and waste management of Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, plus the MOX plant and the transport, storage and disposal of radioactive waste returned from overseas…The total cost calculations for the plant are based on it operating for 40 years from 2006 then taking 32 years to dismantle. In total, the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant alone consumes 11 trillion yen, or 60% of the total back-end costs.”）

10 July 2006
Japan's nuclear fuel cycle program has been under development since 1956. Despite several trillion yen (tens of billions of dollars) of ratepayer and taxpayer money spent, the program fails to provide any electricity to the public.

Japan's nuclear fuel cycle program is comprised of the development of fast breeder reactor technology, use of mixed (plutonium and uranium) oxide fuel in commercial nuclear power plants, and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. None of these have attained commercial-scale use.

The Fast Breeder Reactor Program

Japan's fast breeder reactor (FBR) program begun under Japan's Long-Term Program for Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy (LTP) was originally scheduled to attain commercialization in the 1970's. So far the date for commercialization has been postponed 7 times. Present plans under the Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy is to “strive for the commercial use of FBRs from around 2050,“ a 70-year delay from the original plan.1

The fast breeder reactor development program has so far produced only one hour of electricity. This occurred on August 29,1995 when Monju, the prototype fast breeder reactor (located in Fukui prefecture) generated electricity for an hour at 5% output.2 Monju had a sodium leak and fire accident 3 months later on December 8, 1995 and has been shutdown since then. The reactor is being refurbished and re-start is scheduled for spring of 2008.

To date about 1 trillion yen (about $9 billion U.S.) of taxpayer and ratepayer money has been spent on the fast breeder reactor development program.

No design or site has been selected for the demonstration fast breeder reactor.

Year of LTP Planned date of Commercial Implementation of FBR

1956———-
1961———-1970's
1967———-1985-90
1972———-1985-95
1978———-1995-2005
1982———-Around 2010
1987———-Around 2020's – 2030's
1994———-By around 2030
2000———-(No date specified)
20053———From around 2050

Japan's Mox Fuel Program For Lwr's

Scheduled to have started in 1999, the use of mixed plutonium-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel in commercial nuclear reactors (light water reactors) is yet to begin. With the exception of minor testing undertaken years ago, the program has to date produced no electricity.

There is considerable opposition to the MOX program both locally and nationally. In 2002 the governors of Fukushima and Niigata prefectures rescinded their prior approval for MOX fuel use at Tokyo Electric's nuclear power plants in their prefectures. Kansai Electric, the second largest utility in Japan has failed twice to go forward with its program, once due to a scandal in 1999 involving quality control data falsification by the British MOX fuel fabricator BNFL, and a second time in 2004, due to rupture of a secondary steam pipe at the utility's Mihama Unit 2 nuclear power plant involving death and injury of workers.

So far, only two prefectures are approving use of MOX fuel.

Commercial Scale Reprocessing

Japan's Rokkasho reprocessing plant, located in Aomori Prefecture in the north of Japan, is now undergoing “active testing“ leading up to commercial operation scheduled for August 2007. The plant is slated to separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel for use in Japan's nuclear reactors. At a cost of 2.3 trillion yen (about 20 billion U.S.) to ratepayers, it is said to be the most expensive plant ever built in the history of the world.

Choosing the reprocessing option and operating the Rokkasho reprocessing plant will cost 19 trillion yen (about $160 billion U.S.), far more than disposing without reprocessing.4 Critics say it will cost far more.

A second reprocessing plant will be needed for the spent fuel that Rokkasho cannot handle. This is estimated to raise costs to 43 trillion yen (about $375 billion U.S.).

Continuing the reprocessing program will mire Japan in a quagmire of higher nuclear power costs, increased plutonium surplus, and snowballing nuclear waste headaches.

Rokkasho's operation constitutes a violation of Japan's 1997 pledge to the IAEA not to accumulate a plutonium surplus.5 Japan already has over 42 tons of separated plutonium stockpiled in Europe and Japan, so any additional plutonium separated at Rokkasho is not needed and will continue to accumulate on site for years.

Public Opposition And Safety Concerns

Besides the problem of nuclear proliferation, Japan's nuclear program poses a safety and environmental problem.

In Fukui prefecture where the Monju prototype reactor is located, primarily out of safety concerns, nearly a quarter of the region's population has signed a petition seeking that the reactor never be operated again.

According to a survey by Aomori prefecture where the Rokkasho reprocessing plant is located, 81.6% of its population is uneasy (feels anxious about the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear power facilities in the prefecture.6

Aomori is a major agricultural and marine products producer. In February of this year the prefecture announced that radiation levels in the region's rice will rise to twice the present background level with Rokkasho reprocessing plant operation. Levels in seaweed would increase 2000 times. Major supermarkets in central Japan have said they won't buy the products even if contamination levels are low.

Repeated technical bungling by Rokkasho's owner-operator, Japan Nuclear Fuel, Ltd. since the start of testing, has resulted in the Japanese government, the Aomori governor, and the Aomori legislature coming down hard on the company. A special legislative session will be held shortly, solely on JNFL-generated woes.

In Iwate prefecture just south of Aomori, 15 municipalities have petitioned Aomori prefecture because of safety and environmental concerns about the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.

There is considerable citizen opposition to the MOX fuel utilization plan in LWRs. One of the issues involves safety concerns about Japanese utilities intending to load one-quarter of the core with MOX fuel to high burn up levels without undergoing testing at the same or equivalent reactors.

Of the four significant nuclear accidents in Japan during the past decade, three–including one that required evacuation of the public–were at nuclear fuel cycle facilities. In short, the nuclear fuel cycle is giving a bad name to Japan's entire nuclear power program.

Economic

According to its current balance sheet, the owner operator of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, Japan Nuclear Fuel, Ltd. is 2.5 trillion yen (about $10 billion U.S.) in debt.7

Can Japan Cooperate In GNEP?

GNEP could have a significant impact on Japan's fuel cycle policy, and raises serious questions about the proliferation risks associated with Japan’s fuel cycle program. For example, the reprocessing used at Rokkasho is considered a proliferation risk under GNEP. GNEP also appears to recognize the proliferation risks associated with the fast “breeder“ reactors that Japan is developing as well. The technology breeds weapons-grade plutonium as it operates.

GNEP proposes that “fuel supplier states“ will reprocess other countries' spent fuel, but Japan does not have the capacity to reprocess all its own spent fuel, let alone take on any fuel from overseas. Since the Japanese government cannot even secure a site for Japanese highly radioactive reprocessing waste, even if the domestic reprocessing capacity problem were solved, Japanese prefectures and local governments will oppose the import of foreign fuel.

GENP also has serious implications the financially strained Japanese electric utilities can ill afford. The Japanese government is not in a position to make a substantial contribution to GNEP's purported aims. Like its contribution to the “coalition of the willing“ in Iraq, its contribution to GNEP will be purely symbolic— a house of cards.

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Footnotes

1.

Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy (Tentative Translation), October 11, 2005, Japan Atomic Energy Commission, p.29.

2.

PNC, August 29, 1995.

3.

The Long Term Program for Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy was renamed the framework for nuclear Energy Policy in 2005.

4.

The 19 trillion yen cost was submitted by the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPCO) to the Subcommittee to Study Costs and other Issues of the Electricity Industry Committee of the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy. (2005). It is the amount required to operate the Rokkasho reprocessing plant for 40 years, including MOX manufacture. The Rokkasho reprocessing plant is to reprocess 32,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel. A second reprocessing plant is not taken into account in this cost calculation. Consideration of a second reprocessing plant is scheduled to begin in 2010. Operations are scheduled to begin before the current Rokkasho reprocessing plant stops in 2045. Size and amount to be reprocessed is not yet decided.

5.

Statement submitted by the Japanese -government to the IAEA. In 1997.

6.

Poll undertaken by Aomori prefecture September 25 – October 14, 2003.

7.

JNFL financial report of assets and liabilities, March 31, 2006.

[Translated from Japanese] [March 13, 2006]

To: Mr. Toshihiro Nikai
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry

As stated in the enclosed 9 March letter from Dr. Edwin Lyman (Union of Concerned Scientists) and Professor Frank von Hippel (Princeton University) to Aomori Governor Shingo Mimura, there are points that cannot be supported by facts in the explanation given by the Japanese Government to the six US Democratic members of Congress including Edward Markey, and to Aomori Prefecture. This concerns the international implications for nuclear proliferation of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. I therefore request that you take the following action before beginning active tests at the plant:

1. Provide a detailed technical account of why METI believes that MOX is far less useable for making nuclear weapons than pure plutonium oxide.
2. Show in graph form the year-by-year accumulated plutonium inventory at the Rokasho reprocessing in order to explain how the plutonium that is to be accumulated.if and when its separation begins will be consumed based on the power companies’ utilization plans.
3. Explain how Japan justifies the logical inconsistency of commencing reprocessing at Rokkasho using the PUREX method which has nuclear proliferatoion risks, while supporting GNEP which is critical of the PUREX method. The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) initiative maintains that since the PUREX (plutonium-uranium extraction) reprocessing method (the method used at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant) is accompanied by high nuclear proliferation risks, it aims to develop new methods including UREX plus (uranium extraction +) .

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Jungmin KANG, Ph.D.
Independent Nuclear Policy Analyst (August 2002 -Present). Advisor on nuclear energy policy, PresidentialCommission on Sustainable Development, Republic of Korea. Visiting Research Fellow at Princeton University (1999-2000). Associate of Nautilus Institute.

130-dong, 504-ho
Seoul National University
Shilim-dong, Kwanak-go
Seoul 151-742
Republic of Korea

[Translated from Japanese] [March 13, 2006]

METI officials responded along the following lines to the demands of Dr. Kang and five Japanese organizations. They promised to consider providing a written response to demands 1 through 3.

Response to 1:

Mr. Shinichi Mizumoto, Planning Officer (responsible for international nuclear energy issues), Nuclear Energy Policy Division, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, METI:

The MOX issue is only one aspect of the holistic measures which consist of safeguards, physical protection, etc. We object to it being taken up independently. Since precautions are taken to prevent theft, I cannot respond to the question regarding the different degree of concern between MOX and plutonium oxide in the case of theft. Since we ensure that it won’t be stolen, the question “what if it is stolen” doesn’t arise. We do not have any arguments against the views in the IAEA Safeguards Glossary.
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/NVS3_prn.pdf

Response to 2:

Mr. Takuto Miyamoto, Chief Official, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Industry Division, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, METI:

It is up to the companies to decide whether they will first use the plutonium held in Europe or the plutonium separated at Rokkasho. This is not something for the government to dictate. The concept of surplus plutonium is not a quantitative one.

[The question was posed, “METI would not call the plutonium surplus even if it increases to 100 tons, or 200 tons, or 300 tons, as the power companies say they will use it eventually?”]

As long as there is a utilization plan, it is not surplus. But this shouldn’t be interpreted to mean that it would not be considered surplus even if it reached 10,000 tons.

Response to 3:

Mr. Shinichi Mizumoto, Planning Officer (responsible for international nuclear energy issues), Nuclear Energy Policy Division, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, METI:

Japan is also doing research into new reprocessing technologies, so there is no inconsistency.

Response regarding the reply to Congressman Markey, et al.:

Mr. Shinichi Mizumoto, Planning Officer (responsible for international nuclear energy issues), Nuclear Energy Policy Division, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, METI:

The Ambassador has replied to Congressman Markey, et al. You have therefore addressed your demands to the wrong place.

[Akira Kawasaki, Co-Director of Peace Boat, who attended the meeting with METI stated the Ambassador’s reply was not considered adequate. (Peace Boat is one of the five organizations having submitted the demands to METI.)]

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Translated by Kakujoho, Green Action, and Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center.