May 23, 2009
Saga, Japan
MOX Fuel Shipment Arrival Protest
Genkai Nuclear Power Plant

Citizens oppose arrival of Pacific Pintail and Pacific Heron carrying
20 assemblies of MOX fuel from France to Japan

Photo Credit: Saga Hyakunen-no-Kai

Saga Citizens and Consumer Organizations Protest Arrival of MOX Fuel Shipment

Japan Should Terminate MOX (plutonium and uranium)
Fuel, and Rokkasho Reprocessing Programs

For immediate release: May 23, 2009
Contact:
Aileen Mioko Smith(Green Action) +81-90-3620-9251
Philip White (Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center) +81-3-3357-3800

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May 23rd (Tokyo and Kyoto)—Today, at 6:45 am, amidst citizen protest, the British-flagged vessels the Pacific Pintail and Pacific Heron arrived at the port of Kyushu Electric’s Genkai Nuclear Power Plant and unloaded 20 assemblies of MOX fuel for Genkai Unit 3. The nuclear power plant is scheduled to be the first to use MOX fuel on a commercial scale in Japan. The plan is that the fuel will be loaded during the plant’s outage that begins this August. If everything goes according to plan, this will start Japan’s beleaguered MOX fuel utilization program (called the “pluthermal” program).

About 100 Saga citizens and members of the large consumer food cooperative Green Coop of Kyushu, bearing banners reading “STOP MOX” and shouting “No Pluthermal in Saga!” and “Don’t make Saga a Waste Dump!” were at the wooded peninsula where the Genkai plant is located, at the tip of Saga prefecture. They met with Saga Prefecture, Genkai Town, and Kyushu Electric to protest the arrival of the MOX fuel.
The ships first arrived in Japan on May 18th at the Omaezaki port in Shizuoka Prefecture from France, loaded with MOX fuel containing 1.7 metric tons of weapons-usable plutonium in 69 assemblies. These assemblies were fabricated for Chubu Electric’s Hamaoka Unit 4 in Shizuoka prefecture (28 assemblies), Genkai Unit 3 (20 assemblies), and Shikoku Electric’s Ikata Unit 3 in Ehime prefecture (21 assemblies). The ships had also been met with citizen protest at the Omaezaki port

“The MOX fuel use program is part of Japan’s failed plutonium program. Use of MOX fuel has already been proven in France to increase rather than decrease plutonium surplus. The pluthermal program would just make Japan’s stockpile problem worse. Japan should terminate its MOX use program, and shut the Rokkasho reprocessing plant which would also only increase Japan’s plutonium stockpile.” said Aileen Mioko Smith of Green Action and Hideyuki BAN, Secretary General of Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center. (Japan already has 47 tons of plutonium: 38 tons in France and Britain, and about 9 tons in Japan.

The pluthermal program is supposed to “consume” some of this plutonium.)

Earlier, on May 10th, Saga citizens held a rally protesting Kyushu Electric’s MOX fuel program. Saga citizens now aim to gather 400,000 signatures from prefectural citizens (Saga’s total population: 850,000) by the end of August. The petition is directed to governor Yasushi Furukawa and seeks the end to the MOX fuel program.
On May 18th, a total of 420 citizen, consumer, peace, and professional organizations from every prefecture in Japan submitted a petition to the Japanese government stating the pluthermal program forces MOX spent fuel waste onto the prefectures. (Currently, there is no destination for spent MOX fuel.)

To date, virtually none of the plutonium shipped from Europe to Japan, either in the form of plutonium dioxide or MOX fuel, has actually been used. A total of approximately 2.5 tons had been shipped (between 1984 and 2001), of which only about 30kg has been used (in Monju in 1995 before the prototype reactor had a sodium lead and fire accident).

Japan’s MOX fuel utilization program was to start in 1999. However, a quality control data falsification scandal, local citizen referendum, falsification of nuclear power plant inspection data, and a nuclear accident have delayed the program.

In April 2009, a report commissioned by 70 nuclear free local authorities in the UK found that the Pacific Pintail and Pacific Heron have serious design flaws.

It was reported on May 19th that the Pacific Heron had developed problems in one of its engines during the voyage but was able to continue using another independent engine. (No further details are known at the time of this writing.)

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Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho
Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8203
Tel：+81-75-701-7223 Fax：+81-75-702-1952
Cell: +81-90-3620-9251
amsmith@gol.com

Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center
Akebonobashi Co-op 2F-B, 8-5 Sumiyoshi-cho,
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 162-0065, Japan
Tel: +81-3-3357-3800 Fax: +81-3-3357-3801
cnic@nifty.com

For further information on the MOX fuel shipment see:
Green Action website: MOX Fuel Shipment – Issues and Controversies
http://www.greenaction-japan.org/modules/wordpress0/index.php?p=68

Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center website, MOX and Pluthermal page:
http://cnic.jp/english/topics/cycle/MOX/index.html

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Saga Citizens and Consumer Organizations Protest Arrival of MOX Fuel Shipment
Japan Should Terminate MOX (plutonium and uranium)Fuel, and RokkashoReprocessing Programs
Download PDF version (336KB)

Japan Should Terminate MOX (plutonium and uranium)
Fuel Program, Cease All Shipments from Europe

Japan Should Terminate Fast Breeder Reactor and Reprocessing Programs

For immediate release: May 18, 2009
Contact:
Aileen Mioko Smith (Green Action) 090-3620-9251
Philip White (Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center) +81-3-3357-3800

“We call on the Japanese government and electric utilities to terminate this and future MOX fuel shipments and cease from placing en route countries at risk. We call on countries potentially on the route of future MOX fuel shipments to join us in demanding the termination of these dangerous shipments” stated BAN Hideyuki, secretary-general of Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC), Aileen Mioko SMITH, executive director of Green Action, and HOSHIKAWA Jun, executive director of Greenpeace Japan. Regional organizations which have protested past Japanese nuclear shipments include CARICOM (Caribbean Community), ACP(African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, SIDS (Small Island Developing States), and PIF (Pacific Islands Forum).

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May 18, Tokyo, Japan ― Today, May 18 2009, two British-flagged vessels, the Pacific Pintail and Pacific Heron arrived in Japan from France carrying 1.7 metric tons of weapons-usable plutonium contained in 69 assemblies of MOX (mixed plutonium and uranium oxide) fuel. This is the world’s largest shipment of plutonium ever undertaken.

The MOX fuel, made from plutonium separated from Japanese spent fuel shipped to France for reprocessing, is to be used at the nuclear power plants of three Japanese electric utilities: Kyushu, Chubu, and Shikoku Electric Power. Fuel assemblies were delivered today to the Hamaoka Unit 4 plant of Chubu Electric. The ships will continue on to the Ikata Unit 3 plant in Ehime Prefecture and the Genkai Unit 3 plant in Saga Prefecture to deliver the remaining assemblies.

More shipments from France to more plants are scheduled to follow. Japanese nuclear power plants are designed to use uranium fuel, not MOX fuel.

MOX fuel shipments are unsafe and trample on the right of en route countries to protect their citizens and environment

On March 18th, Eni F.H. Faleomavaega (member of US Congress from the Territory of American Samoa) in a statement made on the floor of the US House of Representatives protested this latest MOX fuel shipment, stating, “This latest shipment of MOX fuel complements earlier shipments of spent fuel, about 170, from Japan to Europe. As usual, plans for this latest shipment, the largest so far, was covered in shrouds of secrecy without prior consultation or notification of en-route states. Yet, any accident involving the ships or their cargo could have catastrophic consequences on the environment and the population of en-route states. Moreover, with the increasing threat of piracy, the transported plutonium MOX fuel could easily fall in the hands of terrorists…”

Faleomavaega continues, “This unnecessary and unjustifiable shipment provides another example of the unacceptable risks and adverse impact the use of nuclear power and nuclear materials have on the environment and the lives of those involved. It demonstrates once again the imperialistic behavior of some major countries at the expense of others…. Europe, Japan and all nuclear states, should keep their nuclear materials and waste in their own backyard, and not endanger the lives of others.”

In April 2009, a report commissioned by 70 nuclear free local authorities in the UK found that the British-flagged vessels the Pacific Pintail and Pacific Heron have serious design flaws. The Pacific Pintail (built in 1987) is still operating despite having been built to the same design and construction standards as predecessor vessels decommissioned or scrapped following discovery of “run away” corrosion. The Pacific Heron (built in 2008) has only small modifications from the original design of earlier ships. Available details of these modifications do not describe measures to prevent “run away” corrosion.

The report found both the Pacific Pintail and Pacific Heron are vulnerable to build-up of gas or moisture in their double-skinned hulls and “run away corrosion.” The shippers boast that the ships are double-hulled, where in fact 40% of each vessel is only single-skinned hull. The study also found that claims that the ships are unsinkable “lack scientific and technical credibility.” Moreover, emergency plans for coping with accidents are non-existent.

The Pacific Pintail and Pacific Heron should never again be used for shipping MOX fuel.

Japan’s plutonium utilization program should be terminated

This MOX fuel shipment is part of Japan’s failed plutonium program. Originally begun in 1956, the program was to commercialize the fast breeder reactor by around 1970. The breeder development program is now 80 years behind schedule, with commercialization set for “around 2050.” A commercial reprocessing plant was to be operational at Rokkasho by 1989, but has been delayed 16 times.

Both the fast breeder program and reprocessing program are in dire straits. There is now no date set for re-starting Monju, the prototype fast breeder reactor shutdown since a sodium fire accident in 1995, and the project is facing organizational collapse. The Rokkasho reprocessing plant faces serious problems with its high-level waste vitrification facility and may never successfully operate.

Japan has built up tons of surplus plutonium in the meantime, and MOX fuel utilization in Japanese commercial reactors is Japan’s attempt to consume some of that surplus plutonium, originally intended for the fast breeder reactor program. (Japan’s plutonium surplus now stands at 38 tons of Japanese plutonium in France and the UK, and around 9 tons in Japan.) France’s attempt to reduce its own stockpile of plutonium by using MOX fuel in its commercial nuclear power plants should serve as an example of how this program fails. The program increased rather than decreased France’s plutonium surplus.

Japan’s MOX fuel utilization program was to start in 1999. However, a quality control data falsification scandal, local citizen referendum, falsification of nuclear power plant inspection data, and a nuclear accident have delayed the program. Facing adamant local citizen opposition, the government’s response was not to terminate the program but to implement coercive measures by jacking up subsidies, thus making it nearly impossible for local authorities to refuse the program.

Instead of terminating the failed fast breeder and reprocessing programs, the Japanese government’s response was to elevate these failed projects to programs “central to the nation’s technological development.” The MOX fuel program is a by-product necessary for shoring up these failed programs.

Citizens Protest MOX Program

Citizens protested the arrival of the MOX shipment in Omaezaki today. Protests were also held in Shizuoka and Saga on May 10. Aerial photos of a “No MOX” message formed by people at the protest in Saga are available on the following URL: http://www.greenaction-japan.org/modules/entop2/

Citizen, consumer, and peace groups from every prefecture in Japan today submitted a petition to the Japanese government in opposition to the MOX fuel program and met with government officials from METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry), the Atomic Energy Commission, and MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology), stating the program forces nuclear waste onto the prefectures.

Hideyuki Ban
Co-Director
Citizens Nuclear Information Center

HOSHIKAWA Jun
Executive Director
Greenpeace Japan

Aileen Mioko SMITH
Executive Director
Green Action

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Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center
Akebonobashi Co-op 2F-B, 8-5 Sumiyoshi-cho,
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 162-0065, Japan
Tel: +81-3-3357-3800 Fax: +81-3-3357-3801
cnic@nifty.com

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho
Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8203
Tel：+81-75-701-7223 Fax：+81-75-702-1952
Cell: +81-90-3620-9251
amsmith@gol.com

Greenpeace Japan
NF bldg 2F 8-13-11 Nishi-Shinjuku
Shinjuku-ku Tokyo 160-0023
Tel：+81-3-5338-9800 Fax：+81-3-5338-9817

For further information on the MOX fuel shipment see:
Green Action website: MOX Fuel Shipment ― Issues and Controversies
http://www.greenaction-japan.org/modules/wordpress0/index.php?p=68

Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center website, MOX and Pluthermal page:
http://cnic.jp/english/topics/cycle/MOX/index.html

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Citizens Protest Japanese MOX Shipment: Joint Statement by CNIC, Green Action and Greenpeace Japan
Japan Should Terminate MOX (plutonium and uranium) Fuel Program,
Cease All Shipments from Europe
Japan Should Terminate Fast Breeder Reactor and Reprocessing Programs
Download PDF version (520KB)

Japan’s Plutonium Program

MOX Fuel Shipment 2009: Issues and Controversies

MOX Fuel Shipment 2009: Issues and Controversies
Presented to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan
by Aileen Mioko Smith (Executive Director of Green Action)
Download PDF version (4.3 MB)

Japan’s Failed Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Japan’s Failed Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Presented to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan
by Hideyuki Ban, Co-Director, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center(CNIC)
Download PDF version (270 KB)

The text accompanying Hideyuki Ban’s presentation:
Japan’s MOX Program and Nuclear Proliferation

11 May 2009

STATEMENT BY JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS
CONSEQUENCES OF JAPAN-RUSSIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin will arrive in Tokyo today. During his visit he will meet Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso. According to media reports, they may sign a new nuclear cooperation agreement between the two countries. The agreement will allow Japanese nuclear material to be sent to Russia.

Japan and Russia have for several years been considering the possibility of extracting uranium from spent nuclear fuel reprocessed in the UK and France and re-enriching it in Russia. The re-enriched uranium could be used in nuclear fuel for Japanese nuclear power plants, but there have also been suggestions that nuclear fuel containing Japanese uranium could be exported to third countries.

It is clear that the Russian uranium enrichment plant in Angarsk will serve as the main enrichment plant for such a deal. Russia is establishing a so-called “international center” for uranium enrichment at Angarsk. The aim of the center is to provide a guaranteed supply of uranium fuel for countries which do not enrich uranium themselves, including for countries under international sanctions such as Iran.

If a deal opening the way for reprocessed uranium to be re-enriched is signed between Japan and Russia, uranium extracted from Japanese spent fuel could be transported nearly 10,000 km to the Angarsk uranium enrichment plant near lake Baikal, a UNESCO World Heritage site. Transportation over such a long distance may become a target for terrorist attack, or cause transport accidents leading to large releases of radioactivity.

Uranium enrichment and the production of nuclear fuel result in enormous amounts of radioactive waste, including depleted uranium, which has to be stored and isolated from the environment permanently. According to Russian environmental groups, there is over 100,000 tons of radioactive waste already stored in Angarsk. The Russian nuclear industry has no plan for disposal of that waste. The waste is stored under the open sky in partly corroded containers and poses a threat of radioactive leakages. Any such leakages would contaminate the region around Angarsk and could also damage the ecosystem around Lake Baikal, the largest reservoir of non-salt water on earth.

There are also concerns that Japan’s proposal to send uranium to Russia for enrichment could further undermine the international non-proliferation regime. Japan cannot be confident that Japanese nuclear material will not be diverted to Iran, or to other countries suspected of developing nuclear weapons. Russia traditionally uses its own resources (including down-blending of highly enriched uranium to the enrichment level of uranium fuel for light-water reactors) to meet its own demand. Uranium sourced from other countries is more likely to be exported. The inadequacy of IAEA safeguards in nuclear weapons states and Russia’s supply of fuel for Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant are grounds for serious concern. No Russian facilities are included in IAEA’s latest list of safeguarded facilities.

Local residents are totally opposed to the plan of establishing an international center for uranium enrichment and new enrichment contracts. Protests have been happening since December 2006. People are demanding that authorities withdraw from new enrichment contracts in order to stop the growth of radioactive waste stockpiles near the highly sensitive Baikal ecosystem. Both Japan and Russia must uphold democratic values and respect the wishes of the local residents. We call on both governments not to sign any agreement that permits the re-enrichment of Japanese reprocessed uranium in Russia.

Contact information:
Green Action: +81-75-701-7223 or +81-90-3620-9251 (Aileen Mioko Smith)
email: amsmith@gol.com
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center: +81-3-3357-3800 (Philip White)
email: cnic@nifty.com
Ecodefense (Moscow, Russia): +7-985-7766281 or 903-2997584 (Vladimir Slivyak)
email: ecodefense@online.ru

IAEA “does not differenciate between different isotopic grades of plutonium”
Download PDF (500KB)

Press Release on Joint Appeal issued by Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (Tokyo), Green Action (Kyoto), and Greenpeace Japan

Download PDF (500KB)

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Joint Appeal issued by Citizens’Nuclear Information Center (Tokyo),Green Action (Kyoto), and Greenpeace Japan

NGOs in Japan Call for Japanese Government and Utilities to Terminate Plutonium Fuel (MOX) Shipments from Europe to Japan,
Call for En Route Countries to Join in Ending Shipments

Contact: Green Action (Aileen Mioko Smith) +81-90-3620-9251, CNIC (Philip White) +81-3-3357-3800

The appeal can be downloaded at:http://www.greenaction-japan.org/modules/wordpress0/index.php?p=64

For immediate release.

5 March 2009, Tokyo/Kyoto, Japan—- Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, Green Action, and Greenpeace Japan appealed to the Japanese Government to stop the world’s largest ever shipment of weapons-useable plutonium due to leave France for Japan on 6 March 2009.

The shipment, due to depart from the port of Cherbourg on British-flagged vessels, contains approximately 1.7 metric tons of plutonium contained in 65 assemblies of MOX (mixed plutonium and uranium oxide) fuel. The fuel, made from plutonium separated from Japanese spent fuel, which was shipped to the French state-owned Areva NC1 for reprocessing, is destined for nuclear power plants of three Japanese electric utilities, Kyushu, Chubu, and Shikoku Electric Power Companies.

This shipment is part of Japan’s failed attempt to utilize plutonium in its nuclear power program2. The program, originally designed to commercialize plutonium-producing fast breeder reactors, has been in development for over 50 years costing trillions of yen and yet Japan’s plutonium program today produces no electricity, lights not a single light bulb.

Today, after more than 50 years of development and a waste of vast sums of money, Japan’s plutonium program produces no electricity, lights not a single light bulb. Millions of signatures have been gathered in Japan to date opposing this unsafe, uneconomic, and failed program.

Japanese electric utilities hope the fuel to be shipped will start its troubled MOX fuel utilization program. If begun, many more shipments will follow as Japan holds about 38 tons of plutonium in Europe, continuing to put the en route countries at risk.

“This shipment is a threat to the security, safety, and environment of countries on the route of the shipment. There is no emergency contingency plan made in consultation with maritime authorities of en route states. The shipment lacks an adequate liability and compensation regime, and there is no commitment to salvage the material if it goes overboard," the NGO group stated in their appeal. "We appeal to countries potentially on the route of this and future MOX fuel shipments to join us in calling for the termination of these shipments, which put en route countries’ safety and security at risk.”

In 1992, 1999 and 2001, shipments between Europe and Japan containing plutonium were heavily protested by en route countries and ignored by the Japanese Government. Not one atom of the plutonium in those shipments has been used in Japan due to nuclear power plant accidents, data falsification scandals, and Japanese local opposition to MOX fuel use.

According to the Japanese Government and the Ministry of Land, Transport, Infrastructure and Tourism (MLIT), the utilities are responsible for safety of the MOX fuel transport; "We’ve told [the Japanese electric utilities] time and time again that they should put more effort into the safety of sea transports, just like they put into the safety of their nuclear power plants." (Section Chief Masato Mori, 13 February 2009 at Diet member briefing. Mr. Mori is the official responsible for the transport cask safety at MLIT.) MLIT says the
effort by Japanese electric utilities is not sufficient.

Security for the journey from Europe to Japan will be considerably less extensive than the security provided for the plutonium fuel over the two nights of 4 and 5 March for the 20-kilometer land trip between the Areva reprocessing site in La Hague and the Cherbourg port.

The MOX shipment’s transport casks are only required to withstand the following in sequence: a 9-meter drop, 800 degree Celsius fire for 30 minutes, immersion underwater at 15 meters for 8 hours, followed by immersion under water for 200 meters for 1 hour, without a nuclear chain reaction ("criticality") occurring.

Twenty Japanese national Diet members, including prominent members of the leading opposition party signed a letter addressed to MLIT on 26 January 2009, stating that the shipment should not go forward without meeting Japanese Government regulations. At issue was insufficient testing to assure the MOX fuel will not "go critical" under accident conditions. Disregarding Diet members’ concerns and the Ministry’s own concerns, MLIT rushed through the approval just hours after the initial 15 Diet signatures were submitted.

Notes to Editors:

1. The state-owned French nuclear company Areva, which fabricated the MOX fuel to be transported has misrepresented the proliferation threat posed by commercial plutonium contained in this and other MOX fuel. On 2 March, the Platts trade newsletter reported our letter sent to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei calling on ElBaradei to "remind Areva and the governments involved in the upcoming shipment of the security risks their nuclear programs pose to the world." (Platts Nuclear News Flashes, Monday, March 2, 2009).
2. To date, commercialization of the fast breeder has been delayed 10 times (a total delay of 80 years) with the target date for commercialization set back to 2050. Commercial start up of the recently constructed 2.3 trillion yen Rokkasho reprocessing plant has been delayed 16 times and its future is uncertain due to serious technical problems with the plant. The MOX program planned to start in 1999 has been delayed due to nuclear accidents, data falsification scandals, and local citizen opposition.

Citizens Nuclear Information Center
3F Kotobuki Building, 1-58-15 Higashi-nakano Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003
Tel:+81-3-3357-3800 Fax:+81-3-3357-3801 E-mail:cnic@nifty.com

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8203
Tel:+81-75-701-7223 Fax:+81-75-702-1952 E-mail:amsmith@gol.com

Greenpeace Japan
NF bldg 2F 8-13-11 Nishi-Shinjuku Shinjuku Tokyo 160-0023

Japan Should Terminate its Plutonium Fuel (MOX) Shipments from Europe to Japan and Cease Placing En Route Countries at Risk

Download PDF (500KB)

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Japan’s Plutonium Program is Uneconomic, Unsafe, is a Detriment to Japan’s Energy Program, and Fosters Proliferation

Japan Should Terminate its Plutonium Fuel (MOX) Shipments from Europe to Japan and Cease Placing En Route Countries at Risk

5 March 2009

APPEAL

On March 6 2009, a shipment of approximately 1.7 metric tons of weapons-usable plutonium contained in 65 assemblies of MOX (mixed plutonium and uranium oxide) fuel is scheduled to depart the port of Cherbourg, France bound for Japan on British-flagged vessels. This will be the world’s largest transport of plutonium ever undertaken. The fuel, made from plutonium separated from Japanese spent fuel, which was shipped to France for reprocessing, is to be used at the nuclear power plants of three Japanese electric utilities, Kyushu, Chubu, and Shikoku Electric Power Companies.

Japan’s unsafe, uneconomic and failed plutonium program

This shipment is part of Japan’s failed attempt to utilize plutonium in its nuclear power program. The original program was to commercialize plutonium-producing fast breeder reactors around 1970, operate a full commercial-scale reprocessing plant, and use MOX fuel in commercial nuclear power plants designed originally to use uranium fuel.

However, to date, commercialization of the fast breeder has been delayed 10 times (a total delay of 80 years) with target date for commercialization set back to 2050. The commercial start up of the recently constructed 2.3 trillion yen Rokkasho reprocessing plant has been delayed 16 times so far, and its future is uncertain due to serious technical problems with the plant. The MOX program, which was supposed to have begun a decade ago in 1999 has been chronically delayed.

Today, after more than 50 years of development and a waste of vast sums of money, Japan’s plutonium program produces no electricity, lights not a single light bulb. Millions of signatures have been gathered in Japan to date opposing this unsafe, uneconomic, and failed program.

Shipment threatens the security, safety, and environment of en route countries

Japanese electric utilities persist in pursuing its troubled MOX fuel utilization program. If begun, many more shipments will follow as Japan holds about 38 tons of plutonium in Europe, continuing to put en route countries at risk.

The Japanese ministry in charge of the safety of this MOX fuel transport (MLIT) states, "The Japanese Ministry of Transport, Land, and Infrastructure is not the party which is fully in charge of this transport." It goes on to say, "The primary party responsible is the [Japanese] electric utilities. We’ve told them time and time again that they should put more effort into the safety of sea transports, just like they put into the safety of their nuclear power plants." MLIT concludes that the effort by Japanese electric utilities is not sufficient. (Quote: Section Chief Masato Mori, 13 February 2009 at Diet member briefing. Mr. Mori is the official responsible for the transport cask safety at MLIT.)

In 1992, 1.5 metric tons of plutonium was transported from France to Japan for use in Japan’s prototype fast breeder reactor, Monju. Dozens of countries raised concerns about this shipment and were ignored. Two MOX fuel shipments from Europe to Japan which followed in 1999 and 2001 were also heavily protested by en route States, but the protests were ignored. Not one atom of the plutonium in those shipments has been used in Japan due to nuclear power plant accidents, data falsification scandals, and Japanese local opposition to MOX fuel use.

Twenty Japanese national Diet members, including prominent members of the leading opposition party signed a letter addressed to MLIT on 26 January 2009, stating that the shipment should not go forward without meeting Japanese government regulations. Disregarding this and the Ministry’s own concerns, MLIT rushed through the approval that night (26th) just hours after the initial 15 signatures were submitted.

Now in 2009, the en route countries face the same concerns and remain unaddressed by France and Japan:

• There is no emergency contingency plan made in consultation with maritime authorities of en route states. The shipment lacks an adequate liability and compensation regime, and there is no commitment to salvage the material if it goes overboard.
• The MOX shipment’s transport casks are only required to withstand the following in sequence: a 9-meter drop, 800 degree Celsius fire for 30 minutes, immersion underwater at 15 meters for 8 hours, followed by immersion under water for 200 meters for 1 hour, without a nuclear chain reaction ("criticality") occurring (Regulations Concerning Sea Transport and Storage of Hazardous Materials, Clause 81). The Japanese government’s standards are based on the IAEA’s Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. They do not envisage long-distance sea transport. If an accident were to occur en route, considering the nature of past accidents, these standards would not be expected to ensure the safety of the cargo. Much hotter fires of much longer duration than 30 minutes could occur. Further, much of the journey will be through seas deeper than 2,000 meters.
• The MOX fuel, fabricated by the state owned French company Areva NC, will be transported by two lightly armed British-flagged cargo ships, the Pacific Heron and Pacific Pintail. Escorting each other from France to Japan over thousands of kilometers of open sea, security for the journey will be considerably less extensive than that provided for the plutonium fuel over the two nights of March 4 and 5 for the 20-kilometer land trip between the reprocessing site in La Hague and the Cherbourg port.

The plutonium and uranium in the MOX fuel are US-obligated material, having been separated from fresh fuel supplied by the US and irradiated in Japanese reactors. The United States government undertook a secret review of the security plan for this transport. For future shipments en route countries should request the Obama administration to review the security plan in a more transparent manner, with full Congressional oversight. This will reveal that it is deficient from a safety and security perspective and that subsequent shipments should not be undertaken.

Proliferation

The IAEA uses a figure of 8kg plutonium as capable of being used for a nuclear weapon and IAEA safeguards define fresh MOX fuel as “direct use” material for nuclear weapons, with accompanying necessity for stringent physical-protection
measures.

Areva is misrepresenting the proliferation threat posed by commercial plutonium contained in this shipment . On 2 March, the Platts trade newsletter reported our letter sent to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei calling on ElBaradei to “remind Areva and the governments involved in the upcoming shipment of the security risks their nuclear programs pose to the world (Platts Nuclear News Flashes, Monday, March 2, 2009) .

APPEAL

Japan’s Plutonium Program is Uneconomic, Unsafe, is a Detriment to Japan’s Energy Program, and Fosters Proliferation.

We call on the Japanese Government and Electric Utilities to Terminate this and Future Plutonium (MOX) shipments and Cease from Placing En Route Countries at Risk.

We Appeal to Countries Potentially on the Route of this and Future MOX Fuel Shipments to Join Us in Calling for the Termination of these Shipments which Put en Route Countries’ Safety and Security at Risk.

Hideyuki
Ban
Co-Director
Citizens Nuclear Information Center
3F Kotobuki Building, 1-58-15 Higashi-nakano
Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003
Tel：+81-3-3357-3800 Fax：+81-3-3357-3801
cnic@nifty.com

HOSHIKAWA
Jun
Executive Director
Greenpeace Japan
NF bldg 2F 8-13-11 Nishi-Shinjuku
Shinjuku Tokyo 160-0023
Tel：+81-3-5338-9800 Fax：+81-3-5338-9817

Aileen
Mioko SMITH
Executive Director
Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho
Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8203
Tel：+81-75-701-7223 Fax：+81-75-702-1952
amsmith@gol.com

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The three possible routes for the shipment are around the Cape of Good Hope and through the South Pacific, around South America, or, through the Panama Canal.

Regional organizations which have protested past Japanese nuclear shipments include CARICOM (Caribbean Community), ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of states, SIDS( Small Island Developing States), and PIF (Pacific Islands Forum), and South American Countries

Letter sent by Greenpeace, Green Action, and Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center concerning the plutonium of Japanese MOX fuel shipment
Download PDF (80KB)

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Open Letter to Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
International Atomic Energy Agency

2 March 2009
Dear Dr. ElBaradei,

We are writing to warn you that the French state nuclear company, Areva, is actively denying the proliferation risks posed by reactor-grade plutonium contained in Mixed Oxide Fuel. The matter is an urgent one, as on March 6th 2009 a shipment of approximately 1.8 metric tons of plutonium contained in 65 assemblies of MOX fuel is scheduled to depart the port of Cherbourg bound for Japan.1

Our specific concerns are Areva’s misrepresentation of the proliferation threat posed by commercial plutonium contained in this and other MOX fuel. They appear dangerously confused or deliberately denying the inherent proliferation risks of the Japanese plutonium MOX fuel. Specifically they went on record March 1st,

It is impossible to make a nuclear weapon as suggested by Greenpeace. Here you must be clear, this MOX does not have any interest for any people to make a nuclear weapon from it. There is no interest in the diversion of this material. We have this level of protection, because the MOX fuel contains plutonium. Everything that contains plutonium must have a protective measure, Henri Jacques Neau, Director of Transport, Areva. 2

Late last week following an interview with French news agency, AFP, an industrial source3 was cited in the article stating that,

To make a bomb out of MOX,you would first need an installation in order to separate the plutonium from the uranium. And still, the result would only be plutonium of civil quality and not military quality,affirmed this source. 4

These statements are clearly misleading, stating as it does there is a distinction between civil and military grade plutonium. This, as you are aware is not the formal position of the IAEA, which classifies commercial plutonium MOX fuel as Category 1 nuclear material, requiring the highest level of security protection.As the IAEA safeguards glossary states, conversion of MOX fuel or powder to finished plutonium (metal) is of the order of 1-3 weeks.5

Greenpeace is long used to Japanese nuclear industry denials that reactor-grade plutonium is a proliferation threat, and that it cannot be used to make nuclear weapons. However, you will be aware that as long ago as 1990 your predecessor Hans Blix confirmed to the Nuclear Control Institute that the IAEA does not dispute that reactor-grade plutonium can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.6 Both you and your predecessor would surely agree that,

The proliferation activities required to obtain weapon-usable plutonium from fabricated [mixed oxide] fuel assemblies would be essentially the same, (as for oxide) with addition of a simple sawing operation.7 U.S.Department of Energy,1980.

After decades of being aware of the reality of plutonium Japan’s denial neither impresses us, nor the governments in North-east Asia which view its growing plutonium stockpile program with increasing suspicion.

Now we have denials by the nuclear industry including an explicit denial by Areva, which we believe is in defiance of both the IAEA classification of reactor grade plutonium and MOX fuel, as well as senior nuclear weapons scientists and U.S. government departments, including the Department of Energy. We have attached a list of key statements made by leading U.S. nuclear agencies and weapons designers.

You will be aware that the U.S. Department of Energy first briefed Japan and other states on the proliferation risks from commercial reprocessing, reactor grade plutonium and MOX fuel more than 30 years ago.

When we decided a couple of years ago to convince the world community that it (the construction of nuclear explosives out of low-grade plutonium) could be done, we did not bother to explain how we knew. But we knew from calculations from this (test…) When it became clear that we had to convince the international community that we knew what the hell we were talking about -that plutonium is plutonium -we just decided to classify it.8

Since the 1970’s when Japan, France and others were warned about the proliferation dangers inherent within commercial plutonium, the global stockpile of commercial plutonium has risen to in excess of 250 metric tons. Sufficient for tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. In the case of Japan, its stockpile of plutonium has increased from 6 metric tons in 1993 to over 43 tons today. This is despite warnings from former Deputy Director of the IAEA William Dircks made in 1992 that there was a growing threat from commercial plutonium stocks and there was an urgent need to review once again our policies regarding plutonium and its use.9

Ten years ago, on the eve of the first plutonium MOX shipment to Japan, the Nuclear Control Institute, Green Action Japan, the Citizens Nuclear Information Centre, Tokyo and ourselves wrote to you calling for IAEA support for an immediate cessation of weapons-usable plutonium separation, whether for stated military or civil use, and its stockpiling will help to reduce the threat that this material poses.10

Tragically no such cessation has occurred. While plutonium MOX programs have failed to reduce stocks of the fissile material, new facilities in Japan (Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant) and in the UK (Sellafield MOX plant) have been commissioned. As warned by Greenpeace and others both have failed to operate as intended – and yet vested interests – political and commercial – continue to seek to sustain these and other facilities.

Beyond this, Japan and France are now actively supporting the further development of global trade in bomb material through the President George W. Bush initiated Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). The justification given for these programs is that due to finite uranium resources, the operation of breeder reactors and reprocessing, are essential for combating climate change. In reality they will not make any significant contribution to greenhouse gas mitigation and will dramatically increase proliferation dangers.

Discriminatory application of the non-proliferation regime, whereby certain states get full access to weapons usable materials under the guise of peaceful use, is clearly failing. New programs, such as GNEP and the IAEA led International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), will only further destroy the international non-proliferation regime. The negotiation of a comprehensive fissile material treaty by the parties to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is both urgent and long overdue. This treaty must not make the same mistake as current international norms whereby distinction is made between good plutonium and bad plutonium11.

On the eve of the largest plutonium MOX shipment in history, we urge you once again to accept that commercial plutonium programs are unacceptable and must be terminated. We call on the IAEA to recognize the dangers in such programs and to make every effort to secure all weapons-usable fissile materials and end commercial programs utilising these materials.

In view of the inherent proliferation and security threats of this plutonium MOX transport and Areva’s mispresentation of it, we urge you to prevent this dangerous cargo from leaving France and remind Areva and the governments involved of the security risks their nuclear programs pose to the world.

Yours sincerely,

Dr.Rianne Teule
Nuclear Campaigner
Greenpeace International
Ottho Heldringstraat 5
1066 AZ Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Tel. +316 5064 0961
rianne.teule@greenpeace.org

Hideyuki Ban
Co-Director
Citizens Nuclear Information Center
3F Kotobuki Building, 1-58-15 Higashi-nakano
Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003
Japan
cnic-jp@po.iijnet.or.jp

Aileen Mioko Smith
Director
Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho
Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8203
Japan
Tel. 81-75-701-7223
amsmith@gol.com

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1 Greenpeace understands that the 65 assemblies of plutonium MOX fuel contained in TN12 flasks will be transported during the nights of March 3rd/4th and 4th/5th. The Pacific Heron and Pacific Pintail will then proceed to load the plutonium MOX during the night of March 5th/6th, with departure expected during the evening of Friday 6th.

2 Translated from an interview on France Inter, available at
www.france-info.com/spip.php?article259152&theme=29&sous_theme=31.
Original text: On ne peut pas en faire d’armes nucleaires contrairement a ce qu’affirme Greenpeace, hein, et la faut etre tres clair, ce mox n’interesse absolument pas qui que ce soit pour fabriquer des armes nucleaires. (…) c’est que ces matieres nucleaires n’ont aucun interet pour le detournement. On applique ces mesures de protection parce que le combustible MOX contient du plutonium,et qu’au titre de la reglementation internationale, tout ce qui contient du plutonium doit faire l’objet de mesures particulieres de protection.

3 This quote is possibly from Areva, since it is the key player in the industry, most directly involved in this MOX-transport

4 Translated from Areva prépare le départ d’un important convoi radioactif pour le Japon AFP, Cherbourg, February 26th 2009. Original text:Pour fabriquer une bombe à partir du MOX,il faudrait d’abord avoir une installation pour séparer le plutonium de l’uranium.Et encore il n’en résulterait que du plutonium de qualité civile et non pas militaire a affirmé cette source.

5 IAEA Safeguards Glossary, IAEA/SG/INF/1, Vienna, IAEA 1990.

6 The confirmation from Hans Blix came after challenged by Paul Leventhal, President of the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), and the analysis of J Carson Mark, Exlosive Properties of Reactor Grade Plutonium, commissioned by NCI. J. Carson Mark was a member of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, and former division leader of Los Alamos National Laboratories Theoretical Division, see www.NCI.org and “Blix says IAEA does not dispute utility of reactor grade plutonium for weapons,” Nuclear Fuel, November, 12th 1990.

7 U.S.
Department of Energy, NASAP, Vol: Nuclear Proliferation and Civilian Nuclear Power, Report of the Non-
Proliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program, Vol 2, Proliferation resistance, DOE/NE-0001/2 June 1980.

8 See, Gillete, R. Impure plutonium used in the 1962 A-test” Los Angelese Times, September 16th 1977.

9 See, William
J. Dircks, addressed the 1992 Japan Atomic Industrial Forum Annual Meeting on the matter of Nuclear Fuel Recycling – the IAEA Perspective.

10 Letter from Paul Leventhal, NCI, Aileen Mioko Smith, Green Action, Hideyuki Ban, CNIC and Shaun Burnie, Greenpeace International, April 13,1999.

11 A model Comprehensive Fissile Materials Treaty as proposed by Greenpeace can by found at
http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/international/press/reports/comprehensive-fissile-material.pdf

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For further information contact:
Aileen Mioko Smith, Cell: +81-90-3620-9251, Email: amsmith@gol.com

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Secret preparations are underway in Britain and France for shipping 1.8 tons of plutonium, the largest quantity of plutonium every shipped by sea.

The plutonium is contained in 65 assemblies of MOX (mixed plutonium and uranium oxide) fuel and is being shipped to Japan for use in the nuclear power plants of three Japanese electric utilities. No details have been revealed, but it is reported that the fuel will be transported by two British-flagged vessels, escorting each other.

The vessels are to depart Europe anytime on or after March 1st. Neither the hour of departure nor the maritime route to be used will be revealed before the ships depart. The United States must approve the transport plan before the shipment can proceed.

The MOX fuel to be transported has been fabricated in France by Areva NC.

AREVA NC statement on the shipment:
http://www.lahague.areva-nc.fr/scripts/areva-nc/publigen/content/templates/Show.asp?P=8317&L=EN

The three possible routes for the shipment are around the Cape of Good Hope and through the South Pacific, around South America, or, through the Panama Canal.

Japanese electric utilities hope the fuel to be shipped will start its troubled MOX fuel utilization program which was to begin a decade ago in 1999. Many more shipments are scheduled to follow and could take different routes.

The shipment is a threat to the security, safety, and environment of countries en route. It lacks adequate security to protect against terrorists, and there is no emergency contingency plan made in consultation with maritime authorities of en route states. The shipment lacks an adequate liability and compensation regime, and there is no commitment to salvage the material if it goes overboard.

Aileen Mioko Smith, executive director of Green Action based in Kyoto, Japan stated, “Countries potentially on the route of this shipment should seek a moratorium on such nuclear shipments because neither the Japanese government nor electric utilities are giving countries the proper assurance that the plutonium can be shipped safely.”

The hazard of shipping radioactive material by sea is very real. Eleven years ago in 1997, a ship, the MSC Carla, carrying highly radioactive cesium was split in two in a storm in the Atlantic Ocean. The radioactive cargo sank 3,000 meters to the bottom of the ocean. French regulatory authorities acknowledged the containers would rupture but said they would not salvage them.

The MOX shipment’s transport casks are only required to withstand emersion underwater at 15 meters for 8 hours (or 200 meters for 30 minutes). The cask must withstand a 9-meter drop. The material must not distort to the extent it leads to an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction. Japanese electric utilities have not undertaken the drop-test experiment in accordance to Japanese government regulations. Japanese Diet members are objecting to this.

Section Chief Masato Mori, the MLIT (ministry of transport) official in charge of the MOX shipment’s transport cask safety stated on 13 February, “The Japanese transport ministry is not the party which is fully in charge of this transport. The primary party responsible is the [Japanese] electric utilities. We’ve told them time and time again that they should put more effort into the safety of sea transports, just like they put into the safety of their nuclear power plants. As far as we are concerned, they can put much, much more effort into the safety of the sea transports.”

Japanese government authorities, nevertheless state the shipment can go forward.

Plutonium is an essential ingredient of nuclear weapons. Less than 8 kilograms is enough to construct a nuclear bomb. IAEA safeguards define fresh MOX fuel as plutonium and therefore stringent physical-protection measures must apply.

In 1992, the Akatsuki Maru transported 1.7 tons of plutonium from France to Japan for use in Japan’s prototype fast breeder reactor, Monju. Dozens of countries raised concerns about this shipment. Two MOX fuel shipments from Europe to Japan followed in 1999 and 2001, also heavily protested by en route States. Not one atom of the plutonium shipped in 1992, 1999 and 2001 has been used in Japan due to nuclear power plant accidents, data falsification scandals, and Japanese local opposition to MOX fuel use.

Regional organizations which have protested past Japanese nuclear shipments include CARICOM (Caribbean Community), ACP(African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, SIDS (Small Island Developing States), and PIF (Pacific Islands Forum).

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Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho
Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
Tel: +81-75-701-7223
Fax: +81-75-702-1952
Cell:+81-90-3620-9251
email: amsmith@gol.com
URL: http://www.greenaction-japan.org/

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Press release sent to countries on the route of imminent plutonium (MOX fuel) shipment

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