Author: Rick E

Comision de Poblacion, Ambiente y Desarrollo
Asamblea Legislativa
Republica de Panama

Dear Members of the Commission:

Green Action is an environmental NGO based in Kyoto, Japan which works on Japan’s plutonium program issues.

We are submitting this letter in conjunction to your deliberation of proposed legislation that would prohibit shipments of ultrahazardous nuclear cargoes through the Panama Canal. This letter addresses the fact that maritime shipments of ultrahazardous nuclear cargoes from Europe to Japan are not necessary for meeting Japan’s energy needs.

Japan at present has 53 nuclear reactors producing approximately 37% of Japan’s electric power needs, but not a single one of these reactors is dependent on maritime nuclear shipments between Europe and Japan.

The maritime shipments of HLW (high level radioactive waste) and MOX (mixed plutonium-uranium oxide) fuel are taking place only because of Japan’s plutonium program.

Japan’s plutonium program is not only not necessary for meeting Japan’s electricity demand, it is also an economic drain. In fact the chairman of Japan’s most powerful business lobby, the Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren), has called on the national government to review its current nuclear energy policy that pushes use of plutonium for fuel. (Please see attached Japan Economic Newswire article dated January 27, 2003).

There is only one reactor in Japan that uses plutonium fuel to produce electric energy. (The plutonium is procured domestically and not by shipments from Europe.) This reactor is the ATR reactor Fugen. Fugen is scheduled to be shutdown permanently at the end of this month (March 2003). It will subsequently be dismantled. Apart from Fugen, there is not one single light bulb being lit in Japan by the plutonium program.

The French companies Cogema and the British company PNTL continue to attempt to mislead countries on the route of Japanese maritime nuclear shipments, making it appear as though these shipments are necessary for Japan’s energy future. Nothing can be further from the truth.

Now that the ATR program has been scrapped by the Japanese electric utilities, there are two parts of Japan’s plutonium program which remain: Japan’s FBR (fast breeder reactor) program and the use of MOX (mixed plutonium-uranium oxide) fuel in the commercial nuclear reactors currently using uranium fuel (the Pluthermal Program). Both programs are going nowhere.

Japan’s FBR program has been under development for four decades. However, to date, the program has produced only one hour of electricity. This occurred in August 1995. The electricity was produced by the prototype FBR Monju located in Fukui Prefecture. There has been no electricity produced by the FBR program since then. Monju has been shutdown since December 1995 due to a sodium leak and fire accident. There is no restart date set. There is only one other FBR in Japan called Joyo, but this reactor is experimental and cannot produce electricity.

Under Japan’s current Long Term Program for Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy, there are no plans for any further FBRs to be built.

On January 27, 2003, the Nagoya High Court ruled that the license granted for Monju by the national government was illegal. The case is now in the Supreme Court. As can be seen above, Japan’s FBR program is in total disarray.

The Pluthermal Program (use of MOX fuel), the remaining part of Japan’s plutonium program, is also currently at a complete standstill. The program was to begin in the first half of the 1990’s. Kansai Electric and Tokyo Electric were to be the first to implement the program. However, in 1999 BNFL (British Nuclear Fuels plc) was found to have falsified the quality control data for the MOX fuel to be used in the first Kansai Electric reactor in Fukui Prefecture (Takahama Unit 4). The fuel was subsequently returned to Britain in July 2002.

In September of 2002, the governors of the remaining two prefectures, Niigata and Fukushima, which were slated to be the first to use this plutonium (MOX) fuel rescinded their prior approval for the program (to be implemented at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 3 and Fukushima Unit I-3 respectively, both Tokyo Electric reactors).

As can be seen above, Pluthermal Program plans have been set back further each and every year since 1999. There are now no dates for starting the Pluthermal Program and no need for shipping MOX fuel to Japan.

Masatoshi Toyoda, former president of Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL), the company central to Japan’s plutonium program, states in the October 2002 edition of the Japanese publication ENERGY, "Currently, the supply of uranium exceeds demand, and the price is around $50/kgU. On the other hand, reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication fees have increased several times from prices estimated 20 years ago, and the prospect of fast breeder reactors coming into practical use has become opaque. Considering this change in the state of affairs, I believe that it goes without saying that a review of the nuclear fuel cycle should be carried out." ("Circumstances Concerning Reprocessing and Pluthermal", Energy, October 2002. Translation from the Japanese by Green Action.)

We thank you for considering our submission and we hope the above will be helpful for your deliberations.

Sincerely,

Aileen Mioko Smith
Director,Green ActionAttachment:
Japan Economic Newswire article dated January 27, 2003

About Green Action:

Green Action based in Kyoto is a Japanese NGO founded in 1991 which works to stop Japan’s plutonium program. It is co-founder of Stop the Monju (1991), the Japanese NGO working exclusively to stop Japan’s fast breeder reactor program. Green Action is also the international office for and co-founder of Stop Nuclear Waste Campaign.

Green Action has been invited by the Japanese government- the Atomic Energy Commission and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry’s Agency for Natural Resources and Energy-to give testimony at government roundtables and symposiums.Green Action is not affiliated or associated with any political party.

Japan Economic Newswire
January 27, 2003 Monday
SECTION: INTERNATIONAL NEWS
HEADLINE: Nippon Keidanren’s Okuda urges energy policy review
DATELINE: TOKYO, Jan. 27

Hiroshi Okuda, chairman of the Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren), called on the government Monday to pursue energy policy changes from a long-term perspective, taking the opportunity afforded earlier in the day by a high court ruling against construction of the Monju experimental fast-breeder nuclear reactor. ‘It (the ruling) will serve as a starter (for the government) to review its energy policy centering on atomic power,’ Okuda, the head of Japan’s most powerful business lobby, told reporters. While noting that the ruling by the Nagoya High Court nullifying a 1983 government approval of the trouble-plagued reactor could be a big obstacle to energy policy in the short run, Okuda said, ‘It is necessary to look around, to see whether we will need atomic power or not in the long and medium terms.’

The government ’should think about a combination of energy sources as there have been advances in technology, like fuel cells,’ Okuda said, calling for a policy shift taking future technical innovation into consideration. The landmark decision in favor of residents seeking a halt to the operation of the nuclear reactor in Fukui Prefecture on the Sea of Japan coast has clouded plans to reactivate it, following its suspension after a massive sodium coolant leakage in 1995.

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
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Contact:
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For Immediate Release: 27 January 2003
Contact: Aileen Mioko Smith
Cell: +81-90-3620-9251

Kanazawa, Japan—- Plaintiffs in Fukui Prefecture today won a lawsuit verdict against the Japanese government and the owner operator of Japan’s prototype fast breeder reactor Monju located in Fukui Prefecture. The lawsuit sought to stop the construction and operation of Monju. The epochmaking court verdict overturned a lower court ruling and is the first ever plaintiff victory addressing nuclear power in Japan. Monju had been shut since it had a sodium leak and fire accident in December 1995.

Citizens nationwide will be petitioning Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission on 29 January in Tokyo, seeking scrapping of the entire plutonium fast breeder reactor program including Monju. 910,000 signatures have been gathered to date demanding that the government scrap Monju.

The Japanese government was working assertively to re-start the troubled reactor and in December 2002 had granted the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC), the government corporation that owns and operates Monju, approval for a new post-1995 accident safety assessment. The ruling today, however, stated there were fundamental flaws in the original safety assessment made by the government. The court decision effectively guts the partially revised safety assessment that had been granted JNC.

"Today marks the beginning of the end of Japan’s fast breeder program. Monju would have to be rebuilt from the ground up if it were to meet the standards presented by the court today" said Aileen Mioko Smith, director of Green Action an environmental NGO based in Kyoto which works on stopping Japan’s plutonium program.

Ogiso Miwako, head of the Monju lawsuit plaintiff administrative office stated, "It has been a long 18 years but we have won. There is still a long fight ahead, but we have been vindicated today."

Compiled

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
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November 15, 2002

Dr. Richard Meserve
Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Facsimile: 1-301-415-1757

Dear Chairman Richard Meserve:

Re: Opposition to Issuance of Export License for Depleted Uranium to Japan’s Rokkasho Reprocessing Facility

Green Action is a Japanese NGO based in Kyoto, Japan working mainly on Japanese plutonium fuel cycle issues.

Green Action recently obtained a copy of an application to export approximately 26 tons of depleted uranium from the United States to Japan for use as test material in the test operation of Japan’s Rokkasho nuclear fuel reprocessing facility. [License Number XSOU8790, Date of Application 10/17/2002]

Green Action notes that Japan has already stockpiled more than 32 tons of plutonium in Europe for which it has demonstrated no concrete plans to consume. The Rokkasho reprocessing facility has the potential to separate 8 tons of plutonium annually, and full-scale operation of this facility will result in domestic stockpiling of large quantities of weapons-usable plutonium. Japan clearly has no demonstrable use for plutonium, and operation of Rokkasho will do nothing but greatly increase nuclear proliferation concerns in northeast Asia.

Attachment B of the above license application confirms that uranium-testing is an integral part of the start-up of the Rokkasho facility, and for this reason, we believe that the NRC and the Executive Branch of the United States Government should conduct a nuclear proliferation assessment of the impact of operation of Rokkasho prior to issuing a license to export depleted uranium to this facility.

Green Action is concerned that stockpiling of large quantities of plutonium in Japan is not only an inherent environmental and security risk in and of itself, but will also threaten world security since such a large domestic stockpile will encourage other countries to obtain or enlarge their stocks of fissile materials. Considering the enormous security risk associated with operating this facility, we believe that failure to conduct a nuclear proliferation assessment prior to issuing a license for the export of depleted uranium to Rokkasho is tantamount to the United States abdicating its responsibility concerning the management of US origin nuclear materials.

Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission which is responsible for drafting Japan’s Long-Term Program for Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy (LTP), continues to claim that plutonium utilization will go forward as planned. However, the track record of previous LTPs is dismal when it comes to plutonium utilization plans. (See table and chart in Attachment A.)

The AEC expects electric utilities to cooperate with the government to implement the programs outlined in the LTP, but there is no guarantee the electric utilities will do so. For example, in the eighth LTP finalized in 1994, the AEC proclaimed advanced thermal reactor (ATR) technology as "capable of flexibly and efficiently using plutonium and recovered uranium". However, only thirteen months after the 1994 LTP was finalized, the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPCO) submitted a letter to the AEC which stated, "…due to social pressure to reduce electricity costs it is no longer possible to proceed with the costly development of an ATR demonstration reactor." This letter went on to request a full-scale review of the entire ATR development program. As a result of FEPCO’s position on the ATR, all mention of the ATR program disappeared with no explanation from the ninth LTP issued by the AEC in November 2000.

In previous LTPs, plutonium utilization was to center around fast breeder reactor (FBR) technology. However, efforts to develop commercial FBRs have proven to be more difficult than originally estimated, and development plans have been put back further and further in time in every single LTP. On December 1995, a sodium leak and fire accident occurred at the Monju prototype fast breeder reactor in Fukui Prefecture. The accident and subsequent cover-up of the extent of the accident by the operator of the plant severely damaged public confidence in the entire nuclear industry and brought FBR development plans to a standstill.

With the ATR program scrapped and the FBR program at a standstill, the pluthermal program (the use of MOX fuel in light water reactors) became the key program for reducing Japan’s stockpiles of plutonium. The pluthermal program was originally scheduled to begin in 1999, and MOX fuel has been shipped from Britain and France to reactors in Fukui, Fukushima, and Niigata Prefectures. However, the program remains unimplemented due to the December 1999 BNFL MOX fuel data falsification scandal, and the May 2001 referendum in Kariwa village which resulted in a majority of residents voting against the use of MOX fuel at Tokyo Electric’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 3 nuclear power plant. Following the September 2002 announcement that Tokyo Electric systematically concealed inspection results from government regulators, the governors of Fukushima and Niigata prefectures withdrew their advance permission for the pluthermal program. On October 9, 2002 the governor of Fukushima Prefecture called on Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and the national government to review the justification for the nuclear fuel cycle.

Regardless of the AEC’s advocacy of the nuclear fuel cycle, there is widespread public opposition to all plutonium utilization plans, and there is no guarantee that these plans will ever gain the consent of the Japanese public.

Given the abovementioned track record of previous LTPs, Green Action believes Japan’s AEC is incapable of providing the United States government with a convincing schedule for the timely utilization of plutonium separated in Europe and plutonium to be separated at Rokkasho. Based on the reasons outlined in this letter, we strongly urge the NRC to deny issuing a license to export this material.

Sincerely,

Aileen Mioko Smith
Director,
Green Action

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19 September 2002

Consultation Procedures for Citizens of Fukushima Prefecture and Others on the "Interim Report"

Administrative Office
Energy Policy Review

1. Purpose: A consultation is being undertaken to seek views on the "Interim Report" of this Energy Policy Review in order that the views of Fukushima Prefectural citizens etc. will be reflected in future energy policy [of this nation].
2. Who Can Submit: Citizens and organizations not limited to Fukushima
3. Prefecture.
4. How the "Interim Report" will be made public[Libraries, home page, through the media, etc.]
5. Consultation Period: October 1 – November 30, 2002
6. Method of Submission: Mail, fax, email : energy-g@pref.fukushima.jp
7. How Submissions Will Be Handled.

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Interim Report

September 2002

I. Background

(How the Review came about.)

II. Concerning the Problem of "Falsification of Industry Inspections Records at Nuclear Power Plants"

"Of course the responsibility of the utilities [for having caused this situation] must be pursued vigorously, but the Japanese government’s responsibility for this situation is also extremely grave as well."

"This current problem is a problem of the national government’s constitution and disposition, conducting nuclear policy "like a bulldozer", and ‘belittling [holding in contempt] the residents where nuclear power plants are located".

"The Japanese government states, "Even though there may be slight delays as a result of the current problems, the basic plan of aiming for implementation of the pluthermal program remains unchanged." Also, "We will steadily go forward with the Pluthermal Program.’ Perhaps the national government doesn’t understand the basic nature of the current problems."

"The government is looking into the introduction of a new regulatory inspection regime —ASME-type standards. But, can this really result in effectively preventing the reoccurrence of the type of problems we are currently facing Questions remain as to whether these standards will lead to the upgrading of safety and credibility at nuclear power plants. Rather, isn’t it necessary now to take the time and undertake a careful deliberation of the issues

[Referring to the fact the government back in July had at first recognized the high marks for safety and reliability attained by the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Units 3 and 4 after their periodic safety reviews, then retracting these after the scandals erupted, the Fukushima Review states the following:]

"The government was forced into an extraordinary situation of withdrawing its approval because of the exposure of dishonest practices, and this it did without sufficient explanation as to what kind of assessment it had made to deem this judgment correct. If this is the state of affairs of the periodic safety review process which forms the basis of assuring the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants, isn’t it utterly impossible to say that the government’s inspection and assessment regime to assure safety is properly functioning"

III. Concerning "The Main Issues and Concerns"

1. Concerning the Changes in the Energy Supply-Demand Structure:

Considering the fact liberalization of the electricity market is moving forward and the supply-demand structure etc. is changing, will additional electricity-producing sites of electric utilities being built based on the assumption that electricity consumption will continue as before really be necessary

2. Concerning the Possibilities for New Sources of Energy:

The government has made the target for introducing new energy sources to be about 3% of total primary energy supply. However, isn’t it necessary to plan for an even greater increase by adopting policies to introduce each [energy source] area

3. Concerning the Decision Making Process for Formulation of Nuclear Policy:

1. Is Information Disclosure Sufficient:
   Nuclear Energy is a colossal scientific technology, its contents very difficult to understand. Also the promotion of nuclear policy relates to the issue of safety which is deeply connected to basic human rights. Because of this, the thorough disclosure of information is indispensable. However, is thorough disclosure of information taking place
2. Are the views of a wide range of the nation’s citizens being sufficiently heeded when formulating policy Rather than just listening to the views of the nation’s citizens, isn’t it necessary to create an infrastructure whereby, after supplying the nation’s citizens with sufficient information and knowledge to make their own judgments, the views of citizens are reflected when formulating nuclear policy etc.
3. Is assessment of nuclear policy being properly undertakenAfter the Monju accident, and from the point the fast breeder development plans that had been in place were revised, future plans for the utilization of plutonium have become uncertain. Wasn’t it necessary at that point to re-examine the policy of reprocessing all spent nuclear fuel
4. Where is nuclear policy actually decided
   It has been said that it is difficult for citizens to understand the decision making system for nuclear policy. Where is nuclear policy finally decided Who takes responsibility for this policy Also, nuclear policy is decided only by the bureaucracy. Isn’t it necessary instead to consider making the process democratic by having its formulation go through the legislative Diet process, etc.

4. The Position of Nuclear Energy in Overall Energy Policy

1. Is the promotion of nuclear power convincing to the nation’s citizens
2. "….While the fight to cut costs mounts, have proper countermeasures been put in place for assuring safety and undertaking the proper steps for the back-end
3. Are measures for the aging of nuclear power plants being properly undertaken
   Isn’t it necessary to undertake a drastic reconsideration of measures [countermeasures] for aging of reactors
4. What is going to happen with the outlook for disposal of high level radioactive waste Although the legislation and system for realizing a site has been established, isn’t it going to be considerably difficult to site a final repository

5. Concerning the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

1. Can it be said that the nuclear fuel cycle is at this point absolutely necessary If uranium resources can be supplied stably, is reprocessing which is undertaken in order to save on the consumption of uranium absolutely necessary
2. Will the nuclear fuel cycle not only save on resources, but will it likewise lead to a stable supply of energy
   During the Review it was pointed out that if there were no fast breeder reactors, then reprocessing once through would lead to approximately 10% of resource savings. At this level of savings, when considering the uncertainty of the costs of reprocessing and its back-end, can it really be said that reprocessing, for only this amount of resource savings, is really appropriate
3. Aren’t there problems with the cost
   The basis for the financial estimation of the cost of the nuclear fuel cycle within the backdrop of the liberalization of electricity has not, in spite of the fact it is an extremely important problem which affects the regions where nuclear power plants are located tremendously, been made sufficiently clear. Considering this, isn’t an assessment of the economic viability [of the nuclear fuel cycle difficult to make
4. What about plutonium balance
   If the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant begins operation, will it not produce yet more surplus plutonium — considering the fact fast breeder reactor realization is nowhere in sight, construction of the full MOX nuclear reactor at Ohma in Aomori Prefecture is behind schedule, and MOX fuel implementation in light water reactors has not been realized

   …….There are concerns that even the 30 some ton quantity of plutonium from overseas reprocessing will take a considerable time to use up.
   ……Under these circumstances, the plutonium balance in the long term plan for nuclear power is no longer realistic. Can’t it be said that we can no longer say our country’s plutonium utilization is transparent. And, will there not be a possibility that anxiety will be harbored internationally due to the existence of plutonium that is ‘in surplus’ as a result of undertaking reprocessing

5. What is the possibility of the realization of a fast breeder at this time ..Currently there is no outlook for the realization of the fast breeder. Under these circumstances, is it really appropriate to continue promoting the reprocessing path
6. Does reprocessing really greatly reduce the amount of high level radioactive waste …….but it increases the volume of low level waste vastly…….etc., therefore aren’t the merits cancelled out……Isn’t it necessary to re-examine the policy of reprocessing all nuclear waste considering the problems with the cost and back end of reprocessing, the reality that there is no outlook for the fast breeder reactor, and in addition, when evaluating the overall issue of waste volumes of high level radioactive waste
7. What will happen with spent MOX fuel
   ……The chances of a second reprocessing plant becoming reality is extremely small.

6. Considering the Future of Electric Power Plant Sites

1. …… A monoculture economy…….
2. Isn’t it time to think about the future of the regions which now face the reality of the decommissioning of nuclear power plants.IV CONCLUSION[Summary in bullet point form Only parts relevant to nuclear fuel cycle translated here.]

   Especially, as far as the nuclear fuel cycle is concerned, isn’t it necessary to stop once and, moving ahead with information disclosure while undertaking a comparison between the reprocessing of all spent nuclear fuel and the options of direct disposal etc., ask the citizens of the nation what path should be taken from henceforth.
   Finally, we hope and expect that the national government will listen to our views with humility, and, based upon the rights and responsibilities bestowed upon it, carry out the responsibility of explaining the concerns and doubts we have addressed here to the citizens of the nation. We hope and expect that the government will not be bound to the past but indicate to the citizens of this nation a new nuclear energy policy in concrete form, bringing forward a nuclear power administration based on safety and security which can be understood and trusted by the citizens of this nation.

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Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 17
Date: October 26, 2002

Contents:

1. METI to order one year shutdown of Fukushima Dai-Ichi Unit 1
2. Operation status of TEPCO reactors
3. Leaked documents reveal alpha nuclide emissions from Fukushima Dai-Ichi Unit 1 & 2 between 1979 and 1981

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 16
Date: October 11, 2002

Contents:

• Aomori governor threatens to halt SNF imports
• Fukushima legislature passes motion declaring: "Pluthermal Program will not be implemented in Fukushima"
• Tokyo Electric announces damaged CRDM guide tubes in Fukushima Dai-Ichi Unit 4 reactor

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 15
Date: October 9, 2002

Contents:

1. (1) Fukushima governor meets Prime Minister Koizumi and calls for reconsideration of nuclear fuel cycle policy
2. (2) Chugoku Electric failed to report shroud cracks
3. (3) Asahi opinion poll finds 90% fear nuclear accident
4. (4) METI received six allegations of impropriety in September

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 14
Date: September 30, 2002

Contents:

1. Meti will not prosecute TEPCO for falsifications of voluntary inspection data
2. TEPCO regularly manipulated compulsory inspection data. Will METI prosecute

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 13
Date: September 25, 2002

Contents:

1. Japco admits to falsifying reports
2. Shroud cracking found at two more utilities
3. Tepco failed to report CDRM damage from 1988
4. Aomori newspaper editorial calls for moratorium on SNF shipments to Rokkasho

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 12
Date: September 20, 2002

Contents:

1. TEPCO publishes report about falsification of GEII findings
2. Hitachi and Toshiba implicated in falsification of inspection results of recirculation pumps and pipes at TEPCO reactors
3. Chubu Electric fails to report cracks at Hamaoka Units 1 and 3. Shut down of Unit 3 means all four reactors to be shut down
4. Tohoku Electric fails to report cracks at Onagawa Unit 1

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 11
Date: September 13, 2002

Contents:

1. TEPCO consults with METI about illegal repair method
2. METI misinformed public about whistle-blowers intent in order to justify
3. two-year delay
4. Committee meets to scrutinize METI’s two year investigation

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 10
Date: September 12, 2002

Contents:

1. Niigata leaders simultaneously annul prior permission for pluthermal program
2. Fukushima governor expresses indisposition with METI
3. TEPCO illegally repaired ECCS at Fukushima I-1, camouflaged repaired area to avoid detection

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 9
Date: September 10, 2002

Contents:

1. METI establishes two committees to investigate TEPCO scandal
2. Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 8
Date: September 6, 2002

Contents:

1. Kashiwazaki city legislature passes motion calling for cancellation of the pluthermal program
2. Shroud cracks discovered much earlier, internal rules revised to decrease frequency of shroud inspections
3. Fukui governor decides against giving permission for JAPCO to build new reactors

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 7
Date: September 5, 2002

Contents:

1. Shroud cracks at Fukushima II-3 known for years
2. METI visits Aomori Prefecture, stresses no change in nuclear energy policy
3. New nuclear power plant construction plans put on hold
4. TEPCO employees based falsification decisions on US standards
5. Niigata leaders visit Tokyo, call for impovements in nuclear safety supervision

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 6
Date: September 4, 2002

Contents:

1. TEPCO falsified shroud replacement application forms
2. METI minister informed one day before public announcement
3. TEPCO vice-president admits knowledge of shroud problems during tenure as head of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
4. TEPCO conducts door-to-door apologies in Fukushima
5. TEPCO to refrain from advertising

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 5
Date: September 3, 2002

Contents:

1. Radioactive Leak at Fukushima II-2
2. TEPCO president resignation press conference
3. Employees’ motive for falsification
4. METI’s excuse for taking two years to investigate

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 4
Date: September 2, 2002

Contents:

1. Pluthermal permission retracted

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 3
Date: September 1, 2002

Contents:

1. TEPCO announces resignations
2. Fukushima municipalities vote to request withdrawl of pluthermal program permission
3. TEPCO aware of falsification in March 2002
4. Shroud Damage: "Nothing abnormal"
5. Reactors to be shutdown and inspected

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 2
Date: August 31, 2002

Contents:

1. Former GE employee sent letter to METI in July 2000

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 1
Date: August 31, 2002

Contents:

1. METI’s investigation reveals more falsification
2. Possibility of systematic falsification
3. TEPCO president and chairman to resign

Green Action
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—Fukushima Governor Formally Announces Rescinding of Prior Approval for Pluthermal Program, declares, “On this occasion, we should rethink [Japan’s] nuclear power policy itself, taking it back to the starting point.”

—Asahi reports it is now certain that there will be a push for reconsideration of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Asahi Web Site. 2002 September 26th 13:24
English translation by Green Action
(Note words in brackets are by translator.)

At the prefectural legislative session held [September] 26, Fukushima Governor Eisaku Sato, stating that the precondition for implementing the Pluthermal Program had collapses as a result of Tokyo Electric’s cover-up of nuclear power plant problems, formally declared his decision to rescind prior approval for implementing the program he had granted in 1998 for the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Unit 3 reactor. “My understanding is that Pluthermal is a program which has been withdrawn. On this occasion, we should rethink [Japan’s] nuclear power policy itself, taking it back to the starting point.”

Earlier this month, Niigata Prefecture, Kashiwazaki City, etc. had already rescinded their prior approval in connection to the Pluthermal Program at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3. The [Pluthermal] program being put forward by the national government and Tokyo Electric has been brought to a standstill, and it is now certain that there will be a push for reconsideration of the nuclear fuel cycle.

In February of 2001, after the Tokaimura criticality accident in Ibaragi Prefecture, Governor Sato had declared, “Pluthermal is unthinkable for the time-being.”

Fukushima Prefecture began its own Energy Policy Review, and on the 19th of this month made public its report that stated, “The problem is the national government’s innate characteristic [predisposition] of pushing forward nuclear policy like a bulldozer, slighting the residents of the region where power plants are located.”

Green Action
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Environmental NGO Resolution

Eighth International Energy Forum Osaka, Japan
20 September 2002

The 20th century was the fossil fuel century. To the middle of the century, most energy came from coal, and after the 1960’s the use of oil increased rapidly.

Today’s worldwide consumption in energy continues to be dependent on fossil fuels, predominantly oil. These precious fossil fuels have contributed to the development of humanity, easing the burden of daily life. At the same time however, dependence on fossil fuels has caused or contributed to further aggravating the unequal distribution of the world’s wealth, energy wars or civil wars related to energy access, serious environmental destruction as a result of mining, drilling, or accidents at sea, and global warming as a result of emissions of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide.

During the past decade, there has been a slight decrease in the role of coal and oil in overall worldwide energy consumption. However, total overall consumption of these fossil fuels continues to rise. Moreover, of serious concern, is that these sources of energy are being consumed by only a small portion of the overall worldwide population. As much as 2 billion people on this earth have yet to have access to this energy.

Dear energy ministers, in order to protect limited precious sources of energy, in order to maintain a world environment where human beings can survive, in order to prevent further global warming, please work to free the world from dependence on fossil fuels. At the same time, keeping in mind that energy sources such as nuclear power and large hydroelectric dams cause serious adverse effects upon the environment and future generations, please select a path not dependent on these but one that will lead to the development of energy policies centered upon renewable green energy sources and energy conservation. Please direct the greatest possible care so that the peoples of the world will have access to the use of energy on a fair basis. We must not make oil the excuse for war.

As environmental NGOs working on energy and environmental issues in an industrialized country, we will also work for the realization of sustainable energy policies, and will continue our efforts to protect the environment.

Kiko Network
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC)
FoE Japan
Green Action
Green Energy "law" Network (GEN)
Greenpeace Japan
WWF Japan

High Cost of Power Generation and Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing is Strangling the UK’s Largest Power Generator Lessons for Japanese Electric Utilities

British Energy plc is the United Kingdom’s largest electric utility, producing one fifth of the country’s electricity. The company owns and operates 15 nuclear reactors in the UK with a combined generating capacity of approximately 9600 megawatts. The company also operates reactors in the United States and Canada.

On 12 August 2002, British Energy was forced to shut down reactor 1 at the Torness Nuclear Power Station in East Lothian because of vibrations in the gas circulation system which cools the reactor. Reactor 2 at the same station has been shut down since May because of a similar problem. The two reactors account for 12% of British Energy’s annual energy output, and according to the company, this and other unplanned outages will reduce forecast annual output by 4.5 terrawatt hours and cost the company 25 million pounds in maintenance costs. News of the Torness reactor shut down caused British Energy shares to fall 30% after analysts claimed a long-term shutdown will lead to reduced profits and dividends.

When British Energy was privatised in 1996 it acquired it’s fleet of 15 reactors from the UK government for just half the cost of constructing it’s newest reactor, Sizewell B. Following recent stock declines, the company’s market value is now a mere 370 million pounds, whereas Sizewell B cost around 2 billion pounds to construct.

Since privatization, British Energy has increased production of it’s nuclear units by 10%, and reduced costs by a full 30%. Nevertheless, the company is still having problems competing in a free-market environment. As a direct result of electricity market liberalization, the wholesale price of electricity has decreased by 30% in the UK in recent years. Power prices are now below 12 pounds a megawatt hour– 7 pounds below the price which British Energy needs for making a profit. Executive Chairman Robin Jeffery recently acknowledged that a further 10% cut in power prices this year will erode 140 million pounds off British Energy’s earnings.

In addition to high nuclear power generating costs, spent fuel management costs have severely hurt British Energy’s financial position since privatization. In November 2001, British Energy executives criticized the company’s reprocessing contracts with BNFL as ruining the profitability and competitiveness of the company. The company’s executives pointed out that reprocessing spent nuclear fuel was costing the company more than six times as much as the cost to store spent nuclear fuel. By simply storing the spent fuel BE estimates it could save 250 million pounds per year.

In its submission on future radioactive waste policy to the House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, British Energy described reprocessing as an unecessary and expensive exercise that it cannot afford, and called for an immediate moratorium on any further reprocessing of its spent nuclear fuel at BNFL’s THORP reprocessing plant in Sellafield.

When announcing its semi-annual results on 7 November 2001 a British Energy spokesman stated, "We simply do not believe in reprocessing because of its huge costs and we want to renegotiate this contract. We are paying six times as much to deal with our spent fuel as American generators do at a time when electricity costs have fallen markedly." Michael Kirwan, British Energy’s financial director, claimed, "As far as we are concerned, reprocessing is an economic nonsense and should stop straight away."

Lesson’s for Japanese Electric Utilities Japan’s electricity market is currently in the process of being deregulated, and a recent Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry guideline calls for full-scale market liberalization to take place in 2005. Japanese electric utilities have already started to reduce costs in order to remain competetive in a deregulated market environment.

There are many lessons Japanese electric utilities can learn from British Energy’s current financial situation. For example, Japanese electric utilties currently have contracts with Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd (JNFL) to reprocess 10,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel at a reprocessing plant under construction in Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture. According to newspaper reports in Japan, the price of reprocessing one ton of spent nuclear fuel at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant will be four times the amount of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel at BNFL’s THORP reprocessing plant in the United Kingdom. Japanese electric utilities should heed British Energy’s warnings and cancel their reprocessing contracts with JNFL.

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
T + 81 75 701 7223
F + 81 75 702 1952
E-mail amsmith@gol.com

Fukushima Prefecture is currently carrying out a review of Japan’s national energy policy from the point of view of an energy producing prefecture. Since the December 1999 BNFL MOX data falsification scandal, governor Sato has refused to give his consent to the loading of MOX fuel into Tokyo Electric’s Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 3 nuclear power plant. Tokyo Electric is seeking to load 32 MOX fuel assemblies during the current scheduled outage, but it is expected that Sato will continue to refuse implementation of the pluthermal program.

Reported on June 4, 2002 The following comments were made by governor Sato at a meeting with regional mayors at the Fukushima Prefecture Office in Fukushima City on June 3, 2002. During this meeting the pro-pluthermal mayors called on the governor to allow loading of MOX fuel into the Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 3 reactor.

• "(The prefecture) is pursuing a review of energy policy from various angles. The pluthermal program, however, is costly and will lead to the separation of more plutonium, and I don’t see why it is necessary to implement this program." (NHK)
• "From an economic point of view, I don’t understand why it is necessary to implement (such a program)." (NHK)
• "I don’t understand your demands to push forward the pluthermal program, given that terrorism and the three non-nuclear principles are in the news now." (Asahi)
• "(If the nuclear fuel cycle is implemented), plutonium will rapidly build up. At some point in time we need to really think about this." (Asahi)
• "With the prospects for Monju fast breeder reactor development still far from certain, and the nuclear fuel cycle in the unsatisfactory state it is in, (reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel) will only lead to a rapid increase in plutonium." (Kahoku)
• "For approximately 50 years (while there are still reserves of uranium) another method would be to pursue a once through fuel cycle policy, and if an energy crisis occurs, consider the project at that point in time. The national government should disclose this to the public and both sides should think about this option." (Kahoku)
• "In a deregulated electricity market, if the costly pluthermal program is implemented, it might lead to worker layoffs." (Kahoku)
• "One option is for Fukushima Prefecture to say, ‘We’re freezing this program.’" (Mainichi)
• "For 50 years a once through policy could be implemented, and in that time if there is an energy crisis, then the pluthermal program could be implemented." (Mainichi)
• "Is this program really necessary Freezing (the program) should also be considered." (Yomiuri)
• "I gave advance permission for the [pluthermal] program, but is [the program] really necessary Opinions have been given which point out that the outlook for Monju and the nuclear fuel cycle is unclear, and that the [pluthermal] program will not solve the surplus plutonium problem." (Yomiuri)
• "I do not understand why such a costly project is necessary." (Jiji)
• "In the absence of a firm recycling plan, it will only result in a huge amount of excess plutonium." (Jiji)
• "If someone doesn’t think seriously about this issue, then something unfortunate will happen." (Fukushima Minpo)
• "It is not hard for me to understand demands for building more nuclear power plants, but I can not understand demands for implementing the pluthermal program." (Fukushima Minpo)

Reported on June 5, 2002 The following comment is an excerpt from an interview published in Fukushima Minpo on June 5, 2002.

• "The national government’s nuclear energy administration is a black box, and there is no civil sector control." (Fukushima Minpo)Reported on Aug 6, 2002 The following comments were made by governor Sato at a meeting with all five commissioners of Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in Fukushima City on August 5, 2002.
• "In 1998 Fukushima was the first prefecture to give prior consent to the pluthermal program and we have cooperated with government policy. However, even though the time and state of affairs has changed, nuclear policy has not changed. From the point of view of an electricity producing region, I am concerned about the future. Has not atomic energy policy, including the pluthermal program, entered into a second stage" (Denki Newspaper)
• "The central government’s nuclear energy policy is decided without listening to regional opinion, and the grounds for nuclear energy being cheap have not been clarified." (Kyodo)
• "If reprocessing is continued, surplus plutonium will pile up. Shouldn’t reprocessing be considered after abundant supplies of uranium have been used up" (Kyodo)
• "Not enough is being done to provide information to the public and allow everyone to think about what should be done." (Kyodo)
• "Society as a whole is going through a period of change. Hasn’t the time come for nuclear energy policy to be returned to the drawing boards and rethought" (Kahoku Shinpo)
• "(The Atomic Energy Commission) should make public information such as whether nuclear power is expensive or cheap. This should be explained to the public and the public’s views should be sought." (Asahi)
• "The nuclear fuel cycle is different from the recyling of other resources. It imposes a burden on the environment because of issues such as nuclear waste." (Denki Shimbun)

Compiled

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
T + 81 75 701 7223
F + 81 75 702 1952
E-mail amsmith@gol.com