Author: Rick E

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The government of Japan made a written and unequivocal pledge to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in December 1997 to uphold the “principle of no surplus plutonium.”*1

Despite this commitment, Japan will separate out 4 tons of plutonium at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, if active testing using spent nuclear fuel begins as scheduled in February 2006. The stark fact is that the Japanese nuclear power program has no use for this plutonium, now or in the foreseeable future.

The “Plutonium Utilization Plan of Japan” presented to the IAEA in 1997 stated that mixed plutonium-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel in light water reactors would be the “principle way of utilizing plutonium in Japan over the next few decades.” The program, however, has never gotten off the ground due to public opposition, data falsification scandals in 1999 and 2002 and the fatal accident at the Mihama nuclear power plant in 2004. Today, not a single electric utility has the go ahead to consume MOX fuel.

Furthermore, a fundamental technical problem exists. Japan lacks the capability to turn any plutonium produced at Rokkasho into MOX fuel. There is only a government “expectation” that a MOX fuel fabrication plant be fully operational by fiscal 2012.*2 Therefore, if active testing begins at Rokkasho this year, any separated plutonium will languish at the facility.

Moreover, a massive cache of Japanese plutonium already exists: thirty-seven tons sit in Europe. Japan’s Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy issued in October 2005 gives priority to the consumption of this plutonium in Europe over any produced at Rokkasho.*3

Japan allowed the stockpile in Europe to grow even after the MOX program fell apart, although it was clear the plutonium could not be consumed. Now, it is set to accumulate more plutonium, this time in Japan.

Simply put, Japan already has tons of plutonium and no way to burn it. Further stockpiling is not only irresponsible but also a clear break with Japan’s pledge to produce no surplus plutonium.

Japan originally made this commitment in the interests of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, a field in which it is a valuable leader. Given the heightened political tension around disarmament and non-proliferation in North East Asia, and its role as Chair of the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan should not renege on this commitment.

For these reasons, Japan should indefinitely postpone active testing at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.

PETITION

To ensure that Japan does not breach its international commitment to the “principle of no surplus plutonium”, we urge the IAEA Secretariat and Board of Governors to immediately discuss this matter and quickly take appropriate action before active testing begins at Rokkasho and plutonium is accumulated.

5 January 2006

Hideyuki Ban (Co-Director)
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC)
3F Kotobuki Bldg., 1-58-15 Higashi-nakano
Nakano-ku, Tokyo, 164-0003, Japan
Phone: +81 3 5330 9520

Aileen Mioko Smith (Director)
Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75, Tanaka Sekiden-cho
Sakyo-ku Kyoto, 606-8203, Japan
Phone: +81 75 701 7223

Atsuko Nogawa (Nuclear Campaigner)
Greenpeace Japan
N F bldg. 2F 8-13-11 Nishi-Shinjuku
Shinjuku, Tokyo, 160-0023, Japan
Phone: +81 3 5338 9800

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*1 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Communication Received from Certain Member States Concerning their Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium”, INFCIRC/549/Add. 1, 31 March 1998. Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc549a1.pdf

*2 Japan Atomic Energy Commission, “Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy”, 14 October 2005, p.34.

Available at http://aec.jst.go.jp/jicst/NC/eng/index.htm

*3 Ibid, p.11.

Contact:
Aileen Mioko Smith (Green Action)
Cell: 090-3620-9251
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center
Tel: 03-5330-9520

5 January 2006 (Kyoto, Japan)—Japanese NGOs today sent a letter to IAEA Director

General Mohamed ElBaradei and the Board of Governors urging the inter-governmental body to discuss and take action to ensure Japan upholds its 1997 commitment made to the international organization not to produce surplus plutonium.

Testing scheduled to take place next month at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant will separate out 4 tons of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. This will violate the commitment Japan made to the IAEA because the plutonium cannot be consumed.

The petition sent to the IAEA by Green Action, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center and Greenpeace Japan states, “Japan originally made this commitment in the interests of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, a field in which it is a valuable leader. Given the heightened political tension around disarmament and non-proliferation in North East Asia, and its role as Chair of the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan should not renege on this commitment.”

Green Action director Aileen Mioko Smith stated, “Japanese utilities will shortly be going public with a fabricated plutonium utilization plan. The Japanese government is intending to approve it. Instead Japan should keep its promise to the IAEA and indefinitely postpone testing at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.”

Japan already has over 42 tons of surplus plutonium in Europe and Japan.

May 29, 2005 (Revised)

WHAT IS MONJU

Monju (280MW) is Japan’s prototype fast breeder reactor located at the tip of the Tsuruga Peninsula in Fukui Prefecture. On January 27, 2003, the Nagoya Court of Appeals (Kanazawa Branch) handed down a verdict in favor of Fukui citizens suing to stop the reactor from operating. The court found the license issued by the national government for Monju illegal due to serious deficiencies in the government’s safety review. On January 31, 2003, the national government appealed the decision.

The Supreme Court verdict on Monju is to be handed down May 30, 2005 in Tokyo.

Monju has been shut down since December 8, 1995 because of a sodium leak and fire accident. The accident occurred while the reactor was undergoing testing at low output before attaining full power.

The Japanese government and Monju’s owner and operator, Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) sought an early re-start of the reactor, and on February 6, 2005 Governor Nishikawa of Fukui gave approval for refurbishment work necessary for re-start. Construction work is underway.

Japan currently has 54 commercial nuclear power plants (light water reactors). These reactors use uranium for fuel and supply approximately 34% of Japan’s electricity demand. Fast breeder reactor technology which uses a mixture of plutonium and uranium fuel has been under development in Japan since the 1960’s with the aim of replacing the current inefficient nuclear technology. Plutonium, an element non-existent in nature, is created in conventional nuclear reactors as the uranium fuel fissions, and is extracted for use by reprocessing.

Advocates of the fast breeder claim that the technology would create a never-ending source of energy because it can convert uranium 238, an abundant isotope of uranium that could not be used as fuel in conventional reactors, into plutonium, thus breeding even greater quantities of plutonium than was put into the reactor.

However, in spite of being the main pillar of the Japanese government’s nuclear energy long-term development plan for decades, and costs exceeding 2 trillion yen, the fast breeder program has to date produced only one hour of electricity (at Monju in September 1995). (The Long Term Program for the Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy  is reviewed once every 5 years. The fast breeder program has to date been a part of nine Long Term Programs.)

Commercialization of the fast breeder is nowhere in site. The Japanese government’s Long Term Program [November 2000] now makes no mention of specific goals for commercialization. The current program nevertheless calls for the early re-start of Monju.

Nuclear weapon states such as the USA, Britain, and France spent decades developing fast breeder technology as part of their nuclear weapons and energy programs. However all three countries have since abandoned their programs. Germany also constructed a prototype fast breeder reactor at Kalkar but abandoned the program before the reactor went into operation.

WHY DO CITIZENS WANT TO STOP MONJU

Fast breeder reactor technology is dangerous because it uses immense quantities of plutonium. In addition the fast breeder is vulnerable to reactivity accidents (explosions). Monju requires 1.2 tons of plutonium. The half-life of plutonium is 24,000 years (i.e. it takes 24,000 years for plutonium’s radioactivity to halve). One millionth of 1 gram of plutonium entering the lungs can cause lung cancer.

Fast breeder reactors, unlike conventional nuclear reactors that use water as a source of coolant, use sodium to cool the reactor and transfer the heat for electricity generation. Sodium burns and explodes when it comes into contact with air and water. In Monju, the thickness of the pipes separating the sodium from the water is only 3.8 mm thick. Many fast breeder reactors that were under development in the world have suffered accidents involving sodium.

Although proponents state that the plutonium that fast breeder reactors would breed would provide a virtually never-ending source of energy, it is highly doubtful whether fast breeders could ever operate long enough without technical difficulties or accidents to produce enough plutonium to be worthwhile as an energy source.

Fast breeder reactors are particularly vulnerable to earthquakes since the high heat generated by the reactor has made it necessary for the pipes to be bent in many locations in order to absorb the expanding and shrinking of pipe materials, and pipes are strung up in this configuration. Monju is located in an area with several earthquake faults.

Commercial use of plutonium involves the handling of massive quantities of this nuclear weapon capable material. Only a few kilograms of plutonium are necessary to make a nuclear weapon. (The IAEA considers 8 kilograms to be an SQ, significant quantity, enough to make one nuclear weapon.) One commercial breeder would require approximately 10 tons of plutonium, five tons approximate in the reactor and an additional five tons approximate for refueling. If fast breeder reactors were to supply the same amount of nuclear energy as is currently supplied in Japan by conventional nuclear power plants, they would require more than twice the plutonium as is in all the nuclear weapons worldwide today.

The plutonium Monju would breed if operated, although not great in quantity, is super weapons-grade plutonium. One of the reasons nuclear weapon states developed fast breeder technology was to obtain this type of plutonium. Possession and development of such technology by Japan would be a detriment to Asian regional security.

ISN’T MONJU NECESSARY TO MEET JAPAN’S ENERGY NEEDS

Even if development of the fast breeder were to proceed according to hopes of advocates, the technology would not be capable of supplying 1% of Japan’s energy needs in the mid-21st century. (Five full size fast breeder reactors operating at capacity would supply little more than 1% of Japan’s total energy needs based on current demands. Commercialization by 2050 is considered to be difficult even by fast breeder advocates.)

WHY HAVE THE MONJU PROGRAM IF IT CAN’T SUPPLY ELECTRICITY

Without a fast breeder program or use of MOX (mixed plutonium and uranium) fuel at conventional nuclear power plants in Japan, the Japanese government and electric utilities would need to admit that there is no need to extract plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel of nuclear power plants. If there is no need for plutonium to be extracted from the spent nuclear fuel, it would become unnecessary to ship this fuel to the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Aomori for reprocessing. Without being able to ship the fuel to Rokkasho, the fuel would “overflow” at nuclear power plant sites and utilities would be forced to shut down their nuclear power plants because there would no longer be space to store the spent fuel.

The breeder program is a hoax energy program, and one of the reasons for continuing the program is to defer dealing with the nuclear waste problem. There is also concern that Japan continues the fast breeder program because the Japanese government wants to maintain and develop its plutonium technology with the intent of keeping the options open to some day possess nuclear weapons. Another reason given for the program continuing is bureaucratic stagnation and Diet inaction.

WHAT ARE CITIZENS DOING TO STOP MONJU

Citizens nationwide have submitted more than one million signatures calling on the Japanese government to initiate a moratorium on Monju. The civil and administrative lawsuit against Monju filed in September 1985 by Fukui Prefecture citizens although ending in plaintiffs’ defeat in March 2000, was reversed by victory in the Court of Appeals as mentioned above.

More than 200,000 Fukui Prefecture citizens are on record signing a petition seeking permanent closure of Monju. Another national petition drive is on-going demanding complete closure of Monju, and 980,000 signatures have been gathered to date.

END

Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center
1-58-15-3F, Higashi-nakano, Nakano-ku
Tokyo, Japan
Phone:+81-3-5330-9520
Fax: +81-3-5330-9530

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku
Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
Phone:+81-75-701-7223
Fax: +81-75-702-1952

Rokkasho. The name might not be well known outside of the anti-nuclear movement, but we hope it will become better known during the NPT Review Conference.

Rokkasho is the site of a huge reprocessing plant being constructed on the northern tip of Honshu, the largest island in Japan. In December last year it began uranium trials (testing the processes using depleted uranium). Active trials using spent nuclear fuel are scheduled to begin in December this year and the plant is due to start operations in May 2007. It will then become the first commercial-scale reprocessing plant outside of the nuclear weapons states, extracting 8 tons of plutonium per year from the spent fuel produced in Japan’s nuclear reactors. That is enough to build 1,000 Nagasaki-type bombs per year. If that isn’t reason enough for it to be placed high on the agenda of the NPT Review Conference, what is

George Bush might not often agree with Mohamed ElBaradei and Kofi Annan, but he agrees that facilities for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and for uranium enrichment present a nuclear proliferation risk. Though the fine points of their proposals differ, over the last year or so all three of them have called for a moratorium on these facilities. They have all also studiously avoided mentioning Rokkasho. George Bush much prefers to talk about Iran and North Korea, but, dangerous though the nuclear developments in those two countries are, he can’t expect the world to take him seriously when he ignores Japan’s enrichment and reprocessing facilities. If ‘non-nuclear weapons state’ Japan is allowed to operate Rokkasho, other non-nuclear weapons states will inevitably feel discriminated against if they can’t have such facilities too. It sets a bad precedent for would-be proliferators, regardless of whether Japan plans to build nuclear weapons itself. So Rokkasho should be the first candidate for a moratorium.

ElBaradei has said that the moratorium idea will be raised at the NPT Review Conference, but at the moment the proposal doesn’t seem to have the support of most of the key players. Japan, the US and Iran have all rejected it on the grounds of narrowly defined ‘national interests’. They don’t want any of their pet projects to be jeopardized. A broad view of the ‘national interests’ of these countries would recognize that the unraveling of the non-proliferation regime is about as dangerous a development as could be imagined. Measured against this greater ‘national interest’, sacrificing new reprocessing and enrichment projects, the benefits of which are highly dubious anyway, shouldn’t be too difficult a decision. But lack of vision seems to be a common problem amongst the world’s leaders these days, so we don’t expect them to shift without some pressure from below.

NGOs must take the lead on this issue. Even though a few national governments are determined to kill the moratorium idea, NGOs must not lose sight of the main issue. The moratorium idea was proposed to respond to a real danger. That danger is that if weapons-usable material continues to be produced, and if more and more countries develop the technology to produce this material, nuclear weapons will be acquired by more and more countries, and the chance of these weapons finding their way into the hands of terrorists increases. If governments won’t focus on this danger in a non-discriminatory way, NGOs must continue to bring their attention back to this issue.

We can give credit to Mohamed ElBaradei for putting the issue on the NPT Review Conference agenda, but we can’t leave it to him to take the running on the debate. He and his organization, the IAEA, are committed to promoting nuclear energy, so they have linked the moratorium proposal to the perverse idea of internationalizing reprocessing and uranium enrichment services. We must continue to point out the flaws in this proposal.

Let us raise the issue of Rokkasho and other related issues at, among others, the following event:

Thursday, May 5

“Stopping the Spread of Plutonium; The Argument for Abandoning the Japanese Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant”

When:

Thursday, May 5th. 11am -1 pm

Where:

UN Conference Room E

Contact:

Damon Moglen

Public Outreach Coordinator

Global Security Program

Union of Concerned Scientists

Email: dmoglen@ucsusa.org

Phone: 202-331-5425

Article by: Philip White and Aileen Mioko Smith

Philip White
International Liaison Officer
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (Tokyo)

Aileen Mioko Smith
Director,
Green Action (Kyoto, Japan)
—
Information in English about Rokkasho:
http://cnic.jp/english/topics/cycle/rokkasho/index.html

Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center
1-58-15-3F, Higashi-nakano, Nakano-ku
Tokyo, Japan
Phone:+81-3-5330-9520
Fax: +81-3-5330-9530

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku
Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
Phone:+81-75-701-7223
Fax: +81-75-702-1952

Kyodo Wire Services

14 February 2005 20:34

NISA, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency’s “Inquiry Committee on Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant Comprehensive Inspection” (Chairperson: Keiji KANDA) met on the 14th to begin its examination into the causes etc. of the faulty design of the High Level Vitrified Radioactive Waste Storage Facility’s cooling equipment.

After the meeting Chairperson KANDA made clear his intention to instruct that a comprehensive inspection be undertaken on the design of all of JNFL’s nuclear fuel cycle facilities including the Reprocessing Plant and the Uranium Enrichment Plant. The results of the inspection is to be reported by JNFL to the committee at its meeting to be held the coming fiscal year.

The design faults which were found are in the #4 Installation etc. of the Reprocessing Plantﾕs vitrified nuclear waste storage buildings. The vitrified waste temperature targeted to be 500 degrees or lower was first reported to be approximately 430 degrees. However, recalculations revealed the temperatures would go over 620 degrees.

(Informal English translation by Green Action)

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
T + 81 75 701 7223
F + 81 75 702 1952
E-mail amsmith@gol.com
Contact:
Aileen Mioko Smith Mobile:
+81-90-3620-9251

Sept 24th 2004
PETITION
FUKUI PREFECTURE

To: Shoichi Nakagawa, Minister, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
From: Issei Nishikawa, Governor, Fukui Prefecture

On the 9th of August 2004 an accident occurred at the Mihama Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 reactor. This incident seriously injured 11 people 5 of which lost their lives. This was the biggest disaster to date in the history of Japanese nuclear power.

In Fukui Prefecture we have worked hard for many years to win the people s trust and to build a safe reputation for nuclear power. It is extremely regrettable that this accident has destroyed that trust and the reputation of nuclear power in Fukui Prefecture.

I have serious misgivings about the government policy of leaving the supervision of the secondary loop to the autonomous safety inspections of the utilities. I strongly urge that the Government strengthen its involvement in the secondary loop inspection regime and establish a comprehensive strategy emphasizing prevention of accidents before they occur. The Government is responsible for ensuring safety and I strongly petition that it respond.

I petition that the Government undertake, as rapidly as possible, a responsible response to the issues raised in this petition.

Governor, Fukui Prefecture
Issei Nishikawa.

[EXCERPTS OF ISSUES RAISED]

1. Concerning the Investigation into the Cause of the Accident and Establishment of Measures to Prevent Reoccurrence

The government should undertake a comprehensive technical investigation into the rupture of the pipe, the direct cause of the accident. In addition the government should investigate the problem of supervision of the thickness of the pipes and address the companies  general approach to safety, which can be thought of as the background which caused the accident.

The government should make all efforts to carry out a thorough deliberation of the application of and supervision of safety procedures listed below, and implement a comprehensive strategy to prevent the reoccurrence of similar accidents:

• the utility s autonomous management system which address requirements of outside consignors
• method of assuring that the utility s data management system and inspection regimes are appropriately in place
• accurate sharing of technical information with other utilities  and manufacturers

2. A Reassessment of Measures to be Undertaken for Aging Nuclear Power Plants

We are entering an era where nuclear power plants are aging, demanding even greater thoroughness of inspections. The Mihama Unit 3 accident was an accident brought on by the fact due attention was not paid to the aging problem.

A reassessment of the measures to be taken for the nation s aging plants must be undertaken which establishes the methods of inspection and assessment that include a detailed investigation into damage due to aging which has occurred in Europe and the USA, analyses and appraisals of safety regulation and management methods, investigation and examination of the newest knowledge and information, and inspection of aging nuclear power plants.

4. Building a Radically Different Safety Management System

(1) The government should constantly take the newest knowledge and information, including information which can be gleaned from examples of accidents both domestic and international, establishing clear safety standards, maintenance standards, and inspection guidelines based on scientific rationality.

5. Establishing a Comprehensive System whereby the Safety Authority will be Located within Local/ Regional Authorities where Nuclear Power Plants are Located

The regulatory functions of nuclear power plant safety should be transferred to the local/regional areas where nuclear power plants are located, and should adopt regional solutions in alignment with the area.

6. Nuclear Inspection and Research Organs

In order that nuclear power be trusted by the people and become an industry that is well established within the region, it is absolutely necessary that a research and development body be established at the site of the local/regional authority where the nuclear power plants are located. We demand that the government establish such a body in Fukui Prefecture. This body will look into the causes of accidents and incidents, undertake inspection and analysis etc. on potential accidents and incidents, be a testing and research institute which will undertake inspection and research concerning safety issues, and, undertake a wide range of nuclear research over a broad area of discipline.

7. The Government s Safety Regulatory Regime

(1) In this day and age of fast pace new technological developments, it is necessary to rapidly incorporate new knowledge, with a government safety regime which aims for precision, reliability, transparency, fairness, and speed.

We demand that a regulatory regime for safety be established which can be trusted by the citizens of this nation and whose seat of responsibility is clearly delineated. This would entail a fundamental revamping of current nuclear power safety regulation such as bringing together into one entity such organs as the Nuclear Safety Commission and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), making transparent what are the responsibilities and roles of government and industry respectfully, etc.

(2) We demand that a Nuclear Power Accident Investigation Committee (provisional name) be established. This committee would have the authority to propose investigation into the cause of serious accidents at nuclear facilities or into indications where such accidents may occur, and to issue recommendations concerning policies to prevent accidents.

8. The Government’s Role in Recovering Trust in Nuclear Power

The government must commit its utmost to recover the trust of prefectural citizens in nuclear power lost as a result of this accident, eradicating anxiety and suspicion. This should be undertaken by investigating the causes of the accident, and, with regards to deliberation concerning measures to prevent reoccurrence and the current state of the utility’s inspection results, the government should explain and report thoroughly to the local/regional authorities where the plants are located, making the information public in a timely and proper manner.

END

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku
Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
Phone:+81-75-701-7223
Fax: +81-75-702-1952

14 May 2004

Mr Stephen Timms MP
Minister for Energy
C/O The British Embassy
Tokyo, Japan
Tel: 03-5211-1332
Fax: 03-5211-1270

Dear Mr Timms

We are Japanese citizens, consumer, professional and anti-nuclear organisations from Osaka, Kyoto, Aomori, the Tokyo and central Japan regions. We write to you concerning BNFL’s hopes of resurrecting business with Japanese electric utilities concerning MOX (mixed oxide) fuel use, this time at the Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP).

Trust in BNFL has been destroyed in Japan. The December 1999 BNFL data falsification scandal is still very fresh in the minds of the Japanese public. In a recent Fukui legislative session, distrust concerning BNFL was raised yet again, and an important conservative Fukui legislator in the region, Akihiro Ichise adamantly stated he would not allow BNFL MOX fuel in Fukui.

If BNFL were serious about regaining trust, as a first step it would reveal all its quality assurance data for MOX fuel made for Kansai Electric at MDF. This includes the top, middle, and bottom measurements of all pellets diameters for the Takahama Unit 4 fuel. Then and only then can inroads be made to get to the bottom of past scandals.

On 16 December 1999, the then MITI minister Takashi Fukaya declared the “collapse of trust for BNFL”. BNFL’s poor track record since the 1999 MOX fuel quality control data falsification incident has assured that this view remains unchanged today.

The multitude of safety violations at Sellafield over the years which have been documented by the British newspapers also continue to shock Japanese citizens and nuclear safety officials in the prefectures that intend to use MOX fuel in Japan.

BNFL’s lack of technical experience and its management inability were also stated in the Japanese courts in 2000 and 2001. (See attachment.) The inability to successfully operate SMP have further confirmed BNFL’s lack of technical experience and management inability.

The motive and extent of the MDF falsification has yet to be determined by BNFL or the NII. This has significant generic implications beyond “bored workers” or an “outdated MDF plant”.

In its verdict the Fukushima District Court also quotes from the report issued by the BNFL-Manufactured MOX Fuel Data Problem Investigation Committee set up by MITI. The title of the report quoted and date issued is, “BNFL-Manufactured MOX Fuel Data Problem Investigation Committee Report” , 22 June 2000. The court states:

“The report severely criticizes BNFL’s corporate constitution stating, ….’The occurrence of such a state of affairs is proof that the system for quality control is frail, showing inadequacy in the site management by those responsible for quality assurance work. This sort of company is not qualified to conduct business in the field of nuclear power.’ ”

Once again it should be noted that the committee does not state “the MDF plant is not qualified”, but “this sort of company” is not qualified, referring to BNFL as a whole. Simply having built a fully automated new plant, the SMP, which is yet to operate successfully, will not solve this problem.

How can BNFL possibly expect to gain the trust of Japanese electric utilities when it continues to hide, or adamantly ignore addressing, past problems The crucial, unresolved issues concerning the 1999 falsification of Kansai Electric MOX fuel quality assurance data reveal significant current problems with BNFL :

• – BNFL has ignored issues raised by Kansai Electric in the company’s 1 March 2000 Report concerning other forms of cheating, suspicious data in other fuel pellet lots manufactured for Kansai Electric at MDF. [See Kansai Electric (2000), An Investigation into the Problem of BNFL Fabricated MOX Fuel, 1 March 2000.] This is also addressed by the BNFL committee set up by MITI and documented in the Fukushima District Court verdict of 23 March 2001. (See above.)
• – BNFL states the SMP plant is “fully automated”. But this means very little to us in Japan, since in the past BNFL secretly made changes to “failsafe” checks, making them no longer “failsafe”.* [* Nuclear Safety Inspector Was Kept in the Dark by BNFL, The Independent, 8 March 2000.] BNFL described its automated check on pellet diameter at MDF as “failsafe”, when in actuality it had made changes to this test which made it no longer “failsafe”, while keeping this fact from the NII. Indeed we understand form the May 10th issue of Nuclear Fuel that the SMP is not even operating due to commissioning problems.
• – BNFL has failed to identify individual(s) who sabotaged Japanese customer fuel.* The fact that it does not continue to investigate this matter indicates that BNFL must not be concerned if these people work at the SMP plant it hopes to operate. (*The Kansai Electric Report of March 2000 goes extensively into the incident in which a screw was inserted by an unknown person or persons into the MOX fuel rod manufactured for Kansai Electric. The media in the central region of Japan also reported on this incident with many newspapers printing photographs of the fuel rod picturing the pellets and the inserted screw. BNFL, however, never exerted effort into resolving this problem.)
• – BNFL has yet to identify the motives for the data falsification that took place at MDF, but, nevertheless, is attempting to sell the SMP to Japanese customers. There is genuine concern in Japan that manufacturing ability at BNFL is deficient , and that this could possibly have lead to cheating on quality control. In other words cheating not just because workers are bored, but cheating as a necessary part of passing MOX pellet lots.

A case in point is TEPCO elaborating in its Fukushima Court testimony that BNFL could not meet Mitsubishi specifications for Kansai Electric MOX fuel. TEPCO states,

”…It is pointed out that, ‘Although Mitsubishi had sought the automation of the pellet random sampling inspection during examination of the manufacturing process conducted at the time of pre-production [of MOX fuel for Kansai Electric], BNFL did not accept this, stating that this improvement would be too difficult to make.’ From this it can be easily imagined that BNFL’s production capability and quality control ability is deficient when compared to that of Belgonucleaire. It has to be said that since the ratio of disqualified pellets during the random sampling inspection at BNFL is 1.25 percent, the manufacturing ability and quality control ability is in a low state.”

Kansai Electric in its March 2000 report also address BNFL’s production problems stating,

“According to production validation made by MHI [Mitsubishi], the outer diameter of pellets produced at MDF satisfied the specification but had a process capability index as 1.04 which is less than 1.33 which is criteria regarded as an index for “production being stable”.

The Kansai Electric Report continues,

“On the number of samples in the AQL for outer diameter inspection, MHI initially proposed to BNFL the extraction of 20 pellets by way of weighing extraction method. Against this, BNFL indicated that there was no proper distribution of diameter due to the performance of the grinding machine, and asserted that the account extraction method would be inappropriate.”

A track record of falsification and secretly altering checks and yet declaring them “failsafe”, refusing to release quality control data that will prove one way or the other if other types of falsification have taken place, coupled with a process capability index which did not meet the criteria for stable production, no proper distribution of pellet diameter … These and other problems all point to the possibility that other forms of falsification much more devious than simply “copying data because of boredom” have taken place at BNFL. This definitely cannot be resolved simply by starting up another plant, the SMP, at Sellafield..

Our view is that if you and BNFL are genuinely interested in regaining trust, BNFL would be addressing these issues.

Yours sincerely,

Aileen Mioko Smith
Director,
Green Action (Kyoto)

Yoko TOMIYAMA
Chairperson,
Consumers Union of Japan

Shigetoshi IWAMATSU
President,
Japan Congress against A- and H-Bombs (GENSUIKIN)

Hideyuki Koyama
Director of
Osaka Citizens against the Mihama, Oi and
Tkahama Nuclear Power Plants(Mihama no Kai)

Kazue SUZUKI
Nuclear Campaigner,
Greenpeace Japan

Ryoich HIRANO
Chair,
Nuclear Fuel Waste Intake Arrest Action Committee

Hideyuki BAN
Co-Director,
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center

ATTACHMENT:

In a statement to the Fukushima District Court last September, Tokyo Electric (TEPCO), as defendant in an injunction case brought forward by citizens groups, asserted that the company has a low assessment of BNFL MOX technology. TEPCO states,

“Belgonucleaire has abundant experience in the manufacture of MOX fuel. In comparison, however, BNFL’s MOX fuel fabrication facility is…by nature that of a demonstration plant level… its manufacturing experience …by far inferior to that of Belgonucleaire. ”

In further testimony, TEPCO once again emphasizes BNFL’s lack of experience as a whole in MOX fuel fabrication. The company states:

”… BNFL which fabricated MOX fuel for Kansai Electric began operations in 1993, and, moreover, its annual manufacturing capacity is less than one-quarter that of Belgonucleaire, resulting in an extraordinary gap in manufacturing experience. The disparity is remarkable* between the two companies’ experience. [*Translator’s note: “conspicuous, remarkable, marked, striking, prominent” in Japanese].

TEPCO court submission to Fukushima District Court. Submission (Yo) #33,

18 September 2000.

Clearly, TEPCO considers BNFL to be inexperienced and technically inferior to Belgonucleaire, and therefore, by association, to COGEMA.

The Fukushima District Court in its 23 March 2001 verdict also addresses the BNFL problem. When addressing the types of falsification conducted by BNFL on MOX fuel manufactured for Kansai Electric, the court acknowledges,

”… when the measurement value went slightly above the specification value, the inspectors [at BNFL] undertook such practices as re-measuring the pellet, rotating it 90 degrees.”

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
T + 81 75 701 7223
F + 81 75 702 1952
E-mail amsmith@gol.com
Contact:
Aileen Mioko Smith Mobile:
+81-90-3620-9251

Stop Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Aomori Japan —

For Immediate Release: 25 April 2003 Contact: Aileen Mioko Smith Mobile: +81-90-3620-9251

On 25 April, Green Action and other Japanese citizen and consumer organizations issued an appeal to governments party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty asking them to urge Japan "not to go forward with separation of massive quantities of plutonium at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant."

The Rokkasho plant (800 tons HM/year) is located in Aomori Prefecture, northern Japan and is scheduled to begin uranium commissioning this June according to Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd (JNFL), owner/operator of the plant. Reprocessing is scheduled to start in 2005. The plant is capable of separating out 7 tons of weapons-capable plutonium a year.*

The Appeal is being sent by facsimile to key governments party to the NPT. Satomi Oba, director of the Hiroshima-based organization Plutonium Action Hiroshima, will be traveling to Switzerland on 28 April, addressing the Appeal further during the NPT PrepCom being held in Geneva 28 April – 9 May.

The Appeal is being issued by: (Alphabetical Order) Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, Consumers Union of Japan, Green Action, Greenpeace Japan, Mihama-no-Kai, No Nukes Asia Forum, Plutonium Action Hiroshima, and Stop the Monju.

The Appeal states, "The Japanese people have in our collective memory the devastating effects of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We are therefore seriously concerned with the current build-up in nuclear tensions in the Far East — the Korean Peninsula and Japan. This, more than anything, urges us to write to you today."

"Japan has a program to use massive quantities of plutonium for civil use. In spite of there being no demand for plutonium in Japan due to a standstill in the implementation of this program, Japan is going forward with preparations to operate a huge reprocessing plant capable of separating out massive quantities of plutonium." Japan already has a huge plutonium surplus**, 4.1 tons in Japan and 32.4 tons stockpiled at reprocessing plants in France and Britain.

The organizations point out Japan’s problematic track record when it comes to plutonium management. In 1994 the then Nagasaki mayor Hitoshi Motoshima called plutonium management Tokaimura, "careless to the extreme". This year an SRD (Shipper/Receiver Difference) of 206 kilograms (recently questionably revised to 59 kilograms) of plutonium was recorded at the Tokai Reprocessing Plant (120 tons HM/year). The Appeal states, "Japanese sloppiness with plutonium management is a serious concern considering the scheduled operation of the much larger scale Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant."

The Rokkasho plant, if operated, will be the first large-scale plant capable of separating plutonium in a non-nuclear weapons state.

* According to the IAEA, 8 kilograms of reactor grade plutonium is one "significant quantity", enough to make one nuclear weapon.

**Latest figure: December 2001. Quantity in 2003 is greater.

Immediate release:

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
T + 81 75 701 7223
F + 81 75 702 1952
E-mail amsmith@gol.com
Contact:
Aileen Mioko Smith Mobile:
+81-90-3620-9251

We are organizations in Japan concerned with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Japanese people have in our collective memory the devastating effects of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We are therefore seriously concerned with the current build-up in nuclear tensions in the Far East — the Korean Peninsula and Japan. This, more than anything, urges us to write to you today.

---

Japan has a program to use massive quantities of plutonium for civil use. In spite of there being no demand for plutonium in Japan due to a standstill in the implementation of this program, Japan is going forward with preparations to operate a huge reprocessing plant capable of separating out massive quantities of plutonium.

The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (800 tons HM/year) will be the first large-scale reprocessing plant located in a non-nuclear weapons state. Rokkasho, if operated, would be capable of separating 7 tons of plutonium a year.

Now is the time to stop the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant. The plant is scheduled to begin reprocessing in 2005. Testing with depleted uranium is to begin later on this year (2003). The testing will contaminate the plant, thus furthering Japan’s commitment to reprocessing and making Rokkasho even more difficult to stop.

Japan already has a huge plutonium surplus. As of the end of 2001 there were 4.1 tons of surplus plutonium in Japan, and 32.4 tons of Japanese plutonium stockpiled at reprocessing plants in Europe (France and Britain).

Rokkasho’s plutonium was originally intended to be consumed at Japanese commercial nuclear power plants. However, the program has not been implemented. Two of the three governors of the prefectures scheduled to first use this fuel have rescinded their prior approval for the program.

In the meantime, Japan’s fast breeder reactor program — four decades under development and yet to produce but one hour of electricity in total — received a severe blow this January when a Japanese High Court revoked the original license granted by the national government for Japan’s prototype fast breeder reactor Monju.

Monju is capable of producing enough weapons-grade plutonium in two weeks to make one nuclear weapon. There are no plans to commercialize fast breeder reactor technology under Japan’s current Long-Term Program for Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy. In spite of this, the Japanese government is pressing for early restart of Monju.

Japan has a problematic track record when it comes to plutonium management.A 70 kilogram hold-up of plutonium occurred in 1994 at the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF) during fabrication of Monju fuel with a subsequent long delay in clean up. The problem provoked the then Nagasaki mayor to state that plutonium management at the plant was "careless to the extreme".

This year an SRD (Shipper/Receiver Difference) of 206 kilograms (recently revised to 59 kilograms) of plutonium was recorded at the Tokai Reprocessing Plant (120 tons HM/year). Japanese sloppiness with plutonium management is a serious concern considering the scheduled operation of the much larger scale Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant.

We ask all nations concerned with security in Asia to immediately urge Japan not to go forward with separation of plutonium at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Aomori Prefecture, northern Japan.

We wish to thank you for your persevering efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons, and as states party to the NPT meeting in Geneva to discuss the many critical challenges facing the non-proliiferation regime, we hope that you will consider the request stated in this appeal.

Yours sincerely,

Hideyuki BAN
Co-director
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center

Yoko TOMIYAMA
Chairperson
Consumers Union of Japan

Aileen Mioko SMITH
Director
Green Action

Masashi KIMURA
Executive Director
Greenpeace Japan

Hideyuki KOYAMA
Director
Mihama-no-Kai (Osaka)

Daisuke SATO
Executive Director
No Nukes Asia Forum (Japan)

Satomi OBA
Director
Plutonium Action Hiroshima

Fukiko IKEJIMA
Director
Stop the Monju

Green Action

Tel: +81-75-701-7223 Fax: +81-75-702-1952 amsmith@gol.com

Plutonium Action Hiroshima

2258-14, Ichikawa, Shiraki-cho Asakita-ku, Hiroshima 739-141 Japan

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
T + 81 75 701 7223
F + 81 75 702 1952
E-mail amsmith@gol.com

Plutonium Action Hiroshima
2258-14, Ichikawa, Shiraki-cho Asakita-ku, Hiroshima
739-141Japan

For Immediate Release: 25 April 2003 Contact: Aileen Mioko Smith 　 Mobile: +81-90-3620-9251

On 25 April, Green Action and other Japanese citizen and consumer organizations issued an appeal to governments party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty asking them to urge Japan "not to go forward with separation of massive quantities of plutonium at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant."

The Rokkasho plant (800 tons HM/year) is located in Aomori Prefecture, northern Japan and is scheduled to begin uranium commissioning this June according to Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd (JNFL), owner/operator of the plant. Reprocessing is scheduled to start in 2005. The plant is capable of separating out 7 tons of weapons-capable plutonium a year.*

The Appeal is being sent by facsimile to key governments party to the NPT. Satomi Oba, director of the Hiroshima-based organization Plutonium Action Hiroshima, will be traveling to Switzerland on 28 April, addressing the Appeal further during the NPT PrepCom being held in Geneva 28 April – 9 May.

The Appeal is being issued by: (Alphabetical Order) Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, Consumers Union of Japan, Green Action, Greenpeace Japan, Mihama-no-Kai, No Nukes Asia Forum, Plutonium Action Hiroshima, and Stop the Monju.

The Appeal states, "The Japanese people have in our collective memory the devastating effects of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We are therefore seriously concerned with the current build-up in nuclear tensions in the Far East — the Korean Peninsula and Japan. This, more than anything, urges us to write to you today."

"Japan has a program to use massive quantities of plutonium for civil use. In spite of there being no demand for plutonium in Japan due to a standstill in the implementation of this program, Japan is going forward with preparations to operate a huge reprocessing plant capable of separating out massive quantities of plutonium." Japan already has a huge plutonium surplus**, 4.1 tons in Japan and 32.4 tons stockpiled at reprocessing plants in France and Britain.

The organizations point out Japan’s problematic track record when it comes to plutonium management. In 1994 the then Nagasaki mayor Hitoshi Motoshima called plutonium management Tokaimura, "careless to the extreme". This year an SRD (Shipper/Receiver Difference) of 206 kilograms (recently questionably revised to 59 kilograms) of plutonium was recorded at the Tokai Reprocessing Plant (120 tons HM/year). The Appeal states, "Japanese sloppiness with plutonium management is a serious concern considering the scheduled operation of the much larger scale Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant."

The Rokkasho plant, if operated, will be the first large-scale plant capable of separating plutonium in a non-nuclear weapons state.

* According to the IAEA, 8 kilograms of reactor grade plutonium is one "significant quantity", enough to make one nuclear weapon.

**Latest figure: December 2001. Quantity in 2003 is greater.

Immediate release:

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
T + 81 75 701 7223
F + 81 75 702 1952
E-mail amsmith@gol.com
Contact:
Aileen Mioko Smith Mobile:
+81-90-3620-9251