Largest Plutonium Sea Transport Could Pass Near Your Country SAFETY OF TRANSPORT NOT ASSURED

For further information contact: Aileen Mioko Smith, Cell: +81-90-3620-9251, Email: amsmith@gol.com Secret preparations are underway in Britain and France for shipping 1.8 tons of plutonium, the largest quantity of plutonium every shipped by sea. The plutonium is contained in 65 assemblies of MOX (mixed plutonium and uranium oxide) fuel and is being shipped to Japan for use in the nuclear power plants of three Japanese electric utilities. No details have been revealed, but it is reported that the fuel will be transported by two British-flagged vessels, escorting each other. The vessels are to depart Europe anytime on or after March 1st. Neither the hour of departure nor the maritime route …

Joint Public Appeal Issued by Regional NGOs in Niigata Chuetsuoki Earthquake Area Demanding Japanese Government Face Up to the Consequences of the Earthquake for Nuclear Power Plants in Japan

[97 organizations including Green Action have given their support to this public appeal as of 9am, July 21, 2007.] —Joint Public Appeal—We Strongly Urge a Radical Reexaminationof Earthquake Countermeasures for Nuclear Facilities,Facing Consequences Squarely Whatever the Outcome! [PDF version: 48KB][Japanese site]English translationJuly 21, 2007 To:— ABE Shinzo, Prime Minister of Japan— All those in relevant branches of government and in nuclear-related organizations— The People of Japan As a result of the Chuetsuoki Earthquake, unforeseen problems continue to arise at the largest nuclear power plant complex in the world, Tokyo Electric’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power station. All seven reactors are currently shut down, but they remain directly threatened by the danger of …

Japan Should Withdraw its Opportunistic, Cynical and Impractical Offer

Lessons the G8 Can Learn from Japan: the Nuclear Fuel Cycle is an Economic Failure Providing No Energy [Word Doc (US Letter size): 226kb] [Word Doc (A4 size): 234kb] For Immediate Release: 14 July 2006Contact: Philip White (CNIC) 03-5330-9520 Tokyo and Kyoto, Japan—-Japan has opportunistically jumped on President George Bush’s Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) bandwagon in the hope of aiding its troubled nuclear fuel cycle program and gaining recognition for Japan’s unique position as the only Non Nuclear Weapons State (NNWS) member of the Non Proliferation Treaty with access to the full nuclear fuel cycle. It is difficult to imagine, however, that Japan could play a significant role in …

Japan Should Withdraw its Opportunistic, Cynical and Impractical Offer to Cooperate with the US Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

10 July 2006Statement by Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center and Green Action [Word Doc (US Letter size): 255kb][Word Doc (A4 size): 253kb] Japan has opportunistically jumped on President George Bush’s Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) bandwagon. Just when doubts were being expressed about the proliferation dangers of separating plutonium at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant in Aomori Prefecture, GNEP was like a gift from Uncle George. The government is treating GNEP as a great opportunity to gain recognition of Japan’s unique position as the only Non Nuclear Weapons State (NNWS) member of the Non Proliferation Treaty with access to the full nuclear fuel cycle. Japan is the only NNWS with industrial scale …

Japan's Nuclear Fuel Cycle Program—An Economic Failure Providing No Energy for Japan

10 July 2006Japan's nuclear fuel cycle program has been under development since 1956. Despite several trillion yen (tens of billions of dollars) of ratepayer and taxpayer money spent, the program fails to provide any electricity to the public. Japan's nuclear fuel cycle program is comprised of the development of fast breeder reactor technology, use of mixed (plutonium and uranium) oxide fuel in commercial nuclear power plants, and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. None of these have attained commercial-scale use. The Fast Breeder Reactor Program Japan's fast breeder reactor (FBR) program begun under Japan's Long-Term Program for Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy (LTP) was originally scheduled to attain commercialization …

Demands Submitted by Dr. KANG Jungmin to the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)

[Translated from Japanese] [March 13, 2006] To: Mr. Toshihiro NikaiMinister of Economy, Trade and Industry As stated in the enclosed 9 March letter from Dr. Edwin Lyman (Union of Concerned Scientists) and Professor Frank von Hippel (Princeton University) to Aomori Governor Shingo Mimura, there are points that cannot be supported by facts in the explanation given by the Japanese Government to the six US Democratic members of Congress including Edward Markey, and to Aomori Prefecture. This concerns the international implications for nuclear proliferation of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. I therefore request that you take the following action before beginning active tests at the plant: Provide a detailed technical account of …

METI Response to Demands Submitted by Dr. KANG Jungmin

[Translated from Japanese] [March 13, 2006] METI officials responded along the following lines to the demands of Dr. Kang and five Japanese organizations. They promised to consider providing a written response to demands 1 through 3. Response to 1: Mr. Shinichi Mizumoto, Planning Officer (responsible for international nuclear energy issues), Nuclear Energy Policy Division, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, METI: The MOX issue is only one aspect of the holistic measures which consist of safeguards, physical protection, etc. We object to it being taken up independently. Since precautions are taken to prevent theft, I cannot respond to the question regarding the different degree of concern between MOX and plutonium …

Letter to governor of Aomori concerning Rokkasho and nuclear proliferation sent by Edwin S. Lyman, Jungmin Kang, and Frank von Hippel

March 9, 2006Governor Shingo MimuraGovernor’s Office 1-1-1 Nagashima, Aomori CityAomori Prefecture 030-8570 Japan Dear Governor Mimura, We are writing to you to express our concerns about the complacency that seems to exist in Japan regarding the threat posed by the Rokkasho reprocessing plant to international efforts to limit nuclear proliferation. If you give your approval, this plant in your prefecture may start active testing as early as the end of this month — a test that will ultimately separate over 4 tons of plutonium from spent fuel, enough to make more than 500 Nagasaki-type bombs. One example of this complacency can be observed in the February 14 letter sent by …

Response to Saga Prefecture’s Determination of the Safety of Pluthermal Use

Dr. Edwin S. LymanSenior Staff ScientistUnion of Concerned ScientistsMarch 3, 2006 1. MOX Fuel Relocation During LOCAs The planned use of MOX (pluthermal) fuel in the Genkai-3 reactor in Saga Prefecture will be well outside the existing commercial experience base for MOX fuel with regard to plutonium concentration and fuel burnup. Saga Prefecture acknowledges this, but asserts that even in the absence of commercial data for the regime to which the fuel will be exposed, sufficient experimental data exists and analytical tools are reliable enough to make accurate safety assessments. This assertion is not justified. While there is a very small quantity of experimental data on the performance of MOX …

Excerpts from Saga Prefecture February 7, 2006 document titled: “SAFETY ISSUES CONCERNING THE PLUTHEMAL PROGRAM FOR GENKAI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 3”

(Unofficial translation by Green Action) This document analyses 8 areas concerning safety of MOX fuel use. It presents arguments of both anti and pro MOX sides, and gives Saga Prefecture’s conclusions. For all items, Saga Prefecture agrees with the pro MOX argument. The 8 areas: 1. Control of Reactor (1) Efficacy of Control Rods and Boron (2) Concerning Self-regulating characteristics (3) Characteristics of Output Distribution 2. Safety of the Fuel (1) Melting Point of Fuel (2) Internal Pressure of Fuel (Plutonium Spots) 3. Experience with MOX Fuel Performance (1) Experience concerning Plutonium Enrichment Levels and Burn Up 4. Radioactive Dose During Normal Operation (1) Worker Dose 5. Effects Due to …