Letter to British Minister for Energy Timms concerning BNFL and MOX fuel from Green Action director and other directors of Japanese NGOs.

14 May 2004

Mr Stephen Timms MP
Minister for Energy
C/O The British Embassy
Tokyo, Japan
Tel: 03-5211-1332
Fax: 03-5211-1270

Dear Mr Timms

We are Japanese citizens, consumer, professional and anti-nuclear organisations from Osaka, Kyoto, Aomori, the Tokyo and central Japan regions. We write to you concerning BNFL’s hopes of resurrecting business with Japanese electric utilities concerning MOX (mixed oxide) fuel use, this time at the Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP).

Trust in BNFL has been destroyed in Japan. The December 1999 BNFL data falsification scandal is still very fresh in the minds of the Japanese public. In a recent Fukui legislative session, distrust concerning BNFL was raised yet again, and an important conservative Fukui legislator in the region, Akihiro Ichise adamantly stated he would not allow BNFL MOX fuel in Fukui.

If BNFL were serious about regaining trust, as a first step it would reveal all its quality assurance data for MOX fuel made for Kansai Electric at MDF. This includes the top, middle, and bottom measurements of all pellets diameters for the Takahama Unit 4 fuel. Then and only then can inroads be made to get to the bottom of past scandals.

On 16 December 1999, the then MITI minister Takashi Fukaya declared the “collapse of trust for BNFL”. BNFL’s poor track record since the 1999 MOX fuel quality control data falsification incident has assured that this view remains unchanged today.

The multitude of safety violations at Sellafield over the years which have been documented by the British newspapers also continue to shock Japanese citizens and nuclear safety officials in the prefectures that intend to use MOX fuel in Japan.

BNFL’s lack of technical experience and its management inability were also stated in the Japanese courts in 2000 and 2001. (See attachment.) The inability to successfully operate SMP have further confirmed BNFL’s lack of technical experience and management inability.

The motive and extent of the MDF falsification has yet to be determined by BNFL or the NII. This has significant generic implications beyond “bored workers” or an “outdated MDF plant”.

In its verdict the Fukushima District Court also quotes from the report issued by the BNFL-Manufactured MOX Fuel Data Problem Investigation Committee set up by MITI. The title of the report quoted and date issued is, “BNFL-Manufactured MOX Fuel Data Problem Investigation Committee Report” , 22 June 2000. The court states:

“The report severely criticizes BNFL’s corporate constitution stating, ….’The occurrence of such a state of affairs is proof that the system for quality control is frail, showing inadequacy in the site management by those responsible for quality assurance work. This sort of company is not qualified to conduct business in the field of nuclear power.’ ”

Once again it should be noted that the committee does not state “the MDF plant is not qualified”, but “this sort of company” is not qualified, referring to BNFL as a whole. Simply having built a fully automated new plant, the SMP, which is yet to operate successfully, will not solve this problem.

How can BNFL possibly expect to gain the trust of Japanese electric utilities when it continues to hide, or adamantly ignore addressing, past problems The crucial, unresolved issues concerning the 1999 falsification of Kansai Electric MOX fuel quality assurance data reveal significant current problems with BNFL :

  • – BNFL has ignored issues raised by Kansai Electric in the company’s 1 March 2000 Report concerning other forms of cheating, suspicious data in other fuel pellet lots manufactured for Kansai Electric at MDF. [See Kansai Electric (2000), An Investigation into the Problem of BNFL Fabricated MOX Fuel, 1 March 2000.] This is also addressed by the BNFL committee set up by MITI and documented in the Fukushima District Court verdict of 23 March 2001. (See above.)
  • – BNFL states the SMP plant is “fully automated”. But this means very little to us in Japan, since in the past BNFL secretly made changes to “failsafe” checks, making them no longer “failsafe”.* [* Nuclear Safety Inspector Was Kept in the Dark by BNFL, The Independent, 8 March 2000.] BNFL described its automated check on pellet diameter at MDF as “failsafe”, when in actuality it had made changes to this test which made it no longer “failsafe”, while keeping this fact from the NII. Indeed we understand form the May 10th issue of Nuclear Fuel that the SMP is not even operating due to commissioning problems.
  • – BNFL has failed to identify individual(s) who sabotaged Japanese customer fuel.* The fact that it does not continue to investigate this matter indicates that BNFL must not be concerned if these people work at the SMP plant it hopes to operate. (*The Kansai Electric Report of March 2000 goes extensively into the incident in which a screw was inserted by an unknown person or persons into the MOX fuel rod manufactured for Kansai Electric. The media in the central region of Japan also reported on this incident with many newspapers printing photographs of the fuel rod picturing the pellets and the inserted screw. BNFL, however, never exerted effort into resolving this problem.)
  • – BNFL has yet to identify the motives for the data falsification that took place at MDF, but, nevertheless, is attempting to sell the SMP to Japanese customers. There is genuine concern in Japan that manufacturing ability at BNFL is deficient , and that this could possibly have lead to cheating on quality control. In other words cheating not just because workers are bored, but cheating as a necessary part of passing MOX pellet lots.

A case in point is TEPCO elaborating in its Fukushima Court testimony that BNFL could not meet Mitsubishi specifications for Kansai Electric MOX fuel. TEPCO states,

”…It is pointed out that, ‘Although Mitsubishi had sought the automation of the pellet random sampling inspection during examination of the manufacturing process conducted at the time of pre-production [of MOX fuel for Kansai Electric], BNFL did not accept this, stating that this improvement would be too difficult to make.’ From this it can be easily imagined that BNFL’s production capability and quality control ability is deficient when compared to that of Belgonucleaire. It has to be said that since the ratio of disqualified pellets during the random sampling inspection at BNFL is 1.25 percent, the manufacturing ability and quality control ability is in a low state.”

Kansai Electric in its March 2000 report also address BNFL’s production problems stating,

“According to production validation made by MHI [Mitsubishi], the outer diameter of pellets produced at MDF satisfied the specification but had a process capability index as 1.04 which is less than 1.33 which is criteria regarded as an index for “production being stable”.

The Kansai Electric Report continues,

“On the number of samples in the AQL for outer diameter inspection, MHI initially proposed to BNFL the extraction of 20 pellets by way of weighing extraction method. Against this, BNFL indicated that there was no proper distribution of diameter due to the performance of the grinding machine, and asserted that the account extraction method would be inappropriate.”

A track record of falsification and secretly altering checks and yet declaring them “failsafe”, refusing to release quality control data that will prove one way or the other if other types of falsification have taken place, coupled with a process capability index which did not meet the criteria for stable production, no proper distribution of pellet diameter … These and other problems all point to the possibility that other forms of falsification much more devious than simply “copying data because of boredom” have taken place at BNFL. This definitely cannot be resolved simply by starting up another plant, the SMP, at Sellafield..

Our view is that if you and BNFL are genuinely interested in regaining trust, BNFL would be addressing these issues.

Yours sincerely,

Aileen Mioko Smith
Director,
Green Action (Kyoto)

Yoko TOMIYAMA
Chairperson,
Consumers Union of Japan

Shigetoshi IWAMATSU
President,
Japan Congress against A- and H-Bombs (GENSUIKIN)

Hideyuki Koyama
Director of
Osaka Citizens against the Mihama, Oi and
Tkahama Nuclear Power Plants(Mihama no Kai)

Kazue SUZUKI
Nuclear Campaigner,
Greenpeace Japan

Ryoich HIRANO
Chair,
Nuclear Fuel Waste Intake Arrest Action Committee

Hideyuki BAN
Co-Director,
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center

ATTACHMENT:

In a statement to the Fukushima District Court last September, Tokyo Electric (TEPCO), as defendant in an injunction case brought forward by citizens groups, asserted that the company has a low assessment of BNFL MOX technology. TEPCO states,

“Belgonucleaire has abundant experience in the manufacture of MOX fuel. In comparison, however, BNFL’s MOX fuel fabrication facility is…by nature that of a demonstration plant level… its manufacturing experience …by far inferior to that of Belgonucleaire. ”

In further testimony, TEPCO once again emphasizes BNFL’s lack of experience as a whole in MOX fuel fabrication. The company states:

”… BNFL which fabricated MOX fuel for Kansai Electric began operations in 1993, and, moreover, its annual manufacturing capacity is less than one-quarter that of Belgonucleaire, resulting in an extraordinary gap in manufacturing experience. The disparity is remarkable* between the two companies’ experience. [*Translator’s note: “conspicuous, remarkable, marked, striking, prominent” in Japanese].

TEPCO court submission to Fukushima District Court. Submission (Yo) #33,

18 September 2000.

Clearly, TEPCO considers BNFL to be inexperienced and technically inferior to Belgonucleaire, and therefore, by association, to COGEMA.

The Fukushima District Court in its 23 March 2001 verdict also addresses the BNFL problem. When addressing the types of falsification conducted by BNFL on MOX fuel manufactured for Kansai Electric, the court acknowledges,

”… when the measurement value went slightly above the specification value, the inspectors [at BNFL] undertook such practices as re-measuring the pellet, rotating it 90 degrees.”

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
T + 81 75 701 7223
F + 81 75 702 1952
E-mail amsmith@gol.com
Contact:
Aileen Mioko Smith Mobile:
+81-90-3620-9251

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