Green Action Japan

[18 January 2006]

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Japan’s 1997 Pledge

The government of Japan made a written and unequivocal pledge to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in December 1997 to uphold the “principle of no surplus plutonium.”*1

To honor this commitment, the Japan Atomic Energy Commission issued a Decision on 5 August 2003*2 which specified that electric utilities present concrete plans for utilizing plutonium before separating it from spent nuclear fuel at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.

On 6 January 2006, the Federation of Electric Power Companies released its “Plutonium Utilization Plan.”*3 The Plan, however, does not comply with the specifications set forth by the Atomic Energy Commission.

Defects of the Plan Released by the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPCO):

• None of the nuclear power plants specified under the plan has approval from the local authorities to use plutonium (MOX) fuel
• Tokyo Electric, head of FEPCO, does not specify in which plant it will use the plutonium, yet says it will consume it
• Nuclear power plants where consent from local authorities have not been applied for are included
• The Ohma “full-MOX” nuclear power plant which does not exist and does not have a reactor installation license is included

Will the AEC Approve the FEPCO Plan?

If the AEC approves the FEPCO Plan, surplus plutonium with nowhere to go will pile up at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.

In the rush to start the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, will the Atomic Energy Commission trash its own 2003 Decision, rubber-stamp the Federation of Electric Power Companies’ Plan, and renege on Japan’s commitment to the IAEA and to the international community?

Or, will the AEC honor Japan’s commitment to not produce surplus plutonium.

The eyes of the world are watching.

Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC)
3F Kotobuki Bldg., 1-58-15 Higashi-nakano
Nakano-ku, Tokyo, 164-0003, Japan
Phone: +81 3 5330 9520

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75, Tanaka Sekiden-cho
Sakyo-ku Kyoto, 606-8203, Japan
Phone: +81 75 701 7223

Greenpeace Japan
N F bldg. 2F 8-13-11 Nishi-Shinjuku
Shinjuku, Tokyo, 160-0023, Japan
Phone: +81 3 5338 9800

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*1 Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc549a1.pdf

*2 Available (in Japanese) at: http://aec.jst.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei/siryo2003/kettei/kettei030805.pdf

*3 Available (in English translation) at: http://cnic.jp/english/topics/cycle/MOX/pluplanFEPCO6Jan06.html

[Joint letter sent from Green Action, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, and Greenpeace Japan]

Director General Mohamed ElBaradei
International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA Secretariat
Headquarters Offices
A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Re: ROKKASHO REPROCESSING PLANT AND JAPANESE ELECTRIC UTILITIES’ PLUTONIUM UTILIZATION PLANS

Dear Director General ElBaradei:

On 5 January 2006 we sent you a petition urging you to ensure that Japan does not breach its international commitment to the principle of “no surplus plutonium” and to quickly take appropriate action before active testing begins at Rokkasho and plutonium is accumulated. The following day the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan (FEPCO) published its Plutonium Utilization Plan.

Attached please find a media briefing we issued today. It is a critique of the plutonium utilization plans of Japanese electric utilities. It addresses the concern that the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) may be approving these plans later this month in order to start “active testing” at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.

While some of the numbers in the latest Plutonium Utilization Plan are slightly different from those previously released, the plan confirms the basic substance of our petition. We therefore reiterate our appeal for the IAEA Secretariat and Board of Governors to immediately discuss this matter and quickly take appropriate action.

Sincerely yours,

Aileen Mioko Smith
Director, Green Action

cc: IAEA Board of Governors

CONTACT:
Aileen Mioko Smith, Green Action (Director)
+ 81 75 701 7223 or 090 3620 9251 (Cell)

Philip White, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (International Liaison)
+ 81 3 5330 9520

Atsuko Nogawa, Greenpeace Japan (Nuclear Campaigner)
+ 81 3 5338 9800

11 January 2006 (2nd edition)

Japanese NGOs Label Electric Utility Plutonium Utilization Plan “Fiction” Concern Raised that Atomic Energy Commission may Rubber-Stamp Plan

Japanese NGOs yesterday released a scathing critique*1 of the Plutonium Utilization Plan issued by the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPCO) on 6 January, dubbing the plan as “fiction” and pointing out that it does not comply with specifications stipulated by the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) in 2003.

At this time there is concern JAEC may approve this plan as early as mid-month in order to start “active testing” at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant.*2 Regional and local authorities’ opposition to the plan is expected.

Rushing to Start “Active Tests” at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

The Plutonium Utilization Plan covers the use of plutonium fuel, known as MOX fuel, in nuclear power plants*3 operated by Japan’s electric power companies. However, none of the reactors slated under the plan have received consent from local authorities to consume the material.

In February 1997, the government of Japan made a written commitment to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to uphold the “principle of no surplus plutonium”. Based on this, JAEC issued a decision on 5 August 2003 stipulating that electric utilities must state the amount, location, starting date, and length of time required to consume MOX fuel before spent nuclear fuel can be reprocessed to extract plutonium at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.

The plan issued by FEPCO falls far short of this requirement. There is concern that JAEC will rubber-stamp it in the rush to start “active testing” at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. Active testing is currently scheduled to begin in February. During the active tests the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant will extract plutonium from spent fuel for the first time. According to the plan, 1.6 tons of plutonium will be extracted during fiscal years 2005 and 2006, enough for 200 Nagasaki type nuclear bombs.

Plan will Increase Plutonium Stockpile in Japan

This plan ignores the plutonium that Japan already possesses. Japan already has a surplus of 43.1 tons of plutonium (37.4 tons held in Europe and 5.7 tons held in Japan). The plutonium surplus continues to grow, despite the 1997 “no surplus plutonium” pledge.

An earlier Plutonium Utilization Plan, relating to plutonium held overseas, was submitted to the IAEA in December 1997. The plan, along with the “no surplus plutonium” commitment, was published in IAEA INFCIRC/549/Add.1, 31 March 1998. No MOX fuel has been used in Japan’s nuclear power plants in accordance with this 1997 plan because it foundered.

NGOs point out that the latest FEPCO plan is simply a copy-and-paste job of the 1997 plan. Under the former plan, utilities were to consume MOX fuel at 16 to 18 reactors. The number of reactors slated this time is identical to the 1997 plan, but the latest plan relates to plutonium separated in Japan at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. No explanation is given regarding the overseas plutonium, so it must be assumed that separating more plutonium now will add to the existing surplus. (Japan’s “Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy” issued October 2005 by the JAEC gives priority to the consumption of the plutonium in Europe over any produced at Rokkasho.*4)

Plan Fails to Provide Required Information

The plan fails to provide the minimum information required by JAEC’s 2003 decision.

It effectively says nothing about the time of commencement, or the time required to use the plutonium. It says that the plutonium will be used “in and after 2012″. However, this is just a statement of the obvious. Plutonium extracted at Rokkasho is to be fabricated into MOX fuel at the MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant, but this plant has not been built and is only “expected” to commence operation by 2012*5. Apparently the time required to use the plutonium is just calculated on the basis of the number of reactors and their power output. There is no indication of by when all the plutonium will be used.

Regarding the location, reactors where the plutonium will be used are identified for only six companies: Kansai Electric, Kyushu Electric, Shikoku Electric, Chugoku Electric, Chubu Electric and Japan Atomic Power Company. The remaining four companies fail to specify which reactors will be used: Tokyo Electric, Hokuriku Electric, Tohoku Electric and Hokkaido Electric. Due to local opposition and past scandals, Kansai Electric and Tokyo Electric were forced to refer to the need to recover public trust before their plans can be implemented.

No company has obtained the prior consent of the prefectural or local governments except Kansai Electric and three have not even applied for prior consent. Previously granted consent was withdrawn by Niigata and Fukushima Prefectures (Tokyo Electric). Kansai Electric states it is not in the position to proceed with the Pluthermal (MOX fuel use) program at this time due to the 2004 Mihama nuclear power plant accident.

Regarding the amount to be used by each company, some plutonium is to be allocated to companies which will have no spent fuel reprocessed in fiscal 2005 and 2006. This will put pressure on these companies to proceed with Pluthermal plans, even thought they are not ready to do so.

Plutonium is also allocated to the non-existent Ohma Nuclear Power Plant. Ohma is still under review for a nuclear reactor installation license. It is still not certain Ohma will be built. Not surprisingly, no date is specified for plutonium use at Ohma.

Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission Must Not Accept Plan

Clearly FEPCO’s latest Plutonium Utilization Plan is not based on reality. The purpose of the plan is simply to enable the Rokkasho reprocessing plant to start “active tests” in February.

JAEC should uphold its own 2003 decision and state clearly that the plan is inappropriate. It should declare that “active tests” cannot begin at Rokkasho.

English translation of FEPCO’s Plutonium Utilization Plan chart issued 6 January 2006 is available at: http://cnic.jp/english/topics/cycle/MOX/pluplanFEPCO6Jan06.html

See also previous petition and briefing sent to the International Atomic Energy Agency on 5 January 2006
available at: http://www.greenaction-japan.org/modules/wordpress0/index.php?p=27
Briefing at: http://www.greenaction-japan.org/modules/wordpress0/index.php?p=28

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FOOTNOTES:

*1. On 10 January, twenty-five NGOs from Fukushima, Niigata, Fukui prefectures, Tokyo and Kansai metropolitan areas, and Kyushu issued a critique on FEPCO’s Plutonium Utilization Plan. Available in Japanese at: http://www.greenpeace.or.jp/campaign/nuclear/documents/doc060110.pdf

*2. The Rokkasho Reprocessing plant located in Aomori Prefecture, Japan is under construction and currently undergoing uranium commissioning. The plant has the capacity to reprocess 800 tons/HM of spent nuclear fuel a year. At full capacity, Rokkasho is capable of separating approximately 8 tons of plutonium annually.

*3. The use of plutonium fuel in light water reactors (’thermal’ reactors as opposed to ‘fast’ reactors) is called ‘pluthermal’. The fuel is made from a mixed oxide of plutonium and uranium, commonly referred to as MOX.

*4. Japan Atomic Energy Commission, “Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy”, 14 October 2005, p.11.

*5: Ibid., p. 34.

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[Compiled 5 January 2006 by Green Action]

Statements on Rokkasho, Surplus Plutonium and MOX Fuel

Fukushima governor Eisaku Sato’s statement to the Japan Atomic Energy Commission about the Rokkasho reprocessing plant and surplus plutonium:

“Why rush to operate a new reprocessing facility when there is still no solution for disposing the 40 tons of plutonium Japan already possesses?”

Submission to Public Comment on draft of “Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy”, August 2005

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Of the 430 tons of spent nuclear fuel to be reprocessed during the active testing scheduled to start at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant in February, 310 tons belong to the two largest electric utilities in Japan – 170 tons from Tokyo Electric and 140 tons from Kansai Electric. Neither utility, however, can consume the plutonium that will be produced at Rokkasho.

All seventeen Tokyo Electric nuclear power plants are located in two prefectures, Niigata and Fukushima. As a result of public opposition andTokyo Electric’s safety data falsification in 2002, both prefectures withdrew authorization for MOX fuel use. Their opposition remains adamant.

Niigata Governor Hirohiko Izumida:

“The Pluthermal (MOX fuel utilization) issue is not even at a stage for discussion. It would be deplorable and damage the trust of the public and Niigata regional authorities if the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant site were to be included in plutonium utilization plans and announced to the public.”

Excerpt from December 2005 letter submitted to Tokyo Electric president Tsunehisa Katsumata.
Source: Kyodo

“Niigata Governor Lodges Warning to Tokyo Electric Regarding Pluthermal (MOX utilization) Plans”
26 December, 2005

“In the middle of all of this, we have heard that the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant site is being listed in the company’s Plutonium Utilization Plans….It is deplorable* that the Atomic Energy Commission is calling for public release of plutonium utilization plans at this time… We petition your committee that you understand this situation in our prefecture and take it into consideration in some manner.”

Excerpt from letter etter submitted to Shunsuke Kondo, Chair, Japan Atomic Energy Commission
27 December 2005

Fukushima Governor Eisaku Sato:

“I do not care what Tokyo Electric says. It is inconceivable that MOX fuel utilization takes place in this prefecture. I believe that Tokyo Electric understands the (prefecture’s) position.”

Excerpt from governor’s regular monthly press conference
26 December 2005

Source: Fukushima Minyu Newspaper (Morning News)

“Pluthermal (MOX fuel utilization) Inconceivable”
27 December 2005

“The governor, in giving his reasons, referred to the statement he had made during the September 2002 prefectural legislative session in which he stated, ﾔPrior consent (for MOX fuel utilization) has been withdrawn because the necessary conditions for granting it have collapsed.’ This statement by the governor was made after revelations in August (2002) that Tokyo Electric had concealed problems at its nuclear power plants. The governor (also) referred to the prefectural legislative assembly’s resolution in opposition and stated, ﾔWe have decided not to have the program implemented in our prefecture in accordance with the collective will of our citizens.’”

Excerpt from the Fukushima Minyu Newspaper article

“Pluthermal (MOX fuel utilization) Inconceivable”
27 December 2005

Meanwhile, due to the 2004 accident at Kansai Electric’s Mihama nuclear power plant, the utility itself admits implementing the MOX program is at present impossible.

Kansai Electric on MOX Program Status:

“At present we are concentrating fully on Mihama Unit 3 post-accident measures and are therefore not in the position to consider MOX fuel use.”

Kansai Electric
Osaka Headquarters
20 October 2005 (Repeated 20 December 2005)

[Informal English translation of news articles and statements are by Green Action.]

Status of Light Water Reactors using MOX Fuel in Japan

No electric utility in Japan has the go-ahead to consume MOX fuel.

Tables detailing the status for light water reactors using MOX fuel are available in English at:

”Japanese Nuclear Power Companies’ Pluthermal* Plans”

http://cnic.jp/english/topics/cycle/MOX/pluthermplans.html.

The tables have been compiled by Kakujoho (http://kakujoho.net/e/index.html) from publicly available documents and translated into English by Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center.

* In Japan, the program to use MOX (plutonium-urainum mixed oxide) fuel in light water reactors is called the “pluthernmal” program.

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75, Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku Kyoto, 606-8203, Japan
Phone: +81 75 701 7223 Facsimile: +81 75 702 1952 Email: amsmith@gol.com www.greenaction-japan.org

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The government of Japan made a written and unequivocal pledge to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in December 1997 to uphold the “principle of no surplus plutonium.”*1

Despite this commitment, Japan will separate out 4 tons of plutonium at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, if active testing using spent nuclear fuel begins as scheduled in February 2006. The stark fact is that the Japanese nuclear power program has no use for this plutonium, now or in the foreseeable future.

The “Plutonium Utilization Plan of Japan” presented to the IAEA in 1997 stated that mixed plutonium-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel in light water reactors would be the “principle way of utilizing plutonium in Japan over the next few decades.” The program, however, has never gotten off the ground due to public opposition, data falsification scandals in 1999 and 2002 and the fatal accident at the Mihama nuclear power plant in 2004. Today, not a single electric utility has the go ahead to consume MOX fuel.

Furthermore, a fundamental technical problem exists. Japan lacks the capability to turn any plutonium produced at Rokkasho into MOX fuel. There is only a government “expectation” that a MOX fuel fabrication plant be fully operational by fiscal 2012.*2 Therefore, if active testing begins at Rokkasho this year, any separated plutonium will languish at the facility.

Moreover, a massive cache of Japanese plutonium already exists: thirty-seven tons sit in Europe. Japan’s Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy issued in October 2005 gives priority to the consumption of this plutonium in Europe over any produced at Rokkasho.*3

Japan allowed the stockpile in Europe to grow even after the MOX program fell apart, although it was clear the plutonium could not be consumed. Now, it is set to accumulate more plutonium, this time in Japan.

Simply put, Japan already has tons of plutonium and no way to burn it. Further stockpiling is not only irresponsible but also a clear break with Japan’s pledge to produce no surplus plutonium.

Japan originally made this commitment in the interests of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, a field in which it is a valuable leader. Given the heightened political tension around disarmament and non-proliferation in North East Asia, and its role as Chair of the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan should not renege on this commitment.

For these reasons, Japan should indefinitely postpone active testing at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.

PETITION

To ensure that Japan does not breach its international commitment to the “principle of no surplus plutonium”, we urge the IAEA Secretariat and Board of Governors to immediately discuss this matter and quickly take appropriate action before active testing begins at Rokkasho and plutonium is accumulated.

5 January 2006

Hideyuki Ban (Co-Director)
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC)
3F Kotobuki Bldg., 1-58-15 Higashi-nakano
Nakano-ku, Tokyo, 164-0003, Japan
Phone: +81 3 5330 9520

Aileen Mioko Smith (Director)
Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75, Tanaka Sekiden-cho
Sakyo-ku Kyoto, 606-8203, Japan
Phone: +81 75 701 7223

Atsuko Nogawa (Nuclear Campaigner)
Greenpeace Japan
N F bldg. 2F 8-13-11 Nishi-Shinjuku
Shinjuku, Tokyo, 160-0023, Japan
Phone: +81 3 5338 9800

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*1 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Communication Received from Certain Member States Concerning their Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium”, INFCIRC/549/Add. 1, 31 March 1998. Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc549a1.pdf

*2 Japan Atomic Energy Commission, “Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy”, 14 October 2005, p.34.

Available at http://aec.jst.go.jp/jicst/NC/eng/index.htm

*3 Ibid, p.11.

Contact:
Aileen Mioko Smith (Green Action)
Cell: 090-3620-9251
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center
Tel: 03-5330-9520

5 January 2006 (Kyoto, Japan)—Japanese NGOs today sent a letter to IAEA Director

General Mohamed ElBaradei and the Board of Governors urging the inter-governmental body to discuss and take action to ensure Japan upholds its 1997 commitment made to the international organization not to produce surplus plutonium.

Testing scheduled to take place next month at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant will separate out 4 tons of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. This will violate the commitment Japan made to the IAEA because the plutonium cannot be consumed.

The petition sent to the IAEA by Green Action, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center and Greenpeace Japan states, “Japan originally made this commitment in the interests of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, a field in which it is a valuable leader. Given the heightened political tension around disarmament and non-proliferation in North East Asia, and its role as Chair of the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan should not renege on this commitment.”

Green Action director Aileen Mioko Smith stated, “Japanese utilities will shortly be going public with a fabricated plutonium utilization plan. The Japanese government is intending to approve it. Instead Japan should keep its promise to the IAEA and indefinitely postpone testing at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.”

Japan already has over 42 tons of surplus plutonium in Europe and Japan.

May 29, 2005 (Revised)

WHAT IS MONJU

Monju (280MW) is Japan’s prototype fast breeder reactor located at the tip of the Tsuruga Peninsula in Fukui Prefecture. On January 27, 2003, the Nagoya Court of Appeals (Kanazawa Branch) handed down a verdict in favor of Fukui citizens suing to stop the reactor from operating. The court found the license issued by the national government for Monju illegal due to serious deficiencies in the government’s safety review. On January 31, 2003, the national government appealed the decision.

The Supreme Court verdict on Monju is to be handed down May 30, 2005 in Tokyo.

Monju has been shut down since December 8, 1995 because of a sodium leak and fire accident. The accident occurred while the reactor was undergoing testing at low output before attaining full power.

The Japanese government and Monju’s owner and operator, Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) sought an early re-start of the reactor, and on February 6, 2005 Governor Nishikawa of Fukui gave approval for refurbishment work necessary for re-start. Construction work is underway.

Japan currently has 54 commercial nuclear power plants (light water reactors). These reactors use uranium for fuel and supply approximately 34% of Japan’s electricity demand. Fast breeder reactor technology which uses a mixture of plutonium and uranium fuel has been under development in Japan since the 1960’s with the aim of replacing the current inefficient nuclear technology. Plutonium, an element non-existent in nature, is created in conventional nuclear reactors as the uranium fuel fissions, and is extracted for use by reprocessing.

Advocates of the fast breeder claim that the technology would create a never-ending source of energy because it can convert uranium 238, an abundant isotope of uranium that could not be used as fuel in conventional reactors, into plutonium, thus breeding even greater quantities of plutonium than was put into the reactor.

However, in spite of being the main pillar of the Japanese government’s nuclear energy long-term development plan for decades, and costs exceeding 2 trillion yen, the fast breeder program has to date produced only one hour of electricity (at Monju in September 1995). (The Long Term Program for the Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy  is reviewed once every 5 years. The fast breeder program has to date been a part of nine Long Term Programs.)

Commercialization of the fast breeder is nowhere in site. The Japanese government’s Long Term Program [November 2000] now makes no mention of specific goals for commercialization. The current program nevertheless calls for the early re-start of Monju.

Nuclear weapon states such as the USA, Britain, and France spent decades developing fast breeder technology as part of their nuclear weapons and energy programs. However all three countries have since abandoned their programs. Germany also constructed a prototype fast breeder reactor at Kalkar but abandoned the program before the reactor went into operation.

WHY DO CITIZENS WANT TO STOP MONJU

Fast breeder reactor technology is dangerous because it uses immense quantities of plutonium. In addition the fast breeder is vulnerable to reactivity accidents (explosions). Monju requires 1.2 tons of plutonium. The half-life of plutonium is 24,000 years (i.e. it takes 24,000 years for plutonium’s radioactivity to halve). One millionth of 1 gram of plutonium entering the lungs can cause lung cancer.

Fast breeder reactors, unlike conventional nuclear reactors that use water as a source of coolant, use sodium to cool the reactor and transfer the heat for electricity generation. Sodium burns and explodes when it comes into contact with air and water. In Monju, the thickness of the pipes separating the sodium from the water is only 3.8 mm thick. Many fast breeder reactors that were under development in the world have suffered accidents involving sodium.

Although proponents state that the plutonium that fast breeder reactors would breed would provide a virtually never-ending source of energy, it is highly doubtful whether fast breeders could ever operate long enough without technical difficulties or accidents to produce enough plutonium to be worthwhile as an energy source.

Fast breeder reactors are particularly vulnerable to earthquakes since the high heat generated by the reactor has made it necessary for the pipes to be bent in many locations in order to absorb the expanding and shrinking of pipe materials, and pipes are strung up in this configuration. Monju is located in an area with several earthquake faults.

Commercial use of plutonium involves the handling of massive quantities of this nuclear weapon capable material. Only a few kilograms of plutonium are necessary to make a nuclear weapon. (The IAEA considers 8 kilograms to be an SQ, significant quantity, enough to make one nuclear weapon.) One commercial breeder would require approximately 10 tons of plutonium, five tons approximate in the reactor and an additional five tons approximate for refueling. If fast breeder reactors were to supply the same amount of nuclear energy as is currently supplied in Japan by conventional nuclear power plants, they would require more than twice the plutonium as is in all the nuclear weapons worldwide today.

The plutonium Monju would breed if operated, although not great in quantity, is super weapons-grade plutonium. One of the reasons nuclear weapon states developed fast breeder technology was to obtain this type of plutonium. Possession and development of such technology by Japan would be a detriment to Asian regional security.

ISN’T MONJU NECESSARY TO MEET JAPAN’S ENERGY NEEDS

Even if development of the fast breeder were to proceed according to hopes of advocates, the technology would not be capable of supplying 1% of Japan’s energy needs in the mid-21st century. (Five full size fast breeder reactors operating at capacity would supply little more than 1% of Japan’s total energy needs based on current demands. Commercialization by 2050 is considered to be difficult even by fast breeder advocates.)

WHY HAVE THE MONJU PROGRAM IF IT CAN’T SUPPLY ELECTRICITY

Without a fast breeder program or use of MOX (mixed plutonium and uranium) fuel at conventional nuclear power plants in Japan, the Japanese government and electric utilities would need to admit that there is no need to extract plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel of nuclear power plants. If there is no need for plutonium to be extracted from the spent nuclear fuel, it would become unnecessary to ship this fuel to the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Aomori for reprocessing. Without being able to ship the fuel to Rokkasho, the fuel would “overflow” at nuclear power plant sites and utilities would be forced to shut down their nuclear power plants because there would no longer be space to store the spent fuel.

The breeder program is a hoax energy program, and one of the reasons for continuing the program is to defer dealing with the nuclear waste problem. There is also concern that Japan continues the fast breeder program because the Japanese government wants to maintain and develop its plutonium technology with the intent of keeping the options open to some day possess nuclear weapons. Another reason given for the program continuing is bureaucratic stagnation and Diet inaction.

WHAT ARE CITIZENS DOING TO STOP MONJU

Citizens nationwide have submitted more than one million signatures calling on the Japanese government to initiate a moratorium on Monju. The civil and administrative lawsuit against Monju filed in September 1985 by Fukui Prefecture citizens although ending in plaintiffs’ defeat in March 2000, was reversed by victory in the Court of Appeals as mentioned above.

More than 200,000 Fukui Prefecture citizens are on record signing a petition seeking permanent closure of Monju. Another national petition drive is on-going demanding complete closure of Monju, and 980,000 signatures have been gathered to date.

END

Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center
1-58-15-3F, Higashi-nakano, Nakano-ku
Tokyo, Japan
Phone:+81-3-5330-9520
Fax: +81-3-5330-9530

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku
Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
Phone:+81-75-701-7223
Fax: +81-75-702-1952

Rokkasho. The name might not be well known outside of the anti-nuclear movement, but we hope it will become better known during the NPT Review Conference.

Rokkasho is the site of a huge reprocessing plant being constructed on the northern tip of Honshu, the largest island in Japan. In December last year it began uranium trials (testing the processes using depleted uranium). Active trials using spent nuclear fuel are scheduled to begin in December this year and the plant is due to start operations in May 2007. It will then become the first commercial-scale reprocessing plant outside of the nuclear weapons states, extracting 8 tons of plutonium per year from the spent fuel produced in Japan’s nuclear reactors. That is enough to build 1,000 Nagasaki-type bombs per year. If that isn’t reason enough for it to be placed high on the agenda of the NPT Review Conference, what is

George Bush might not often agree with Mohamed ElBaradei and Kofi Annan, but he agrees that facilities for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and for uranium enrichment present a nuclear proliferation risk. Though the fine points of their proposals differ, over the last year or so all three of them have called for a moratorium on these facilities. They have all also studiously avoided mentioning Rokkasho. George Bush much prefers to talk about Iran and North Korea, but, dangerous though the nuclear developments in those two countries are, he can’t expect the world to take him seriously when he ignores Japan’s enrichment and reprocessing facilities. If ‘non-nuclear weapons state’ Japan is allowed to operate Rokkasho, other non-nuclear weapons states will inevitably feel discriminated against if they can’t have such facilities too. It sets a bad precedent for would-be proliferators, regardless of whether Japan plans to build nuclear weapons itself. So Rokkasho should be the first candidate for a moratorium.

ElBaradei has said that the moratorium idea will be raised at the NPT Review Conference, but at the moment the proposal doesn’t seem to have the support of most of the key players. Japan, the US and Iran have all rejected it on the grounds of narrowly defined ‘national interests’. They don’t want any of their pet projects to be jeopardized. A broad view of the ‘national interests’ of these countries would recognize that the unraveling of the non-proliferation regime is about as dangerous a development as could be imagined. Measured against this greater ‘national interest’, sacrificing new reprocessing and enrichment projects, the benefits of which are highly dubious anyway, shouldn’t be too difficult a decision. But lack of vision seems to be a common problem amongst the world’s leaders these days, so we don’t expect them to shift without some pressure from below.

NGOs must take the lead on this issue. Even though a few national governments are determined to kill the moratorium idea, NGOs must not lose sight of the main issue. The moratorium idea was proposed to respond to a real danger. That danger is that if weapons-usable material continues to be produced, and if more and more countries develop the technology to produce this material, nuclear weapons will be acquired by more and more countries, and the chance of these weapons finding their way into the hands of terrorists increases. If governments won’t focus on this danger in a non-discriminatory way, NGOs must continue to bring their attention back to this issue.

We can give credit to Mohamed ElBaradei for putting the issue on the NPT Review Conference agenda, but we can’t leave it to him to take the running on the debate. He and his organization, the IAEA, are committed to promoting nuclear energy, so they have linked the moratorium proposal to the perverse idea of internationalizing reprocessing and uranium enrichment services. We must continue to point out the flaws in this proposal.

Let us raise the issue of Rokkasho and other related issues at, among others, the following event:

Thursday, May 5

“Stopping the Spread of Plutonium; The Argument for Abandoning the Japanese Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant”

When:

Thursday, May 5th. 11am -1 pm

Where:

UN Conference Room E

Contact:

Damon Moglen

Public Outreach Coordinator

Global Security Program

Union of Concerned Scientists

Email: dmoglen@ucsusa.org

Phone: 202-331-5425

Article by: Philip White and Aileen Mioko Smith

Philip White
International Liaison Officer
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (Tokyo)

Aileen Mioko Smith
Director,
Green Action (Kyoto, Japan)
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Information in English about Rokkasho:
http://cnic.jp/english/topics/cycle/rokkasho/index.html

Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center
1-58-15-3F, Higashi-nakano, Nakano-ku
Tokyo, Japan
Phone:+81-3-5330-9520
Fax: +81-3-5330-9530

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku
Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
Phone:+81-75-701-7223
Fax: +81-75-702-1952

Kyodo Wire Services

14 February 2005 20:34

NISA, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency’s “Inquiry Committee on Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant Comprehensive Inspection” (Chairperson: Keiji KANDA) met on the 14th to begin its examination into the causes etc. of the faulty design of the High Level Vitrified Radioactive Waste Storage Facility’s cooling equipment.

After the meeting Chairperson KANDA made clear his intention to instruct that a comprehensive inspection be undertaken on the design of all of JNFL’s nuclear fuel cycle facilities including the Reprocessing Plant and the Uranium Enrichment Plant. The results of the inspection is to be reported by JNFL to the committee at its meeting to be held the coming fiscal year.

The design faults which were found are in the #4 Installation etc. of the Reprocessing Plantﾕs vitrified nuclear waste storage buildings. The vitrified waste temperature targeted to be 500 degrees or lower was first reported to be approximately 430 degrees. However, recalculations revealed the temperatures would go over 620 degrees.

(Informal English translation by Green Action)

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Sept 24th 2004
PETITION
FUKUI PREFECTURE

To: Shoichi Nakagawa, Minister, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
From: Issei Nishikawa, Governor, Fukui Prefecture

On the 9th of August 2004 an accident occurred at the Mihama Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 reactor. This incident seriously injured 11 people 5 of which lost their lives. This was the biggest disaster to date in the history of Japanese nuclear power.

In Fukui Prefecture we have worked hard for many years to win the people s trust and to build a safe reputation for nuclear power. It is extremely regrettable that this accident has destroyed that trust and the reputation of nuclear power in Fukui Prefecture.

I have serious misgivings about the government policy of leaving the supervision of the secondary loop to the autonomous safety inspections of the utilities. I strongly urge that the Government strengthen its involvement in the secondary loop inspection regime and establish a comprehensive strategy emphasizing prevention of accidents before they occur. The Government is responsible for ensuring safety and I strongly petition that it respond.

I petition that the Government undertake, as rapidly as possible, a responsible response to the issues raised in this petition.

Governor, Fukui Prefecture
Issei Nishikawa.

[EXCERPTS OF ISSUES RAISED]

1. Concerning the Investigation into the Cause of the Accident and Establishment of Measures to Prevent Reoccurrence

The government should undertake a comprehensive technical investigation into the rupture of the pipe, the direct cause of the accident. In addition the government should investigate the problem of supervision of the thickness of the pipes and address the companies  general approach to safety, which can be thought of as the background which caused the accident.

The government should make all efforts to carry out a thorough deliberation of the application of and supervision of safety procedures listed below, and implement a comprehensive strategy to prevent the reoccurrence of similar accidents:

• the utility s autonomous management system which address requirements of outside consignors
• method of assuring that the utility s data management system and inspection regimes are appropriately in place
• accurate sharing of technical information with other utilities  and manufacturers

2. A Reassessment of Measures to be Undertaken for Aging Nuclear Power Plants

We are entering an era where nuclear power plants are aging, demanding even greater thoroughness of inspections. The Mihama Unit 3 accident was an accident brought on by the fact due attention was not paid to the aging problem.

A reassessment of the measures to be taken for the nation s aging plants must be undertaken which establishes the methods of inspection and assessment that include a detailed investigation into damage due to aging which has occurred in Europe and the USA, analyses and appraisals of safety regulation and management methods, investigation and examination of the newest knowledge and information, and inspection of aging nuclear power plants.

4. Building a Radically Different Safety Management System

(1) The government should constantly take the newest knowledge and information, including information which can be gleaned from examples of accidents both domestic and international, establishing clear safety standards, maintenance standards, and inspection guidelines based on scientific rationality.

5. Establishing a Comprehensive System whereby the Safety Authority will be Located within Local/ Regional Authorities where Nuclear Power Plants are Located

The regulatory functions of nuclear power plant safety should be transferred to the local/regional areas where nuclear power plants are located, and should adopt regional solutions in alignment with the area.

6. Nuclear Inspection and Research Organs

In order that nuclear power be trusted by the people and become an industry that is well established within the region, it is absolutely necessary that a research and development body be established at the site of the local/regional authority where the nuclear power plants are located. We demand that the government establish such a body in Fukui Prefecture. This body will look into the causes of accidents and incidents, undertake inspection and analysis etc. on potential accidents and incidents, be a testing and research institute which will undertake inspection and research concerning safety issues, and, undertake a wide range of nuclear research over a broad area of discipline.

7. The Government s Safety Regulatory Regime

(1) In this day and age of fast pace new technological developments, it is necessary to rapidly incorporate new knowledge, with a government safety regime which aims for precision, reliability, transparency, fairness, and speed.

We demand that a regulatory regime for safety be established which can be trusted by the citizens of this nation and whose seat of responsibility is clearly delineated. This would entail a fundamental revamping of current nuclear power safety regulation such as bringing together into one entity such organs as the Nuclear Safety Commission and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), making transparent what are the responsibilities and roles of government and industry respectfully, etc.

(2) We demand that a Nuclear Power Accident Investigation Committee (provisional name) be established. This committee would have the authority to propose investigation into the cause of serious accidents at nuclear facilities or into indications where such accidents may occur, and to issue recommendations concerning policies to prevent accidents.

8. The Government’s Role in Recovering Trust in Nuclear Power

The government must commit its utmost to recover the trust of prefectural citizens in nuclear power lost as a result of this accident, eradicating anxiety and suspicion. This should be undertaken by investigating the causes of the accident, and, with regards to deliberation concerning measures to prevent reoccurrence and the current state of the utility’s inspection results, the government should explain and report thoroughly to the local/regional authorities where the plants are located, making the information public in a timely and proper manner.

END

Green Action
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