The government of Japan made a written and unequivocal pledge to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in December 1997 to uphold the “principle of no surplus plutonium.”*1
Despite this commitment, Japan will separate out 4 tons of plutonium at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, if active testing using spent nuclear fuel begins as scheduled in February 2006. The stark fact is that the Japanese nuclear power program has no use for this plutonium, now or in the foreseeable future.
The “Plutonium Utilization Plan of Japan” presented to the IAEA in 1997 stated that mixed plutonium-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel in light water reactors would be the “principle way of utilizing plutonium in Japan over the next few decades.” The program, however, has never gotten off the ground due to public opposition, data falsification scandals in 1999 and 2002 and the fatal accident at the Mihama nuclear power plant in 2004. Today, not a single electric utility has the go ahead to consume MOX fuel.
Furthermore, a fundamental technical problem exists. Japan lacks the capability to turn any plutonium produced at Rokkasho into MOX fuel. There is only a government “expectation” that a MOX fuel fabrication plant be fully operational by fiscal 2012.*2 Therefore, if active testing begins at Rokkasho this year, any separated plutonium will languish at the facility.
Moreover, a massive cache of Japanese plutonium already exists: thirty-seven tons sit in Europe. Japan’s Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy issued in October 2005 gives priority to the consumption of this plutonium in Europe over any produced at Rokkasho.*3
Japan allowed the stockpile in Europe to grow even after the MOX program fell apart, although it was clear the plutonium could not be consumed. Now, it is set to accumulate more plutonium, this time in Japan.
Simply put, Japan already has tons of plutonium and no way to burn it. Further stockpiling is not only irresponsible but also a clear break with Japan’s pledge to produce no surplus plutonium.
Japan originally made this commitment in the interests of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, a field in which it is a valuable leader. Given the heightened political tension around disarmament and non-proliferation in North East Asia, and its role as Chair of the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan should not renege on this commitment.
For these reasons, Japan should indefinitely postpone active testing at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.
PETITION
To ensure that Japan does not breach its international commitment to the “principle of no surplus plutonium”, we urge the IAEA Secretariat and Board of Governors to immediately discuss this matter and quickly take appropriate action before active testing begins at Rokkasho and plutonium is accumulated.
5 January 2006
Hideyuki Ban (Co-Director)
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC)
3F Kotobuki Bldg., 1-58-15 Higashi-nakano
Nakano-ku, Tokyo, 164-0003, Japan
Phone: +81 3 5330 9520
Aileen Mioko Smith (Director)
Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75, Tanaka Sekiden-cho
Sakyo-ku Kyoto, 606-8203, Japan
Phone: +81 75 701 7223
Atsuko Nogawa (Nuclear Campaigner)
Greenpeace Japan
N F bldg. 2F 8-13-11 Nishi-Shinjuku
Shinjuku, Tokyo, 160-0023, Japan
Phone: +81 3 5338 9800
*1 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Communication Received from Certain Member States Concerning their Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium”, INFCIRC/549/Add. 1, 31 March 1998. Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc549a1.pdf
*2 Japan Atomic Energy Commission, “Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy”, 14 October 2005, p.34.
Available at http://aec.jst.go.jp/jicst/NC/eng/index.htm
*3 Ibid, p.11.