To Delegates to the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Restart of Japan’s Monju Fast Breeder Reactor – Implications for Nuclear Proliferation, Nuclear Safety and Energy Supply

On May 6, Japan’s Monju Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor(1) was restarted, after being shut down for over 14 years due to an accident involving a sodium leak and a fire. It is a great irony that a plutonium-fueled fast breeder reactor was restarted at a time when unprecedented international attention is being given to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and security. We wish to draw your attention to some of the implications of the Monju restart, in particular in relation to nuclear proliferation, nuclear safety and energy supply.

Implications for Nuclear Proliferation
The key nuclear proliferation issue associated with fast breeder reactors is the use and production of plutonium, which can be used to build nuclear weapons. Japan’s fast reactor program uses plutonium as fuel and plans to “breed” more plutonium than it consumes.(2)

Although Japan’s nuclear power facilities are under IAEA safeguards, the bulk-handling facilities needed to support the operation of fast reactors like Monju (reprocessing plants and plutonium fuel fabrication plants) cannot be effectively safeguarded against diversion. Moreover, the IAEA cannot meet its inspection goals at such facilities through the use of material accountancy alone. In fact, the plant used to fabricate Monju’s initial core, the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility, lost track of 70 kilograms of plutonium, and the plant had to be shut down for several years to resolve the discrepancy.

Japan already has over 47 tons of separated plutonium, nearly 10 tons of which is stockpiled in Japan. The rest is held in Europe. If the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant ever operates to full capacity, a further 8 tons of plutonium will be separated each year from spent nuclear fuel. Japan plans to use some of this plutonium as MOX fuel in its fleet of light water reactors and in fast reactors Joyo and Monju. However, because Japan will continue to separate plutonium there is little prospect that Japan’s massive stockpile of weapons-usable plutonium will be eliminated, or even brought into line with consumption any time soon.

Use of plutonium in the civil nuclear fuel cycle also increases nuclear terrorism risks. The April 13, 2010 Communiqué of the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington recognized that “highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium require special precautions”. Both of these materials can be used to produce nuclear weapons, yet far more attention was paid to the risks associated with the use of highly enriched uranium than those of plutonium. In fact, as pointed out by Gareth Evans, Co-Chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, the Summit should have given more attention to the problems associated with plutonium.(3) The relatively limited attention given to plutonium was undoubtedly because some U.S. allies, including Japan, use plutonium in their nuclear power programs.

In addition to the direct proliferation risks associated with Japan’s program to separate and re-use plutonium, the example set by Japan encourages other countries to pursue plutonium-based nuclear power programs. However, widespread use of plutonium would dramatically increase the proliferation risks associated with the civil use of nuclear energy. As pointed out in the NGO presentation on nuclear energy, delivered to this NPT Review Conference on May 7,

“Separation of plutonium through reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and the creation of a global plutonium economy exacerbates the problem. It is fundamentally contrary and counterproductive to the NPT commitment to retire nuclear weapons, since it would put weapons-usable materials directly into global commerce.”(4)

Civil plutonium stockpiles create serious instabilities in the NPT regime. As noted above, separated plutonium cannot be effectively safeguarded. Any country that possesses separated “civil” plutonium could be only a short time away-days to weeks-from producing nuclear weapons should it choose to break out of its NPT obligations.

Implications for Nuclear Safety and Energy Supply
Fast breeder reactors, which use plutonium, are not needed to ensure the supply of energy. In fact, they have been highly unreliable in providing energy. The history of Japan’s plutonium fuel cycle program, and the plutonium fuel cycle programs of other countries clearly demonstrate that there are major safety and economic problems that will prevent fast reactors from being reliable producers of energy. Continuing to pour money into research and development will only prevent other safe, secure, and economically viable alternatives from being developed.

A recent report by the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) sums up the problems of fast breeder reactors as follows:

The problems described in the country case studies in the following chapters make it hard to dispute Admiral Hyman Rickover’s summation in 1956, based on his experience with a sodium-cooled reactor developed to power an early U.S. nuclear submarine, that such reactors are “expensive to build, complex to operate, susceptible to prolonged shutdown as a result of even minor malfunctions, and difficult and time-consuming to repair.”(5)

In the same IPFM report Tatsujiro Suzuki discusses Japan’s fast reactor program.

Japan remains officially committed to the fast breeder reactor and closed fuel cycle systems. However, the fast breeder reactor commercialization date has receded far into the future while the fast breeder reactor R&D budget has been shrinking. Japan’s continued commitment to the fast breeder reactor appears largely driven by socio-political factors affecting Japan’s management of the back-end of the light-water reactor fuel cycle and R&D management. (6)

There is considerable opposition to Monju within Japan. Attached is a statement that was signed by 29 Japanese scientists preceding the restart of Monju. In particular, the statement addresses problems associated with the safety and organizational culture of Monju’s owner and operator, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency. Fourteen years after the sodium accident in 1995, it is very doubtful that these problems have been rectified.

Conclusion
Japan’s fast reactor and reprocessing program will not help meet Japan’s energy needs. At the same time it complicates efforts to control the spread of weapons-usable materials and provides potential proliferators an excuse to justify their own programs. The restart of the Monju FBR undermines Japan’s claim to leadership in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Recommendations
In view of the problems outlined above, we urge delegates to the 2010 NPT Review Conference to:
1) Call upon the Government of Japan to abandon its fast-breeder and reprocessing program.
2) Support a Comprehensive Fissile Material Ban that includes civil plutonium programs.

New York, May 21, 2010

Notes
1. Monju is located in Tsuruga City in Fukui Prefecture on the Japan Sea side of Japan’s main island of Honshu. It has an electrical power output of 280MW.
2. When FBRs are used in “breeder” mode, plutonium is produced in a blanket of depleted uranium around the core. The plutonium produced in the blanket has a concentration of 98% plutonium-239, the most convenient plutonium isotope for nuclear weapons production. It is relatively easy to separate this plutonium, because the depleted uranium blanket is less contaminated with highly radioactive fission products than regular spent fuel.
3. Extract from “Nuclear summit seeks to boost protection without new treaties”, by Randy Woods and Rennie MacKenzie, published in Nucleonics Week (15-Apr-10).
Speaking April 12 in Washington, nonproliferation expert Gareth Evans cautioned that world leaders should not lose sight of plutonium’s importance. Evans, who is co-chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, was speaking at a nuclear security meeting in Washington hosted by the Fissile Materials Working Group, a coalition of more than 40 nonproliferation academics and advocates.
“At the same time that the use of HEU is diminishing – although not quickly enough – plutonium, particularly in the form of mixed oxides, is coming into more widespread use,” he said.
4. The NGO paper on nuclear energy and Article IV of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty delivered at the 2010 NPT Review Conference is available on the following link:
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/ngostatements/NuclearEnergy.pdf
5. Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status, A research report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, February 2010, page 3.
http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/rr08.pdf
6. ibid., page 60. Since writing the article Tatsujiro Suzuki has been appointed Vice-Chairman of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission.

Letter endorsed by the following groups

International
Greenpeace International
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

Japan
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center
Friends of the Earth Japan
Green Action
Greenpeace Japan
Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs (Gensuikin)
Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies
Peace Boat

Korea
Citizens’ Institute for Environmental Studies
Energy Justice Actions
Green Korea United
Korea Federation for Environmental Movements
Korean Women’s Association United
Korean Women’s Environmental Network
Peace Network
People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy
Uljin Social Policy Institute

Europe
Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment (UK)
Österreichisches Ökologie-Institut (Austrian Institute of Ecology)
Umweltinstitut München e.V. (Munich Environmental Institute) (Germany)
World Information Service on Energy (Netherlands)

USA
Friends of the Earth US
Greenpeace USA
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Nuclear Information and Resource Service
Physicians for Social Responsibility
Union of Concerned Scientists

Monju Restart: Appeal By Japanese Scientists
http://www.cnic.jp/modules/news/article.php?storyid=895

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PRESS RELEASE

NGOs Criticize Restart of Japan’s Monju Fast Breeder Reactor
Call on NPT Review Conference Delegates to Support an End
to Civil Use of Plutonium

New York, May 21, 2010: A letter criticizing the restart of Japan’s Monju Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor, endorsed by leading peace, non-proliferation and disarmament, and environmental NGOs from around the world, was delivered today to government officials at the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. The letter was endorsed by 29 NGOs from Japan, Korea, Europe and the USA, and international NGOs including International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

The letter highlighted the dangerous implications of the May 6 restart of Monju for nuclear proliferation, nuclear safety and energy supply, saying, “It is a great irony that a plutonium-fueled fast breeder reactor was restarted at a time when unprecedented international attention is being given to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and security.”

Implications for nuclear proliferation and nuclear security of Monju and Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle program include the following:

The bulk-handling facilities needed to support the operation of fast reactors like Monju (reprocessing plants and plutonium fuel fabrication plants) cannot be effectively safeguarded against diversion.

Japan has over 47 tons of separated plutonium. If the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant operates to plan, 8 tons will be added to this each year. There is little prospect that this stockpile of weapons-usable plutonium will be eliminated any time soon.

The example set by Japan encourages other countries to pursue plutonium-based nuclear power programs, but the use of plutonium in the civil nuclear fuel cycle increases nuclear terrorism and proliferation risks.

Any country that possesses separated “civil” plutonium could be only a short time away from producing nuclear weapons should it choose to break out of its NPT obligations.

In regard to nuclear safety and energy supply, the letter noted that fast reactors have been highly unreliable in providing energy and that continuing to pour money into research and development will only prevent other safe, secure, and economically viable alternatives from being developed.

The letter urged delegates to the 2010 NPT Review Conference to:

1) Call upon the Government of Japan to abandon its fast-breeder and reprocessing program.
2) Support a Comprehensive Fissile Material Ban that includes civil plutonium programs.

Contacts:
At the NPT in New York
Shaun Burnie
Phone: +1-646-249-9361, Email: burnie.shaun@googlemail.com
In Japan
Philip White, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (International Liaison Officer)
Phone: (office) +81-3-3357-3800, (home) +81-3-3708-2898, Email: white@cnic.jp
Aileen Smith, Green Action (Director)
Phone: (office)+81-75-701-7223, (cell) 090-3620-9251, Email: amsmith@gol.com

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Press Release:
NGOs Criticize Restart of Japan’s Monju Fast Breeder Reactor
Call on NPT Review Conference Delegates to Support an End
to Civil Use of Plutonium
Download PDF version (70KB)

The full letter, along with a list of endorsing groups
Restart of Japan’s Monju Fast Breeder Reactor – Implications for Nuclear
Proliferation, Nuclear Safety and Energy Supply
Download PDF version (82KB)

Dangerous shipment of Japanese High-Level
Radioactive Nuclear Waste Crossing Pacific Ocean
on Defective Vessel

08 February 2010 (Kyoto, Japan)
For more information contact: +81-90-3620-9251 (Smith)

For immediate release: A shipment of 28 canisters of highly toxic Japanese vitrified high level radioactive waste departed Sellafield, UK on 20 January aboard the Pacific Sandpiper bound for Japan. The cargo is today passing through the Panama Canal and will be entering the Pacific Ocean momentarily. The high level waste (HLW) has been produced by the reprocessing of spent reactor fuel from Japanese electric utilities. It is the first of this kind of shipment from the UK.

A press release issued 25 January by the Nuclear Free Local Authorities in the UK states:

“The Pacific Sandpiper has recently been issued with three Statutory Memos demanding the completion of work related to crew safety, Emergency Towing Procedures, and engine room fire extinguishing systems. The available evidence implies that this work has not yet been carried out.

During recent Port State Control Inspections in Europe and Japan, the Pacific Sandpiper has been shown to have a number of deficiencies including Fire Safety measures.

The Asia Pacific Port State Control Inspection (PSCI) organisation’s website currently reports that the Pacific Sandpiper has a Target Factor of 81 and a High Risk Level.

If this vessel was an oil or chemical tanker, seeking to carry a full cargo of oil or toxic chemicals across two major oceans and through the globally identified Marine High Risk Areas between the UK and Japan, it would be considered as a pariah ship and a potential toxic time bomb. ”

The Pacific Sandpiper is still operating despite having been built to the same design and construction standards as predecessor vessels decommissioned or scrapped following discovery of “run away” corrosion.

Findings of a report* issued April 2009 and commissioned by NFLA (Nuclear Free Local Authorities), a coalition of more than 70 local authorities in Ireland and the UK, found this fleet to be:

Vulnerable to build-up of gas or moisture in their double-skinned hulls, “run away corrosion.”

40% only single-skinned hull

Claims ships are unsinkable “lack scientific and technical credibility.”

Emergency plans for coping with accidents non-existent.

*Report by independent marine pollution consultant, Tim Deere-Jones.(April 2009)

“It is unconscionable that Japan and the UK are engaging in this dangerous transport with an old, defective ship, passing it across the Pacific with no viable emergency plan in place” stated Aileen Mioko Smith, executive director of Green Action based in Japan.

Martin Forwood of CORE (Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment) is quoted as saying, “The high security surrounding today’s shipment is testament to the dangers posed by this highly radioactive material and the unwholesome global trade in which the nuclear industry is immersed. Sellafield needs to wake up to the harsh reality that today’s world and its oceans are a significantly more dangerous place than they were 30 years ago when the contracts were signed.”

This shipment is the first of many such transports scheduled for return to Japan. It is expected that Japan will receive a total of up to 1000 HLW canisters at the rate of around one shipment (4 transport flasks) from Sellafield each year.

According to the press release issued by CORE (Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment) on 20 January, future shipments will be not be made on the Pacific Sandpiper (launched1985) which, as the oldest ship of the Pacific Nuclear Transport (PNTL) fleet and already at its 25 year sell-by date, is due for retirement.

Dangerous shipment of Japanese High Level
Radioactive Waste Passing through the Caribbean and Panama

22 January 2010 (Kyoto, Japan)
For immediate release: A shipment of 28 canisters of Japanese vitrified high level radioactive waste departed Sellafield, UK on 20 January aboard the Pacific Sandpiper bound for Japan. Japan Nuclear Fuels Ltd. (JNFL) reported today that the route of the 6-week voyage will be through the Panama Canal. The high level waste (HLW) has been produced by the reprocessing of spent reactor fuel from Japanese electric utilities.

The Pacific Sandpiper is still operating despite having been built to the same design and construction standards as predecessor vessels decommissioned or scrapped following discovery of “run away” corrosion. Findings of a report* issued April 2009 and commissioned by NFLA (Nuclear Free Local Authorities), a coalition of more than 70 local authorities in Ireland and the UK, found this fleet to be:

Vulnerable to build-up of gas or moisture in their double-skinned hulls, “run away corrosion.”

40% only single-skinned hull

Claims ships are unsinkable “lack scientific and technical credibility.”

Emergency plans for coping with accidents non-existent.

*Report by independent marine pollution consultant, Tim Deere-Jones. (April 2009)

“It is unconscionable that Japan and the UK are engaging in this dangerous transport with an old, defective ship, passing it through the Caribbean with no viable emergency plan in place, just as the tragedy of the earthquake in Haiti is unfolding” stated Aileen Mioko Smith, executive director of Green Action based in Japan.

Martin Forwood of CORE (Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment) is quoted as saying, “The high security surrounding today’s shipment is testament to the dangers posed by this highly radioactive material and the unwholesome global trade in which the nuclear industry is immersed. Sellafield needs to wake up to the harsh reality that today’s world and its oceans are a significantly more dangerous place than they were 30 years ago when the contracts were signed.”

This shipment is the first of many such transports scheduled for return to Japan. It is expected that Japan will receive a total of up to 1000 HLW canisters at the rate of around one shipment (4 transport flasks) from Sellafield each year.

According to the press release issued by CORE (Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment) on 20 January, future shipments will be not be made on the Pacific Sandpiper (launched1985) which, as the oldest ship of the Pacific Nuclear Transport (PNTL) fleet and already at its 25 year sell-by date, is due for retirement.

ion
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho
Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8203
Tel：+81-75-701-7223 Fax：+81-75-702-1952
Cell: +81-90-3620-9251
amsmith@gol.com

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Press Release:
Dangerous shipment of Japanese High Level
Radioactive Waste Passing through the Caribbean and Panama
Download PDF version (148KB)

Japan’s Troubled Plutonium Program

Genkai Nuclear Power Plant Starts MOX Fuel Use
460,000 Citizens Demand Suspension
Round-the-Clock Sit-In Begins

5 November 2009
PRESS RELEASE
For immediate release
Contact: Aileen Mioko Smith—–cell: +81-90-3620-9251

Kyoto, Japan—Japan’s beleaguered “pluthernal” program, MOX (mixed plutonium-uranium oxide) fuel use in commercial power plants, got off to a troubled start at Kyushu Electric’s Genkai Unit 3 Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3 in Saga Prefecture today with the use of 16 MOX fuel assemblies. Full-time opera-tion of the reactor is scheduled to begin December 2nd.

A round-the-clock sit-in began this morning in front of Kyushu Electric headquarters in Fukuoka City and messages of support are pouring in from around the country. In less than two days 673 NGO groups signed on to protest and petition METI, Kyushu Electric, and Saga Prefecture demanding that use of MOX fuel at Genkai not go forward. The number of sign-on groups continue to grow.
See Kyushu blog for details: (in Japanese) http://carnivals.blog93.fc2.com/blog-entry-43.html

Over 460,000 citizens are demanding that use of MOX fuel at Genkai be suspended. This and Kyu-shu Electric’s rush to start use of MOX fuel caused an unprecedented move by the Saga prefectural legislature last month to demand that the utility rescind its original 2 October start-up date, which it did.

On 28 October Japan’s nuclear regulator NISA (Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency) admitted that there are no legal grounds for the government’s criteria for imported fuel assembly inspection of MOX fuel. This admission was made to an Upper House Diet office. Citizens, and national and Saga prefectural legislators demanded that NISA come to Saga to explain. NISA is yet to do so.

The “pluthermal” program is one part of Japan’s troubled plutonium program. The other two parts which are in deep trouble are the fast breeder program and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. Com-mercialization of the fast breeder reactor program has been delayed 8 times and is nearly 80 years behind original schedule (set for early 1970s, now set for “by 2050”.) Commercial operation of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant has been delayed 17 times. Completion of active tests is now set for October 2010. However, with a dysfunctional high-level waste vitrification facility, the future of Rokka-sho is murky.

On 7 October, NISA stated that it couldn’t deny the possibility that the same quality fuel Kansai Elec-tric rejected in August is in Genkai’s MOX fuel. (Kansai Electric rejected one-quarter of the fuel that had been manufactured for use in its Takahama Unit 3 and 4 reactors.) Both utilities’ MOX fuel was fabricated at Areva’s MELOX plant in Marcoule, France.
See Saga Shinbun for NISA admission (English translation available from Green Action):
http://www.sagas.co.jp/news/saga.0.1439726.article.html

Subsequently, Kyushu Electric refused to disclose pertinent information concerning its self-inspection criteria, stating that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, their principle contractor for MOX fuel fabrication would not allow the disclosure. (The same kind of information has been released by Kansai Electric and their principle contractor Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd.) Kyushu Electric stated that MELOX as-sured them that Kyushu’s MOX fuel had no problems like the one found in Kansai Electric MOX fuel, but the utility admitted they were not shown data to confirm this was correct. The concentration of plu-tonium in Genkai’s MOX fuel is unprecedented and exceeds even that used in France.

German nuclear authorities (BMU) initiated an investigatation after Kansai Electric’s rejection of Areva MOX fuel. BMU is reported to take the issue seriously. The status of the investigation is unknown.

“The Japanese government spends 64% of its R&D for energy on nuclear. This program to utilize plu-tonium is the biggest stumbling block to development of renewable energy and energy efficiency in Japan. Prime Minister Hatoyama is woefully ignorant about this reality. The new government must become aware that this detrimental program is merely a lobbyist and bureaucratic haven. It should shut down the program immediately,” stated Aileen Mioko Smith, executive director of Green Action.

The shipment of MOX fuel for use at Genkai and two other plants which took place this spring did not meet MLIT (Ministry of Land, Transport and Infrastructure) requirements. On 26 February, twenty Diet members signed on to an open letter addressing this concern. One of them includes the current MLIT minister Seiji Maehara, and, two other ministers in the Hatoyama government. Future shipments can-not meet this requirement (MOX fuel cask drop test) at this point.

In April a report commissioned by 70 nuclear free local authorities in the UK found that the British-flagged vessels which transport the MOX fuel from Europe to Japan have serious design flaws. Ja-pan’s program is dependent on these shipments since there is no commercial MOX fuel plant in Ja-pan to supply electric utilities. Japanese nuclear transports are protested by dozens of en route coun-tries.

Japan’s pluthermal program start-up is a decade behind schedule due to a quality control data falsifi-cation scandal of Kansai Electric MOX fuel in 1999, citizen protest, nuclear inspection data falsifica-tion by Tokyo Electric in 2002, etc. In June electric utilities announced a multi-year delay in the dead-line to use MOX fuel in 16-18 reactors, originally scheduled for 2010.

Press Release:
Genkai Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3 Starts “Pluthermal” MOX Fuel Use
460,000 Citizens Demand Suspension—- Round-the-Clock Sit-In Begins

Download PDF version (160KB MB)

EMERGENCY OPEN LETTER:
QUESTIONS AND PETITION TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT’S NUCLEAR REGULATORY AUTHORITY

We Ask that You Contact the Foreign Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authorities
Concerning the Safety and Quality Assurance of the MOX Fuel Fabricated at the French company Areva’s Melox plant

On 30 September, Kyushu Electric made public that it will be loading MOX fuel into its Genkai Unit 3 nuclear power plant as early as 3 October. In the meantime, a serious safety and quality assurance problem has emerged concerning the MOX fuel fabricated at the French company Areva’s Melox plant. Kansai Electric has found that some 350,000 pellets of the MOX fuel fabricated for its Takahama Nuclear Power Plant Units 3 and 4 have been found to be defective in one category of its self-inspection regime and has decided not to use these pellets. Kansai Electric has stated that when it asked Areva’s Melox plant for detailed data concerning these pellets, it was refused the data, and that it has not been able to decisively determine what caused this defect. Moreover, in its 19 August press release, Kansai Electric states, "The Melox Company stated that, on the basis of former experience,
these pellets in question could be used as MOX fuel.

As a result, concern has risen as to whether the safety and quality assurance of MOX fuel fabricated by Areva’s Melox plant for not only Kyushu Electric fuel but the fuel being used outside of Japan such as France and Germany has been ensured.

As a result of lessons learned from BNFL MOX fuel quality control data falsification (1999), the Japanese government has stated that it will expend all possible means including exchanging communications with nuclear safety authorities abroad, to assure the safety of MOX fuel. We therefore ask NISA: Have nuclear safety regulatory authorities abroad undertaken any measures toward the electric utilities in their purview which use MOX fuel?

Whereas, due to the concerns above, we submit the following question and petition.We ask for your rapid response.

QUESTION:

1. Have you made contact and submitted inquiries with nuclear safety regulatory authorities abroad concerning the safety and quality assurance of the French company Areva’s MOX fuel?

PETITION:

1. If NISA has not made contact or inquiries as above indicated, please do so immediately.
2. If NISA has made these contact and inquiries, please make the results public.
3. Until you have made this contact and inquiries and have confirmed that the safety and quality assurance of the MOX fuel has been ensured, delay and do not approve the loading of MOX fuel into Genkai Unit 3.

TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN:
Petition to freeze the operation of the Rokkasho Nuclear Reprocessing
Plant in order to stop the radioactive contamination of the ocean and air:

Download PDF version (204 KB MB)

Japan’s Worst Pollution Disaster
MINAMATA DISEASE:　Mercury poisoning from industrial waste

For immediate release: 29 June 2009
Contact: Aileen Mioko Smith
Cell: +81-75-701-7223
(Press conference in Japanese at 16:00 today in Nagata-cho area. Location to be determined.)

Tokyo, Japan—-A delegation of wheelchair-bound congenital Minamata disease victims is arriving in Tokyo this morning seeking a meeting with Yukio Hatoyama and the Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan) leadership in a last minute effort to halt passage of a Minamata disease bill which will have devastating effects on relief for victims.

It was reported in the media yesterday that Prime Minister Taro Aso considers passage of the Minamata bill to be one of the top priorities before dissolving the Lower House.

The Minamata victims’ delegation will be petitioning Diet members in Tokyo today and tomorrow. Poisoned from birth, the victims —many of them in serious condition– have paid their own way to come to Tokyo to lobby leading Diet members in both Upper and Lower Houses, the Minshuto, and Liberal Democratic party.

This so-called special-measures bill submitted to the Diet is supposed to “aid” uncertified sufferers of Minamata disease.

Minamata Disease is widely recognized as Japan’s worst industrial pollution disaster. In 2004, Japan’s Supreme Court found the government guilty of having caused and spread Minamata disease. At present over 30,000 victims are registered “hoken techo” recipients, not officially certified but recognized as living in the polluted area and qualifying for medical relief.

Prime Minister Taro Aso’s government is attempting to pass a bill into law that would enable the polluter, the Chisso Corporation, to escape the burden of further compensating victims by splitting the company into two entities, separating its profit-making branch from the rest of the company. The law would also nullify the designation of Minamata and surrounding areas as an area plagued with Minamata disease under the pollution-related health damages compensation law.

Victims are concerned that certified patients will not be guaranteed future payments, and that victims yet to be recognized will have no entity from which to seek relief. The bill includes no guarantee the government will pick up costs for compensation. A wide range of Minamata victims’ groups have been petitioning Diet members to stop the bill.

More than 6,000 people are currently waiting to be officially certified by administrative authorities as Minamata disease sufferers.

—————
Green Action is an environmental group based in Kyoto, Japan. It’s director, Aileen Mioko Smith is co-author with W. Eugene Smith of MINAMATA which was nominated for the National Book Award (1976).
For further information on Minamata disease: http://www.aileenarchive.or.jp/minamata_en/index.html

May 23, 2009
Saga, Japan
MOX Fuel Shipment Arrival Protest
Genkai Nuclear Power Plant

Citizens oppose arrival of Pacific Pintail and Pacific Heron carrying
20 assemblies of MOX fuel from France to Japan

Photo Credit: Saga Hyakunen-no-Kai

Saga Citizens and Consumer Organizations Protest Arrival of MOX Fuel Shipment

Japan Should Terminate MOX (plutonium and uranium)
Fuel, and Rokkasho Reprocessing Programs

For immediate release: May 23, 2009
Contact:
Aileen Mioko Smith(Green Action) +81-90-3620-9251
Philip White (Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center) +81-3-3357-3800

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May 23rd (Tokyo and Kyoto)—Today, at 6:45 am, amidst citizen protest, the British-flagged vessels the Pacific Pintail and Pacific Heron arrived at the port of Kyushu Electric’s Genkai Nuclear Power Plant and unloaded 20 assemblies of MOX fuel for Genkai Unit 3. The nuclear power plant is scheduled to be the first to use MOX fuel on a commercial scale in Japan. The plan is that the fuel will be loaded during the plant’s outage that begins this August. If everything goes according to plan, this will start Japan’s beleaguered MOX fuel utilization program (called the “pluthermal” program).

About 100 Saga citizens and members of the large consumer food cooperative Green Coop of Kyushu, bearing banners reading “STOP MOX” and shouting “No Pluthermal in Saga!” and “Don’t make Saga a Waste Dump!” were at the wooded peninsula where the Genkai plant is located, at the tip of Saga prefecture. They met with Saga Prefecture, Genkai Town, and Kyushu Electric to protest the arrival of the MOX fuel.
The ships first arrived in Japan on May 18th at the Omaezaki port in Shizuoka Prefecture from France, loaded with MOX fuel containing 1.7 metric tons of weapons-usable plutonium in 69 assemblies. These assemblies were fabricated for Chubu Electric’s Hamaoka Unit 4 in Shizuoka prefecture (28 assemblies), Genkai Unit 3 (20 assemblies), and Shikoku Electric’s Ikata Unit 3 in Ehime prefecture (21 assemblies). The ships had also been met with citizen protest at the Omaezaki port

“The MOX fuel use program is part of Japan’s failed plutonium program. Use of MOX fuel has already been proven in France to increase rather than decrease plutonium surplus. The pluthermal program would just make Japan’s stockpile problem worse. Japan should terminate its MOX use program, and shut the Rokkasho reprocessing plant which would also only increase Japan’s plutonium stockpile.” said Aileen Mioko Smith of Green Action and Hideyuki BAN, Secretary General of Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center. (Japan already has 47 tons of plutonium: 38 tons in France and Britain, and about 9 tons in Japan.

The pluthermal program is supposed to “consume” some of this plutonium.)

Earlier, on May 10th, Saga citizens held a rally protesting Kyushu Electric’s MOX fuel program. Saga citizens now aim to gather 400,000 signatures from prefectural citizens (Saga’s total population: 850,000) by the end of August. The petition is directed to governor Yasushi Furukawa and seeks the end to the MOX fuel program.
On May 18th, a total of 420 citizen, consumer, peace, and professional organizations from every prefecture in Japan submitted a petition to the Japanese government stating the pluthermal program forces MOX spent fuel waste onto the prefectures. (Currently, there is no destination for spent MOX fuel.)

To date, virtually none of the plutonium shipped from Europe to Japan, either in the form of plutonium dioxide or MOX fuel, has actually been used. A total of approximately 2.5 tons had been shipped (between 1984 and 2001), of which only about 30kg has been used (in Monju in 1995 before the prototype reactor had a sodium lead and fire accident).

Japan’s MOX fuel utilization program was to start in 1999. However, a quality control data falsification scandal, local citizen referendum, falsification of nuclear power plant inspection data, and a nuclear accident have delayed the program.

In April 2009, a report commissioned by 70 nuclear free local authorities in the UK found that the Pacific Pintail and Pacific Heron have serious design flaws.

It was reported on May 19th that the Pacific Heron had developed problems in one of its engines during the voyage but was able to continue using another independent engine. (No further details are known at the time of this writing.)

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Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho
Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8203
Tel：+81-75-701-7223 Fax：+81-75-702-1952
Cell: +81-90-3620-9251
amsmith@gol.com

Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center
Akebonobashi Co-op 2F-B, 8-5 Sumiyoshi-cho,
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 162-0065, Japan
Tel: +81-3-3357-3800 Fax: +81-3-3357-3801
cnic@nifty.com

For further information on the MOX fuel shipment see:
Green Action website: MOX Fuel Shipment – Issues and Controversies
http://www.greenaction-japan.org/modules/wordpress0/index.php?p=68

Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center website, MOX and Pluthermal page:
http://cnic.jp/english/topics/cycle/MOX/index.html

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Saga Citizens and Consumer Organizations Protest Arrival of MOX Fuel Shipment
Japan Should Terminate MOX (plutonium and uranium)Fuel, and RokkashoReprocessing Programs
Download PDF version (336KB)

Japan Should Terminate MOX (plutonium and uranium)
Fuel Program, Cease All Shipments from Europe

Japan Should Terminate Fast Breeder Reactor and Reprocessing Programs

For immediate release: May 18, 2009
Contact:
Aileen Mioko Smith (Green Action) 090-3620-9251
Philip White (Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center) +81-3-3357-3800

“We call on the Japanese government and electric utilities to terminate this and future MOX fuel shipments and cease from placing en route countries at risk. We call on countries potentially on the route of future MOX fuel shipments to join us in demanding the termination of these dangerous shipments” stated BAN Hideyuki, secretary-general of Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC), Aileen Mioko SMITH, executive director of Green Action, and HOSHIKAWA Jun, executive director of Greenpeace Japan. Regional organizations which have protested past Japanese nuclear shipments include CARICOM (Caribbean Community), ACP(African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, SIDS (Small Island Developing States), and PIF (Pacific Islands Forum).

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May 18, Tokyo, Japan ― Today, May 18 2009, two British-flagged vessels, the Pacific Pintail and Pacific Heron arrived in Japan from France carrying 1.7 metric tons of weapons-usable plutonium contained in 69 assemblies of MOX (mixed plutonium and uranium oxide) fuel. This is the world’s largest shipment of plutonium ever undertaken.

The MOX fuel, made from plutonium separated from Japanese spent fuel shipped to France for reprocessing, is to be used at the nuclear power plants of three Japanese electric utilities: Kyushu, Chubu, and Shikoku Electric Power. Fuel assemblies were delivered today to the Hamaoka Unit 4 plant of Chubu Electric. The ships will continue on to the Ikata Unit 3 plant in Ehime Prefecture and the Genkai Unit 3 plant in Saga Prefecture to deliver the remaining assemblies.

More shipments from France to more plants are scheduled to follow. Japanese nuclear power plants are designed to use uranium fuel, not MOX fuel.

MOX fuel shipments are unsafe and trample on the right of en route countries to protect their citizens and environment

On March 18th, Eni F.H. Faleomavaega (member of US Congress from the Territory of American Samoa) in a statement made on the floor of the US House of Representatives protested this latest MOX fuel shipment, stating, “This latest shipment of MOX fuel complements earlier shipments of spent fuel, about 170, from Japan to Europe. As usual, plans for this latest shipment, the largest so far, was covered in shrouds of secrecy without prior consultation or notification of en-route states. Yet, any accident involving the ships or their cargo could have catastrophic consequences on the environment and the population of en-route states. Moreover, with the increasing threat of piracy, the transported plutonium MOX fuel could easily fall in the hands of terrorists…”

Faleomavaega continues, “This unnecessary and unjustifiable shipment provides another example of the unacceptable risks and adverse impact the use of nuclear power and nuclear materials have on the environment and the lives of those involved. It demonstrates once again the imperialistic behavior of some major countries at the expense of others…. Europe, Japan and all nuclear states, should keep their nuclear materials and waste in their own backyard, and not endanger the lives of others.”

In April 2009, a report commissioned by 70 nuclear free local authorities in the UK found that the British-flagged vessels the Pacific Pintail and Pacific Heron have serious design flaws. The Pacific Pintail (built in 1987) is still operating despite having been built to the same design and construction standards as predecessor vessels decommissioned or scrapped following discovery of “run away” corrosion. The Pacific Heron (built in 2008) has only small modifications from the original design of earlier ships. Available details of these modifications do not describe measures to prevent “run away” corrosion.

The report found both the Pacific Pintail and Pacific Heron are vulnerable to build-up of gas or moisture in their double-skinned hulls and “run away corrosion.” The shippers boast that the ships are double-hulled, where in fact 40% of each vessel is only single-skinned hull. The study also found that claims that the ships are unsinkable “lack scientific and technical credibility.” Moreover, emergency plans for coping with accidents are non-existent.

The Pacific Pintail and Pacific Heron should never again be used for shipping MOX fuel.

Japan’s plutonium utilization program should be terminated

This MOX fuel shipment is part of Japan’s failed plutonium program. Originally begun in 1956, the program was to commercialize the fast breeder reactor by around 1970. The breeder development program is now 80 years behind schedule, with commercialization set for “around 2050.” A commercial reprocessing plant was to be operational at Rokkasho by 1989, but has been delayed 16 times.

Both the fast breeder program and reprocessing program are in dire straits. There is now no date set for re-starting Monju, the prototype fast breeder reactor shutdown since a sodium fire accident in 1995, and the project is facing organizational collapse. The Rokkasho reprocessing plant faces serious problems with its high-level waste vitrification facility and may never successfully operate.

Japan has built up tons of surplus plutonium in the meantime, and MOX fuel utilization in Japanese commercial reactors is Japan’s attempt to consume some of that surplus plutonium, originally intended for the fast breeder reactor program. (Japan’s plutonium surplus now stands at 38 tons of Japanese plutonium in France and the UK, and around 9 tons in Japan.) France’s attempt to reduce its own stockpile of plutonium by using MOX fuel in its commercial nuclear power plants should serve as an example of how this program fails. The program increased rather than decreased France’s plutonium surplus.

Japan’s MOX fuel utilization program was to start in 1999. However, a quality control data falsification scandal, local citizen referendum, falsification of nuclear power plant inspection data, and a nuclear accident have delayed the program. Facing adamant local citizen opposition, the government’s response was not to terminate the program but to implement coercive measures by jacking up subsidies, thus making it nearly impossible for local authorities to refuse the program.

Instead of terminating the failed fast breeder and reprocessing programs, the Japanese government’s response was to elevate these failed projects to programs “central to the nation’s technological development.” The MOX fuel program is a by-product necessary for shoring up these failed programs.

Citizens Protest MOX Program

Citizens protested the arrival of the MOX shipment in Omaezaki today. Protests were also held in Shizuoka and Saga on May 10. Aerial photos of a “No MOX” message formed by people at the protest in Saga are available on the following URL: http://www.greenaction-japan.org/modules/entop2/

Citizen, consumer, and peace groups from every prefecture in Japan today submitted a petition to the Japanese government in opposition to the MOX fuel program and met with government officials from METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry), the Atomic Energy Commission, and MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology), stating the program forces nuclear waste onto the prefectures.

Hideyuki Ban
Co-Director
Citizens Nuclear Information Center

HOSHIKAWA Jun
Executive Director
Greenpeace Japan

Aileen Mioko SMITH
Executive Director
Green Action

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Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center
Akebonobashi Co-op 2F-B, 8-5 Sumiyoshi-cho,
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 162-0065, Japan
Tel: +81-3-3357-3800 Fax: +81-3-3357-3801
cnic@nifty.com

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho
Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8203
Tel：+81-75-701-7223 Fax：+81-75-702-1952
Cell: +81-90-3620-9251
amsmith@gol.com

Greenpeace Japan
NF bldg 2F 8-13-11 Nishi-Shinjuku
Shinjuku-ku Tokyo 160-0023
Tel：+81-3-5338-9800 Fax：+81-3-5338-9817

For further information on the MOX fuel shipment see:
Green Action website: MOX Fuel Shipment ― Issues and Controversies
http://www.greenaction-japan.org/modules/wordpress0/index.php?p=68

Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center website, MOX and Pluthermal page:
http://cnic.jp/english/topics/cycle/MOX/index.html

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Citizens Protest Japanese MOX Shipment: Joint Statement by CNIC, Green Action and Greenpeace Japan
Japan Should Terminate MOX (plutonium and uranium) Fuel Program,
Cease All Shipments from Europe
Japan Should Terminate Fast Breeder Reactor and Reprocessing Programs
Download PDF version (520KB)