[English translation]
28 March 2011
Radiological Impact of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster
Petition following negotiations with Japanese Ministry of Health,
Labour, and Welfare

Issued by: Participants of the March 28, 2011 meeting with the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare

[Summary]

1. The Ministry’s call for the “active voluntary evacuation” of residents living within a 20 km to 30 km radius of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Stations is irresponsible. Immediately issue a directive to evacuate and enlarge the evacuation zone commensurate with radiation doses.
2. Calculate and publicize regularly the total cumulative radiation dose local residents receive collectively.
3. Repeal the upward revision of the maximum permissible radiation dose (250 milliSieverts) for emergency-response workers at the Fukushima plant.
4. Expand the scope of radiation monitoring and publicize the results.
5. Undertake immediately a comprehensive survey of the radiation exposure and current state of health of local residents and provide for their long-term health care.
6. Do not relax the provisional standards governing the maximum permissible levels of radionuclides in food.
7. Provide compensation for damages to farm and dairy producers and to people who are forced to relocate.
8. Generally, take all measures necessary to ensure that members of the public do not receive radiation doses greater than 1 milliSievert per annum.

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Full text of petition (PDF)

For original Japanese petition see:
総理大臣と厚生労働大臣宛：3月28日厚生労働省との交渉を踏まえた要望書

Green Action (Japan) and Mihama-no-Kai

Urgent Statement Concerning Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident
23 March 2011

High Levels of Radiation Detected in Vegetables, Unprocessed Milk, Water, and Soil

Unnecessary Radiation Exposure Imposed Due to Japanese Government’s Lack of
Evacuation plan and “Declaration of Safety”

• Immediately evacuate infants and pre-school age children and pregnant women who are within the 20-30km radius (“stay indoors” zone) to locations farther from the
  Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
• Extend the evacuation zone radically to avoid further exposure
• Discontinue the “declaration of safety” that states, “there is no immediate harm to human health”. This message is not properly transmitting the dangers of internal exposure and late–onset radiation damage (cancer, leukemia, etc).

Due to the catastrophic accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, high levels of radioactive contamination have been detected in a variety of vegetables, unprocessed milk, water and soil. The contamination has spread outside of Fukushima to neighboring prefectures and has been detected on several leafy vegetables such as spinach, cabbage, komatsuna/Japanese mustard spinach, broccoli, as well as in unprocessed milk.

Radioactive iodine 131 was detected in tap water in Tokyo (approx. 200Bq/l), and the Tokyo government officially announced that people should “refrain from giving tap water to infants under 1 year of age”. Tap water in Iidate village, approx. 40km away from the nuclear plant, measured 965Bq/kg, three times higher than the limit considered safe (300Bq/kg).

In the same Iidate village, the soil has also been contaminated, showing high levels of radioactive cesium137 (163,000Bq/kg). The half-life of cesium is approximately 30 years, resulting in contaminated soil for an extended period of time. A measurement of 1,170,000Bq/kg of radioactive iodine 131 was also detected. This cesium level is equivalent to levels detected some 10 to 150km from the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident.

Due to the high levels of radioactive contamination, the government has issued a “shipping restriction” and “consumption restriction”. However, Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano has repeatedly stated that consumption “in the short term, will not do any harm to human health.” And that the restriction is “just precautionary.” The government is trying to do one thing: downplay radioactive contamination and its influence on people’s health as much as possible. Those infants and pregnant women told to stay indoors within the 20-30km area have been left abandoned. Under these conditions, residents are forced to receive unnecessary radiation exposure due to the government’s “declaration of safety” and lack of an evacuation plan.

Newscasters have finally begun asking experts what the phrase “no immediate harm to health” means, but the experts have only replied that, “There is no immediate harm. However, people should avoid drinking contaminated water in the long term”, and have failed to explain the effects of late-onset radiation damage, such as cancer and leukemia.

• We demand the government extend the evacuation area immediately!
  In particular, evacuate infants and pregnant women within the 20-30km area to locations farther outside of the zone!
• The government should retract its statement that “there is no immediate harm to human health” which does not convey the dangers of internal exposure and the latent effects of radiation exposure (such as cancer and leukemia), and erroneously declares “safety”.

23 March 2011 [Issued at 21:30 Japan time]

Aileen Mioko Smith,
Executive Director
Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
Tel: +81-75-701-7223 Fax: +81-75-702-1952 email: amsmith@gol.com

Hideyuki Koyama,
Director
Osaka Citizens Against the Mihama, Oi, and Takahama Nuclear Power Plants (Mihama-no-Kai)
3F., Seiko Building, 4-3-3 Nishi-Temma, Kita-ku, Osaka, Japan
Tel: +81-6-6367-6580 Fax: +81-6-6367-6581

February 24, 2011: 174 organizations worldwide sent a letter to the Prime Minister of Japan and key Cabinet officials warning that funding for the South Texas project from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation would be an extraordinary financial risk. Sign-on letter to Japanese Prime Minister and Cabinet.

NIRS press release:
http://www.nirs.org/nukerelapse/stexas/jbicpr22411.pdf

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February 24, 2011

Mr Naoto Kan

Prime Minister of Japan

Honorable Prime Minister,

We are writing to urge you to prevent a loan guarantee from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) for the proposed atomic reactor project at the South Texas site in the U.S. state of Texas. Such a loan would entail extraordinary financial and social risk for the JBIC and the Japanese people.

All currently proposed reactor projects in the United States face a challenging economic environment caused by unfavorable market conditions; escalating projected construction costs; decreased electricity demand growth; low natural gas prices and increased competition from safe, clean renewable energy sources. With a deregulated, competitive power market and some of the lowest wholesale electricity prices in the country, Texas is a particularly risky U.S. state in which to invest in expensive new reactors.

The projected cost for the two South Texas reactors has increased from $5.6 billion in 2006 to as much as $18 billion today.¹ Last year, the City of San Antonio reduced its investment in the project by 85 percent because of the rising cost estimates. San Antonio’s municipal utility, CPS Energy, sued their partner NRG Energy (the loan guarantee applicant) for $32 billion, alleging fraud, illegal conduct, and conspiracy over cost estimates and citing NRG’s deals with outside partners. NRG has been desperately pursuing other municipal utilities to commit to purchase electricity from the proposed reactors by promising fixed priced energy and other incentives that would further undermine the economic viability of the project.

New nuclear reactors in Texas would produce energy at far higher costs than the market price of power in the state. An independent assessment conducted for Texas’ main grid operator ERCOT (Electric Reliability Council of Texas) found that the cost of the South Texas reactors would exceed the revenue they would generate in the market by 33 to 52 percent.²

Texas has a host of lower-cost alternatives, especially wind and natural gas, that will continue to meet the need for electricity. Texas is the number one wind market in the United States with more than 8,000MW in service. Natural gas reserves are adequate for 100 years, thus assuring low-cost energy for a long time. A 2010 analysis done for ERCOT projects per kilowatt capital costs for solar power to already be cheaper than nuclear power in Texas―a cost advantage that is projected to grow wider under every possible scenario envisioned.³ Currently, the average wholesale cost for electricity in Texas is 3.7 cents per kilowatt-hour, while electricity from new reactors with capital costs in South Texas’ range is estimated to cost between 12 cents to 20 cents per kilowatt-hour. Moreover, the large projected increases in electricity demand made just a few years ago – which served as the basis for many new reactor proposals – are now highly unlikely to be reached for another decade or more. This is partly due to the U.S. recession, of course, but also due to increasing energy efficiency throughout the U.S. economy.

Due to Japanese corporate involvement in the proposed South Texas reactor project, it might appear that it would make a good investment. The reality, however, is that the projects involving Japanese companies will suffer the same delays, design problems, financial difficulties and determined public opposition as other proposed nuclear projects.

Moreover, the history of U.S. nuclear reactor construction does not provide room for optimism. According to a 1986 study from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA), the average cost overrun of the first 75 U.S. nuclear reactor projects was 207 percent – or more than triple the original estimated cost.⁴ The cost overruns of the last 50 reactors built in the U.S. were even higher, reaching as much as 800% over-budget. Such extraordinary cost overruns led to multi-billion-dollar bond defaults, utility bankruptcy, and significant financial losses by utilities. Nothing in the U.S. experience suggests that new reactor projects will be any more successful at containing costs than past projects.

Just as we have warned American taxpayers and elected officials about these very serious financial risks, we also urge you to very carefully consider these risks before deciding to invest in new reactors in the United States. We respectfully suggest that Japanese taxpayers would not want to lose money on a U.S. reactor project. Nor would U.S. taxpayers want to bail out JBIC when the predictable losses occur. Such outcomes would obviously be uncomfortable on both sides of the Pacific.

cc:

Mr Banri Kaieda
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry

Mr Yoshihiko Noda
Minister of Finance

Mr Koichiro Gemba
Minister for National Policy

For a list of signatories, please see PDF:
http://www.greenaction-japan.org/internal/110224_japanstexasletter.pdf

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References

1. Nuclear Expansion could cost $18.2 billon, San Antonio Express-News, December 23, 2009

2. Potomac Economics, LTD., Independent Market Monitor for the ERCOT Wholesale Market, 2009 State of the Market Report for the ERCOT Wholesale Electricity Markets, July 2010,
http://www.puc.state.tx.us/wmo/documents/annual_reports/2009annualreport.pdf.

3. ERCOT Scenario Development Working Group, Scenario Assumptions Spreadsheet, , September 2010.
http://www.ercot.com/calendar/2010/09/20100910-SDWG

4. An Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Construction Costs, January 1, 1986, Energy Information Administration, Technical Report DOE/EIA-0485

23 January 2011

Statement by Minamata Victims and Supporter Groups
Addressing the Government of Japan’s Proposal to
Call the Mercury Treaty the “Minamata Convention”

ta disease is an ongoing tragedy. As the global community negotiates the mercury treaty, the Japanese government must first confront the Minamata disease issue at home. After fifty-five years of struggling with the disaster, we are opposed to naming the mercury treaty the “Minamata Convention” until the tragedy is faced head on and a road map created for its genuine resolution. The Government of Japan must make clear what was learned from Minamata, implement the lessons learned and, before the diplomatic conference in 2013, reexamine its policies and make concrete progress toward a genuine resolution of the elements described below.

The Government of Japan must implement the following with integrity:

1. Clarify the full extent of damage caused by Minamata disease

Although it has been 55 years since the official discovery of Minamata disease, the full extent of the actual damage is yet to be clarified. Not only is it absolutely necessary to undertake health studies of the entire contaminated region of the Shiranui Sea, follow up studies must continue for the residents living in this contaminated area. Recently, research has shown that children are affected by mercury contamination even at low levels of exposure. Therefore, it is also necessary to implement studies and measures based on these findings.

2. Compensate all victims

The Supreme Court verdict of October 2004 established the legal responsibility of the Government of Japan and Kumamoto prefecture for spreading Minamata disease. The Osaka District Court verdict found that the criteria established by the Government of Japan in 1977 to certify victims of Minamata disease “had no medical basis.” The Government of Japan must respect these legal decisions and recognize all victims as Minamata disease victims, and, compensate them.

3. Instead of protecting the polluting company, ensure full implementation of the “Polluter Pays Principle”

Under the Minamata Disease Victim Relief Law enacted in July 2009, the polluting company Chisso Corporation has been allowed to split into two companies, and this process is moving forward. The polluting company must not be allowed to escape its legal responsibility. The offender must be made to fulfill its responsibilities as the polluting company.

4. Clean up the Minamata Bay and Shiranui Sea mercury contamination

Minamata Bay and the Shiranui Sea were contaminated as a result of several hundred tons of mercury emitted by the Chisso Corporation’s Minamata factory. There are numerous contaminated areas existing within the city of Minamata. Thorough decontamination of these contaminated areas is essential. Also, the existing landfill of part of Minamata Bay is only a temporary storage area for the toxic methylmercury and cannot be considered final decontamination of the area. It would be a travesty to hold the ceremony for a “Minamata Convention” at the very place where massive mercury contamination is being ignored.

5. Establish a health and welfare system so that victims can live secure lives within their society

There are so many victims, including congenital Minamata disease victims, who are living their daily lives in anxiety, worrying about the situation concerning the health and welfare system in the areas where they live. Monetary compensation alone does not solve the problems victims encounter. It is absolutely necessary to have a health and welfare system that victims battling with their own illness and victims continuing to nurse seriously ill victims can feel secure about.

Implementation of the above is not just an issue for Minamata alone. Beginning with Niigata, Japan, which fell victim to the second Minamata disease, there are innumerable locations around the world contaminated with mercury, and even more in the process of being contaminated. We believe that if the mercury treaty learns the lessons of Minamata, then it will indeed be a treaty of great significance. The tragedy of Minamata was the result of eating fish contaminated with mercury. We the undersigned fervently hope for a strong global treaty, which will significantly decrease mercury contamination worldwide so that fish are once again safe to eat.

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Signatures

• Minamata Disease Mutual Aid Society
• Association of Minamata Disease Victims “SHIRANUI”
• Minamata Disease Victimsʼ Mutual Aid Society
• The Collaboration Center for Minamata Disease Victims (NPO)
• Solidarity Network Asia and Minamata
• Green Action
• Organizing Committee “Symposium Addressing Chisso and Government of Japanʼs Minamata Disease Responsibility”
• Tokyo Association to Indict [Those Responsible for] Minamata Disease
• Editorial Office of “Support for Minamata” Magazine
• Minamata Disease Tokai Association
• Tokai Region Minamata Disease Victims and Familiesʼ Mutual Aid Society
• Nagoya Association to Indict [Those Responsible for] Minamata Disease
• Pacific Asia Resource Center (PARC)

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Contact Information

Association of Minamata Disease Victims “SHIRANUI”
2-2-20 Sakurai-cho, Minamata City, Kumamoto 867-0045 Japan,
Tel/Fax +81-966-62-7502
Email: mdshiranui-v@friend.ocn.ne.jp

Minamata Disease Victims’ Mutual Aid Society
108 Nanpukuji, Minamata, Kumamoto 867-0023 Japan,
Tel/Fax +81-966-63-8779
Email: ezg01444@nifty.ne.jp

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Honoring Minamata – International Solidarity Statement In Support of Minamata Victims’ Groups

Japan Civil Network for the CBD
“A Nuclear Plant in Biodiversity Hotspot”

http://webcast.cop10.go.jp/player.asp?id=1919&type=ondemand

COP 10 Convention on Biological Diversity (Nagoya, Japan)

This is the English original of a PowerPoint presentation by Mycle Schneider* to Japanese Diet members and staff. The briefing was held in the House of Councillors Office Building (Tokyo, Japan) on 13 October 2010.

The meeting was organized by Green Action, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, and Gensuikin.

See Green Action Japanese site for Japanese translation:
URL: http://www.greenaction-japan.org/modules/japanese/index.php?id=27

*Mycle Schneider Consulting—Independent Analysis on Energy and Nuclear Policy

Lessons from System Analysis of Energy Policy
in the US, France and Germany
Is Pursuing both
Renewables and Nuclear Feasible?
Download PDF version (4.5 MB)

Press Release

August 11, 2010

Beware of Investing in New US Nukes
Visiting Expert Warns Japanese Government

Tuesday, August 11 (Tokyo): US nuclear expert Kevin Kamps, who is currently visiting Japan, today sent a letter to the Japanese Government warning them to carefully consider the very serious financial risks of investing in new atomic reactors in the United States. The letter, which was endorsed by over 70 US NGOs, was addressed to Prime Minister Naoto Kan, Minister of Finance Yoshihiko Noda and Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Masayuki Naoshima.

Kamps is a member of US NGO Beyond Nuclear. He campaigns on a wide range of nuclear issues, including radioactive waste and US Government funding for new nuclear reactors.

Japanese government and industry hope to export nuclear reactors to countries in Asia, including Vietnam, and to countries in the Middle East, but their first priority is to participate in the construction of proposed new reactors in the United States. However, Kamps points out that the long-awaited US nuclear renaissance might not materialize.

The last order for a new reactor to actually be built was placed in October 1973. To rescue the moribund nuclear industry, the US government is offering various incentives, including loan guarantees, which shift the risk from investors to taxpayers. This means that if companies which receive loan guarantees default on their payments, the government will pick up the tab. The U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has predicted that over half of new reactor project will default, based upon the past history of the nuclear power industry.

So far, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has received applications to build 26 new nuclear reactors, all of which are so-called third generation designs, although the new designs are not significantly innovative compared to currently operating reactors. But, as Kamps points out, None of these applications has been approved by the NRC yet. Until they receive a Construction and Operating License (COL) they cannot receive a loan guarantee.

In February this year, President Obama announced the first loan guarantee for two proposed reactors (AP1000 – AP stands for Advanced Passive) at Southern Company’s Vogtle nuclear power station in Georgia. However, the Westinghouse (owned by Toshiba) AP1000 design being considered has not even received a final NRC design certification. NRC cannot approve a COL until the design is certified, so the loan guarantee cannot be finalized.

Kamps says, The fact that loan guarantees are being announced before designs are approved and licenses issued shows that the whole program is in a state of confusion.

Most of the proposed reactors have Japanese involvement, but the most direct involvement is in two proposed ABWRs (General Electric-Hitachi Advanced Boiling Water Reactors) at the South Texas Project nuclear power station. Toshiba and Tokyo Electric Power Company have both invested in Nuclear Innovation North America (NINA), which plans to build the reactors.

NINA hopes that the involvement of Japanese companies will enable it to win support from the Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC) and Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI). However the project is in deep trouble due to escalating costs and delays in the announcement of loan guarantees. NINA’s owners, NRG Energy and Toshiba, recently announced that they are paring back spending on the proposed plant expansion because of uncertainty surrounding a federal loan guarantee for the project. (See notes attached to the NGO letter for more information about this and other projects.)

U.S. federal taxpayer loan guarantees would cover up to 80% of project costs. New reactor proponents could seek the remaining 20% of financing from Japanese government agencies.

The Japanese Government’s New Growth Strategy proposes an expansion in the range of NEXI’s export and investment insurance to cover the risk of policy changes by the government of the importing country and in an interview with the Asahi Shimbun the Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry Masayuki Naoshima proposed using pension funds as a source of long-term investment finance for nuclear export projects (Asahi Globe, August 2, 2010).

However, when Kamps visited JBIC and NEXI on August 4, he warned them, It is dangerous to view nuclear projects in the United States as less risky than in developing countries. If you want to invest, it would be wiser to invest in highly competitive renewable energy and energy efficiency projects.

Contacts in Japan
Philip White, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, Tel: 03-3357-3800
Aileen Mioko Smith, Green Action, Tel: 075-701-7223
Noriko Shimizu, FoE Japan, Tel: 03-6907-7217

Contact in the US
Kevin Kamps, Beyond Nuclear, Tel: 301-270-2209

30 June 2010

STATEMENT
We Protest MOX Fuel Arrival at Takahama Nuclear Power Plant Units 3 and 4

To Makoto YAGI, President of Kansai Electric
Issued by: Green Action (Kyoto, Japan) and Mihama-no-Kai (Osaka, Japan)

For immediate release.
Contact: +81-90-3620-9251 (Smith)

Today, 30 June, Kansai Electric, ignoring the many voices of protest, brought MOX (mixed oxide) fuel into the Takahama Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3 and Unit 4. Many countries around the world have expressed their concern and protest against the numerous Japanese plutonium shipments from France. However, Kansai Electric, totally ignored these voices of concern, forced through this shipment. We strongly protest this shipment and the arrival of MOX fuel at Takahama.

The MOX fuel that was fabricated at the AREVA Melox plant is of inferior quality, containing impurity levels that would not even pass safety standards for uranium fuel. Burning plutonium in this way at nuclear power reactors that are designed to burn uranium fuel will only further increase the probability of an accident.

Moreover, the spent MOX fuel waste that will be produced as a result of Kansai Electric burning this fuel will be nuclear waste that will have nowhere to go. This ultra-hazardous nuclear waste will remain indefinitely, over an extremely long period of time, at the Takahama Nuclear Power Plant spent fuel pools.

The Japanese government has stated that policy measures deciding on how this fuel will be managed will be deliberated from “sometime around 2010.” However, commercial operation of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, a prerequisite for this deliberation, is not moving forward. Active tests at Rokkasho are at a complete standstill due to intractable problems at its vitrification facility. Another prerequisite for deliberation of policy measures for spent MOX fuel is operation of Monju. Although Monju was restarted after being shut down for over 14 years due to a sodium leak and fire accident in 1995, repeated problems occurred immediately after this May’s restart. The prerequisites for starting deliberations on spent MOX fuel are now even further out of reach. If Kansai Electric’s pluthermal program (MOX fuel use program) goes ahead in full force under these circumstances, the town of Takahama is destined to become a nuclear waste dump.

The pluthermal program producing spent nuclear fuel which has no where to go is, in the first place, in violation of the national government’s nuclear regulatory law.

Moreover, indefinite long term safe storage of spent MOX fuel in spent fuel pools is not guaranteed. In the USA, at the Indian Point nuclear power plant in 2005, and the Salem nuclear power plant in 2002, the environment around the plants were radioactively contaminated due to leakage from spent nuclear fuel pools at these plants. Small quantities leaked from the pools over a long period of time, as much as 5 years, contaminating the underground and groundwater. Levels of radioactive tritium reached as much as 126 times the federally allowed safety levels, becoming a serious social issue.

Kansai Electric’s monitoring of its spent fuel pools basically is only concerned with maintaining water levels within the pools, and there is danger that small quantities leaking from the pools could lead to underground contamination and contamination of the surrounding sea. In fact, in Japan, leaks have been detected from spent fuel pools at the Ikata nuclear power plant Unit 3 in Ehime prefecture, and at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant in Aomori Prefecture.

Extremely long-term storage of spent MOX fuel in the spent fuel pools of Fukui nuclear power plants will not only make these local areas de facto nuclear dumps, there is danger that leakage from these spent fuel pools could lead to the environment of the Wakasa region of Fukui prefecture being contaminated with radioactive materials. It will damage citizens hopes of leaving this rich and beautiful environment for generations to come.

　We are opposed to the loading of MOX fuel at the Takahama Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3 during the October outage. We will continue to stengthen the links between Fukui and Kansai citizens and work to stop implementation of the pluthermal (MOX fuel utilization) program at Takahama Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3.

“Has fast breeder Monju been good for Japan’s energy?”
Fast breeder’s electricity is expensive.

Download PDF version (266 KB)