Green Action Japan

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Japan Atomic Energy Commission Accepts Faulty Plutonium Utilization Plan of Japanese Electric Utilities

3 February 2006

Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
Director General,
International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA Secretariat
Headquarters Offices
A-1400 Vienna, Austria

IAEA Board of Directors
c/o Ambassador Yukiya Amano
Chairperson,
IAEA Board of Directors
Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna
Andromeda Tower, Donau-City Strasse 6, A-1220
Vienna, Austria

　

Dear Director General ElBaradei and IAEA Board of Governors:

In our Petition of 5 January and follow-up letter of 11 January, we urged the IAEA Secretariat and Board of Governors to quickly take appropriate action before active testing begins at Japan’s Rokkasho reprocessing plant and plutonium is accumulated. This was to ensure that Japan does not breach its international commitment made to the IAEA in 1997 which pledged that “plutonium beyond the amount required to implement the program is not to be held, i.e. the principle of no surplus plutonium.”

The Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPCO) of Japan published its “Utilization Plan for Plutonium Recovered at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant”*1 on 6 January, the day after we sent our petition to you. The Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) considered the plan and announced its response on 24 January.*2

JAEC’s 24 January response is at variance with the commitment made by the Japanese government in 1997. This is because the FEPCO Plan announced on 6 January does not meet the conditions stipulated in the JAEC Decision of 5 August 2003, the “Basic Principles for the Utilization of Plutonium in Japan.”*3 The Basic Principles were issued to meet Japan’s commitment to transparency and “no surplus plutonium.”

According to the 2003 JAEC Decision, “The uses of plutonium should specify the quantities of plutonium involved, the places where plutonium will be used, approximate time of start [of] using plutonium, and an approximate period of time required to use the material.”

The 6 January FEPCO Plan fails to meet the “Basic Principles” of the 2003 JAEC Decision:

• Head of FEPCO, Tokyo Electric, does not say which plant will use the plutonium, yet states that it will consume the plutonium.
• None of the nuclear power plants specified under the FEPCO Plan has approval from local authorities to use plutonium (MOX) fuel.
• Moreover, the Plan includes nuclear power plants for which the utilities have not yet even applied to local authorities for approval.
• The Plan also includes the Ohma “full-MOX” nuclear power plant which does not exist and for which no reactor installation license has been granted.
• The approximate start date for plutonium use is not listed.
• There is no clear indication of by when the plutonium will have been used up.
• The FEPCO Plan is supposed to be about obtaining permission to separate plutonium at Rokkasho and is accordingly titled, “Utilization Plan for Plutonium Recovered at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (Fiscal years 2005-2006). The title, however, is misleading since in small print the Plan says, “There are cases where the amount of plutonium to be used includes plutonium recovered overseas.”

In the recent 24 January response, the JAEC effectively admits the FEPCO Plan does not meet JAEC’s Basic Principles, by saying that companies have “not yet reached the stage of producing detailed utilization plans…” Nevertheless it responded that the Plan was appropriate.

A table comparing key elements of Japanese / JAEC documents from 1997, 2003, and 24 January 2006 is appended to this letter.

It appears that, on the strength of JAEC’s response, active testing could begin around April at Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited’s (JNFL) Rokkasho reprocessing plant. The plant would then begin to separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. On the basis of JNFL’s reprocessing schedule and FEPCO’s 6 January plutonium utilization plan, it is clear that Japan’s inventory of separated plutonium will grow rapidly.

Our calculations indicate that implementation of current plans for reprocessing at Rokkasho would result in approximately 35 tons surplus plutonium in Japan by 2012.*4 (2012 is the earliest date plutonium separated at Rokkasho could be used.)

Since there are also no concrete plans to consume the 43 tons of plutonium Japan has already accumulated in Europe and Japan (37.4 tons in Europe and 5.7 in Japan*5), Japanese surplus plutonium may total 78 tons by 2012. This is comparable to the US military inventory (including military excess) of 99.5 tons of separated plutonium, and the UK military and civilian inventory of 77.8 tons.*6

Judging from announcements by power companies to date, little if any of the 37 tons of plutonium currently held in Europe will be used before 2012. The pluthermal plans -using plutonium uranium MOX fuel in thermal reactors- of the two largest power companies Tokyo Electric and Kansai Electric are in disarray. Local and prefectural consent was withdrawn for Tokyo Electric’s plans and Kansai Electric reiterated on 31 January that “concrete pluthermal plans are undecided and we continue to not be in a state for discussing the matter.”*7 Only four of the smaller power companies have announced plans to use plutonium before 2012, and none of them has yet obtained the consent of local and prefectural authorities.

It is worth noting the historic unreliability of Japanese electric utilities’ (FEPCO) plans concerning plutonium consumption. In June 1993 preceding start-up of THORP (UK), Japanese electric utilities took out full-page advertisements in all major UK newspapers stating that they needed the plutonium THORP would separate.*8 To this day, however, not a single gram of plutonium has been consumed. A week preceding the 1993 Japanese electric utilities’ advertisement, our organizations predicted that THORP’s operation would result in approximately 39 tons of surplus Japanese plutonium in Europe by 2005,*9 and a total 70 tons of surplus Japanese plutonium by 2010.*10 Our predictions are right on track.

The continued lack of transparency concerning when and where Japan will consume its plutonium for electricity generation is highly disturbing.

We contend that plutonium stocks are a proliferation risk in themselves, regardless of the current intentions of the Japanese government. They undermine international efforts to stem the drift toward nuclear proliferation.

JAEC’s recent judgment shows that it does not fully comprehend the nuclear proliferation implications and transparency problems of beginning active tests at Rokkasho.*11 *12 The JAEC’s failure to live up to its commitment to “no surplus plutonium” threatens to undermine international confidence in Japan’s oft-repeated claim that the development and utilization of nuclear energy in Japan “is strictly limited to peaceful purposes.”

We therefore urge the IAEA to discuss this matter and to inform the Japanese government that it is not appropriate to begin active tests at Rokkasho.

Yours sincerely,

Hideyuki Ban (Co-Director)
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC)
3F Kotobuki Bldg., 1-58-15 Higashi-nakano
Nakano-ku, Tokyo, 164-0003, Japan
Phone: +81 3 5330 9520

Aileen Mioko Smith (Director)
Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75, Tanaka Sekiden-cho
Sakyo-ku Kyoto, 606-8203, Japan
Phone: +81 75 701 7223

Atsuko Nogawa (Nuclear Campaigner)
Greenpeace Japan
N F bldg. 2F 8-13-11 Nishi-Shinjuku
Shinjuku, Tokyo, 160-0023, Japan
Phone: +81 3 5338 9800

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Enclosures:

Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, Green Action, Greenpeace Japan, Chart: “Comparison of 3 Japanese Government / Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) Decisions Regarding the Use of Plutonium,” compiled 3 February 2006. Available at: http://www.greenaction-japan.org/modules/wordpress0/index.php?p=34

Japanese Government, Letter to the IAEA: “Plutonium Utilization Plan of Japan,” December 1997. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc549a1.pdf

Atomic Energy Commission of Japan, Decision: “Basic Principles for the Utilization of Plutonium in Japan” (Provisional Translation), 5 August 2003. (Personal translation by or for then JAEC commissioner Tetsuya Endo. Sent by JAEC to Green Action.)

Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan (FEPCO), “Utilization Plan for Plutonium Recovered at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (Fiscal 2005-2006),” 6 January 2006. (CNIC translation.)Available at: http://cnic.jp/english/topics/cycle/MOX/pluplanFEPCO6Jan06.html

Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC), “Appropriateness of the Purpose of Use Specified in the Plutonium Utilization Plans Announced by Electric Power Companies et al,” 24 January 2006. (CNIC translation.)

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*1. Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan (FEPCO), “Utilization Plan for Plutonium Recovered at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (Fiscal 2005-2006),” 6 January 2006. English translation by Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center available at: http://cnic.jp/english/topics/cycle/MOX/pluplanFEPCO6Jan06.html

*2. Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC), “Appropriateness of the Purpose of Use Specified in the Plutonium Utilization Plans Announced by Electric Power Companies et al,” 24 January 2006. (Translation by Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center.)

*3. Atomic Energy Commission of Japan, Decision: “Basic Principles for the Utilization of Plutonium in Japan,” 5 August 2003. (The English is a personal translation by or for then JAEC commissioner Tetsuya Endo.) Green Action has been told by JAEC that it understands commissioner Endo sent the English translation to the IAEA.

*4. Based on JNFL’s 1 September 2005 announcement regarding the amount of spent fuel to be separated from FY2005 – FY2012.

*5: Japan Atomic Energy Commission 2005 plutonium inventory figures.

Available at: http://aec.jst.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei/siryo2005/siryo34/tei-si34.htm (In Japanese.)

*6. Institute for Science and International Security, Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials: Summary Tables and Charts (July 12, 2005, Revised September 7, 2005), Table 2, Plutonium and HEU Holdings by Country, end 2003 in tonnes.

*7. Statement made to Green Action and Mihama-no-Kai by Kansai Electric on 31 January 2006.

*8. The Ten Japanese Electric Power Companies, “Let’s be clear about it. The ten Japanese utility companies want THORP.” Full page advertisement in major UK newspapers including The Times (23 June 1993).

*9. Japanese Citizens Concerned About Plutonium, “Why Start THORP If Japan Has No Use For It Anymore?” Advertisement in UK parliament’s House Magazine (14 June 1993.) Signers include Jinzaburo Takagi then director of CNIC and Aileen Mioko Smith, director of Green Action.

*10. Letter dated 15 June 1993 to UK Prime Minister John Major from Aileen Mioko Smith (director of Green Action [former organization name Plutonium Action Network – Kyoto]), Yurika Ayukawa (director for International Relations, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center), and Consumers’ Union of Japan. Letter states, “Japan’s plutonium utilization programme is severely behind schedule. Major problems and chronic delays in the programme will result in an approximate 70 tonne (70,000 kg) gap between actual demand and supply of Japanese plutonium by the year 2010 if current supplies continue.”

*11. “A Call on Japan to Strengthen the NPT by Indefinitely Postponing Operation of the Rokkasho Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plant.” (May 5, 2005) Statement by 27 eminent scientists, former policy makers and analysts, including four Nobel laureates in physics and two former US Secretaries of Defense. They said, “At a time when the nonproliferation regime is facing its greatest challenge, Japan should not proceed with its current plans for the start-up of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.” See press release and statement on the following page: http://www.ucsusa.org/news/press_release/japanese-plutonium-program-threatens-nonproliferation-regime-warn-nobel-laureates-and-other-experts.html

*12. Letter sent to the Japanese Ambassador by six Democrat members of the US Congress calling on Japan “to suspend plans to conduct active testing of Rokkasho…as part of a global initiative to reduce world-wide stockpiles of weapons-usable fissile materials.”

See press release and letter on the following page: http://markey.house.gov/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=1088&Itemid=125

PDF Version

Comparison of 3 Japan Government/Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) Decisions Regarding the Use of Plutonium

Compiled: 3 February 2006

Compiled by Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC), Green Action, and Greenpeace Japan

1997	2003	2006
Japanese government’s December 1997 Letter to the IAEA “Plutonium Utilization Plan of Japan” (INFCIRC/549/Add. 1 31 March 1998) Section 2, Enhancing the Transparency of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Program (English original) The nuclear fuel cycle is promoted based on the principle that plutonium beyond the amount required to implement the program is not to be held, i.e. the principle of no surplus plutonium. Nuclear materials are also strictly managed, so as not to give rise to any international doubts concerning nuclear proliferation. Japan intends to ensure transparency of the plutonium utilization program through these efforts. Projections of plutonium supply and demand in Japan through 2010 have been published by the AEC, as appropriate, based on the progress of related programs, in order to demonstrate that the nuclear fuel cycle program follows the principle of no surplus plutonium.	JAEC’s 5 August 2003 Decision “Basic Principles for the Utilization of Plutonium in Japan” (Provisional translation by JAEC commission) (Footnote Japan has made an important pledge to the international community to utilize plutonium solely for peaceful purposes. However, in order to avoid doubts both at home and abroad about the utilization of such a sensitive substance, it is important that Japan should achieve enhanced transparency regarding the utilization of plutonium and thereby gain an improved understanding of the nation as well as the international community. To this end, AEC has laid down the principle of not holding surplus plutonium, i.e. for no specific purpose… With the commercial operation of the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, a large amount of plutonium will be separated and recovered. Accordingly, AEC considers it necessary to define the purposes for which this plutonium will be used and thereby to achieve further transparency as to the anticipated utilization of the substance. Electric power companies will be required to announce every year plans for the utilization of plutonium before separating plutonium, setting forth the names of owners of plutonium, the amount of plutonium in their possession, and the purposes for which plutonium will be used. The uses of plutonium should specify the quantities of plutonium involved, the places where plutonium will be used, approximate time of start [of] using plutonium, and an approximate period of time required to use the material. Moreover, in order to achieve enhanced transparency, electric power companies should provide details of the uses as the actual plans progress.	JAEC’s 24 January 2006 Decision “Appropriateness of the Purpose of Use Specified in the Plutonium Utilization Plans Announced by Electric Power Companies et al” (CNIC translation) In August 2003 AEC promulgated the decision ‘Basic Principles for the Utilization of Plutonium in Japan’ (’Basic Principles’). This showed that Japan’s concept is that in addition to publishing information on the status of plutonium management, in order to further enhance transparency, as a uniquely Japanese measure, companies must publish a plutonium utilization plan showing the purpose of use, before they can separate plutonium at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. Until now, considering the experience accumulated in Japan and overseas, detailed decisions about the end use of plutonium recovered at reprocessing plants and the time of use may come after the plutonium has been stored for quite a while. However, regarding the recovery within Japan by civilian companies of the sensitive substance plutonium, even if companies have not yet reached the stage of producing detailed utilization plans, since by each year clarifying the plutonium utilization plan, including the plan for the plutonium to be recovered the following year, the most recently published utilization plans will step by step become more and more detailed, AEC believes this to be appropriate from the point of view of maintaining a high level of transparency regarding utilization… We expect electric power companies, under appropriate risk management, in accordance with progress made, from the next fiscal year to make positive efforts to make their utilization plans more detailed. Further, where circumstances arise, as a result of the progress status of plu-thermal plans and the operational status of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, which might affect utilization plans, we expect electric power companies to review the utilization plans announced this time, based on the ‘Basic Principles.’

(Emphasis ours.)

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The English translation of the JAEC 5 August 2003 Decision was provided to Green Action by JAEC. It is a personal translation by or for then JAEC commissioner Endo. Green Action has been told by JAEC that it understands the translation was sent by commissioner Endo to the IAEA.

[Contact: Aileen Mioko Smith Tel: +81 90 3620 9251]

24 January 2006 (Kyoto, Japan)—The Japan Atomic Energy Commission headed by Shunsuke Kondo today approved Japanese utilities’ Plutonium Utilization Plan released earlier this month. Japanese NGOs lambasted as “fiction” the utilities’ fiscal 2005 and 2006 plans which say 1.6 tons of plutonium will be consumed in Japanese nuclear reactors as MOX (mixed plutonium uranium oxide) fuel.

None of the nuclear power plants specified under the Plan has approval from local authorities to use the plutonium. Tokyo Electric which heads the Federation of Electric Power Companies could not name which plants would use the plutonium, yet says it will consume it. Nuclear power plants where consent from local authorities had not been applied for are included in the Plan. The Ohma “full-MOX” nuclear power plant which does not exist and does not have a reactor installation license is also included in the Plan as consuming plutonium.

Utilities were required under a Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) decision issued in August 2003 to state which reactors would use what amount of plutonium from which date and by when before they would be allowed to separate out the plutonium at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant in Aomori.

Aileen Mioko Smith, director of Green Action stated,” Japan today betrayed its 1997 pledge to the IAEA not to stockpile plutonium that isn’t required for implementing Japan’s nuclear program. This is totally unacceptable. The JAEC today also betrayed its own directive which said utilities must present concrete plans for consuming plutonium before they separated it out at Rokkasho. It’s clear this whole thing is driven in a frenzy to start up Rokkasho.”

In December of 1997, the Japanese government had pledged to the IAEA that it was committed to transparency in its nuclear fuel cycle program and that its program would be promoted “based on the principle that plutonium beyond the amount required to implement the program is not to be held, i.e. the principle of no surplus plutonium”.

(Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc549a1.pdf)

Furthermore, a fundamental technical problem exists. Japan lacks the capability to turn any plutonium produced at Rokkasho into MOX fuel. There is only a government “expectation” that a MOX fuel fabrication plant be fully operational by fiscal 2012.

Moreover, a massive cache of Japanese plutonium already exists: thirty-seven tons sit in Europe. Japan’s Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy issued in October 2005 gives priority to the consump-tion of this plutonium in Europe over any produced at Rokkasho.

Japan originally made its “no surplus” pledge in the interests of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Japan has now reneged on its international commitment amidst heightened political tension around disarmament and non-proliferation in North East Asia, and during its term as Chair of the IAEA Board of Governors.

[18 January 2006]

PDF version (472KB)

Japan’s 1997 Pledge

The government of Japan made a written and unequivocal pledge to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in December 1997 to uphold the “principle of no surplus plutonium.”*1

To honor this commitment, the Japan Atomic Energy Commission issued a Decision on 5 August 2003*2 which specified that electric utilities present concrete plans for utilizing plutonium before separating it from spent nuclear fuel at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.

On 6 January 2006, the Federation of Electric Power Companies released its “Plutonium Utilization Plan.”*3 The Plan, however, does not comply with the specifications set forth by the Atomic Energy Commission.

Defects of the Plan Released by the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPCO):

• None of the nuclear power plants specified under the plan has approval from the local authorities to use plutonium (MOX) fuel
• Tokyo Electric, head of FEPCO, does not specify in which plant it will use the plutonium, yet says it will consume it
• Nuclear power plants where consent from local authorities have not been applied for are included
• The Ohma “full-MOX” nuclear power plant which does not exist and does not have a reactor installation license is included

Will the AEC Approve the FEPCO Plan?

If the AEC approves the FEPCO Plan, surplus plutonium with nowhere to go will pile up at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.

In the rush to start the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, will the Atomic Energy Commission trash its own 2003 Decision, rubber-stamp the Federation of Electric Power Companies’ Plan, and renege on Japan’s commitment to the IAEA and to the international community?

Or, will the AEC honor Japan’s commitment to not produce surplus plutonium.

The eyes of the world are watching.

Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC)
3F Kotobuki Bldg., 1-58-15 Higashi-nakano
Nakano-ku, Tokyo, 164-0003, Japan
Phone: +81 3 5330 9520

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75, Tanaka Sekiden-cho
Sakyo-ku Kyoto, 606-8203, Japan
Phone: +81 75 701 7223

Greenpeace Japan
N F bldg. 2F 8-13-11 Nishi-Shinjuku
Shinjuku, Tokyo, 160-0023, Japan
Phone: +81 3 5338 9800

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*1 Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc549a1.pdf

*2 Available (in Japanese) at: http://aec.jst.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei/siryo2003/kettei/kettei030805.pdf

*3 Available (in English translation) at: http://cnic.jp/english/topics/cycle/MOX/pluplanFEPCO6Jan06.html

[Joint letter sent from Green Action, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, and Greenpeace Japan]

Director General Mohamed ElBaradei
International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA Secretariat
Headquarters Offices
A-1400 Vienna, Austria

Re: ROKKASHO REPROCESSING PLANT AND JAPANESE ELECTRIC UTILITIES’ PLUTONIUM UTILIZATION PLANS

Dear Director General ElBaradei:

On 5 January 2006 we sent you a petition urging you to ensure that Japan does not breach its international commitment to the principle of “no surplus plutonium” and to quickly take appropriate action before active testing begins at Rokkasho and plutonium is accumulated. The following day the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan (FEPCO) published its Plutonium Utilization Plan.

Attached please find a media briefing we issued today. It is a critique of the plutonium utilization plans of Japanese electric utilities. It addresses the concern that the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) may be approving these plans later this month in order to start “active testing” at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.

While some of the numbers in the latest Plutonium Utilization Plan are slightly different from those previously released, the plan confirms the basic substance of our petition. We therefore reiterate our appeal for the IAEA Secretariat and Board of Governors to immediately discuss this matter and quickly take appropriate action.

Sincerely yours,

Aileen Mioko Smith
Director, Green Action

cc: IAEA Board of Governors

CONTACT:
Aileen Mioko Smith, Green Action (Director)
+ 81 75 701 7223 or 090 3620 9251 (Cell)

Philip White, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (International Liaison)
+ 81 3 5330 9520

Atsuko Nogawa, Greenpeace Japan (Nuclear Campaigner)
+ 81 3 5338 9800

11 January 2006 (2nd edition)

Japanese NGOs Label Electric Utility Plutonium Utilization Plan “Fiction” Concern Raised that Atomic Energy Commission may Rubber-Stamp Plan

Japanese NGOs yesterday released a scathing critique*1 of the Plutonium Utilization Plan issued by the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPCO) on 6 January, dubbing the plan as “fiction” and pointing out that it does not comply with specifications stipulated by the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) in 2003.

At this time there is concern JAEC may approve this plan as early as mid-month in order to start “active testing” at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant.*2 Regional and local authorities’ opposition to the plan is expected.

Rushing to Start “Active Tests” at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

The Plutonium Utilization Plan covers the use of plutonium fuel, known as MOX fuel, in nuclear power plants*3 operated by Japan’s electric power companies. However, none of the reactors slated under the plan have received consent from local authorities to consume the material.

In February 1997, the government of Japan made a written commitment to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to uphold the “principle of no surplus plutonium”. Based on this, JAEC issued a decision on 5 August 2003 stipulating that electric utilities must state the amount, location, starting date, and length of time required to consume MOX fuel before spent nuclear fuel can be reprocessed to extract plutonium at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.

The plan issued by FEPCO falls far short of this requirement. There is concern that JAEC will rubber-stamp it in the rush to start “active testing” at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. Active testing is currently scheduled to begin in February. During the active tests the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant will extract plutonium from spent fuel for the first time. According to the plan, 1.6 tons of plutonium will be extracted during fiscal years 2005 and 2006, enough for 200 Nagasaki type nuclear bombs.

Plan will Increase Plutonium Stockpile in Japan

This plan ignores the plutonium that Japan already possesses. Japan already has a surplus of 43.1 tons of plutonium (37.4 tons held in Europe and 5.7 tons held in Japan). The plutonium surplus continues to grow, despite the 1997 “no surplus plutonium” pledge.

An earlier Plutonium Utilization Plan, relating to plutonium held overseas, was submitted to the IAEA in December 1997. The plan, along with the “no surplus plutonium” commitment, was published in IAEA INFCIRC/549/Add.1, 31 March 1998. No MOX fuel has been used in Japan’s nuclear power plants in accordance with this 1997 plan because it foundered.

NGOs point out that the latest FEPCO plan is simply a copy-and-paste job of the 1997 plan. Under the former plan, utilities were to consume MOX fuel at 16 to 18 reactors. The number of reactors slated this time is identical to the 1997 plan, but the latest plan relates to plutonium separated in Japan at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. No explanation is given regarding the overseas plutonium, so it must be assumed that separating more plutonium now will add to the existing surplus. (Japan’s “Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy” issued October 2005 by the JAEC gives priority to the consumption of the plutonium in Europe over any produced at Rokkasho.*4)

Plan Fails to Provide Required Information

The plan fails to provide the minimum information required by JAEC’s 2003 decision.

It effectively says nothing about the time of commencement, or the time required to use the plutonium. It says that the plutonium will be used “in and after 2012″. However, this is just a statement of the obvious. Plutonium extracted at Rokkasho is to be fabricated into MOX fuel at the MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant, but this plant has not been built and is only “expected” to commence operation by 2012*5. Apparently the time required to use the plutonium is just calculated on the basis of the number of reactors and their power output. There is no indication of by when all the plutonium will be used.

Regarding the location, reactors where the plutonium will be used are identified for only six companies: Kansai Electric, Kyushu Electric, Shikoku Electric, Chugoku Electric, Chubu Electric and Japan Atomic Power Company. The remaining four companies fail to specify which reactors will be used: Tokyo Electric, Hokuriku Electric, Tohoku Electric and Hokkaido Electric. Due to local opposition and past scandals, Kansai Electric and Tokyo Electric were forced to refer to the need to recover public trust before their plans can be implemented.

No company has obtained the prior consent of the prefectural or local governments except Kansai Electric and three have not even applied for prior consent. Previously granted consent was withdrawn by Niigata and Fukushima Prefectures (Tokyo Electric). Kansai Electric states it is not in the position to proceed with the Pluthermal (MOX fuel use) program at this time due to the 2004 Mihama nuclear power plant accident.

Regarding the amount to be used by each company, some plutonium is to be allocated to companies which will have no spent fuel reprocessed in fiscal 2005 and 2006. This will put pressure on these companies to proceed with Pluthermal plans, even thought they are not ready to do so.

Plutonium is also allocated to the non-existent Ohma Nuclear Power Plant. Ohma is still under review for a nuclear reactor installation license. It is still not certain Ohma will be built. Not surprisingly, no date is specified for plutonium use at Ohma.

Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission Must Not Accept Plan

Clearly FEPCO’s latest Plutonium Utilization Plan is not based on reality. The purpose of the plan is simply to enable the Rokkasho reprocessing plant to start “active tests” in February.

JAEC should uphold its own 2003 decision and state clearly that the plan is inappropriate. It should declare that “active tests” cannot begin at Rokkasho.

English translation of FEPCO’s Plutonium Utilization Plan chart issued 6 January 2006 is available at: http://cnic.jp/english/topics/cycle/MOX/pluplanFEPCO6Jan06.html

See also previous petition and briefing sent to the International Atomic Energy Agency on 5 January 2006
available at: http://www.greenaction-japan.org/modules/wordpress0/index.php?p=27
Briefing at: http://www.greenaction-japan.org/modules/wordpress0/index.php?p=28

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FOOTNOTES:

*1. On 10 January, twenty-five NGOs from Fukushima, Niigata, Fukui prefectures, Tokyo and Kansai metropolitan areas, and Kyushu issued a critique on FEPCO’s Plutonium Utilization Plan. Available in Japanese at: http://www.greenpeace.or.jp/campaign/nuclear/documents/doc060110.pdf

*2. The Rokkasho Reprocessing plant located in Aomori Prefecture, Japan is under construction and currently undergoing uranium commissioning. The plant has the capacity to reprocess 800 tons/HM of spent nuclear fuel a year. At full capacity, Rokkasho is capable of separating approximately 8 tons of plutonium annually.

*3. The use of plutonium fuel in light water reactors (’thermal’ reactors as opposed to ‘fast’ reactors) is called ‘pluthermal’. The fuel is made from a mixed oxide of plutonium and uranium, commonly referred to as MOX.

*4. Japan Atomic Energy Commission, “Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy”, 14 October 2005, p.11.

*5: Ibid., p. 34.

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[Compiled 5 January 2006 by Green Action]

Statements on Rokkasho, Surplus Plutonium and MOX Fuel

Fukushima governor Eisaku Sato’s statement to the Japan Atomic Energy Commission about the Rokkasho reprocessing plant and surplus plutonium:

“Why rush to operate a new reprocessing facility when there is still no solution for disposing the 40 tons of plutonium Japan already possesses?”

Submission to Public Comment on draft of “Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy”, August 2005

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Of the 430 tons of spent nuclear fuel to be reprocessed during the active testing scheduled to start at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant in February, 310 tons belong to the two largest electric utilities in Japan – 170 tons from Tokyo Electric and 140 tons from Kansai Electric. Neither utility, however, can consume the plutonium that will be produced at Rokkasho.

All seventeen Tokyo Electric nuclear power plants are located in two prefectures, Niigata and Fukushima. As a result of public opposition andTokyo Electric’s safety data falsification in 2002, both prefectures withdrew authorization for MOX fuel use. Their opposition remains adamant.

Niigata Governor Hirohiko Izumida:

“The Pluthermal (MOX fuel utilization) issue is not even at a stage for discussion. It would be deplorable and damage the trust of the public and Niigata regional authorities if the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant site were to be included in plutonium utilization plans and announced to the public.”

Excerpt from December 2005 letter submitted to Tokyo Electric president Tsunehisa Katsumata.
Source: Kyodo

“Niigata Governor Lodges Warning to Tokyo Electric Regarding Pluthermal (MOX utilization) Plans”
26 December, 2005

“In the middle of all of this, we have heard that the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant site is being listed in the company’s Plutonium Utilization Plans….It is deplorable* that the Atomic Energy Commission is calling for public release of plutonium utilization plans at this time… We petition your committee that you understand this situation in our prefecture and take it into consideration in some manner.”

Excerpt from letter etter submitted to Shunsuke Kondo, Chair, Japan Atomic Energy Commission
27 December 2005

Fukushima Governor Eisaku Sato:

“I do not care what Tokyo Electric says. It is inconceivable that MOX fuel utilization takes place in this prefecture. I believe that Tokyo Electric understands the (prefecture’s) position.”

Excerpt from governor’s regular monthly press conference
26 December 2005

Source: Fukushima Minyu Newspaper (Morning News)

“Pluthermal (MOX fuel utilization) Inconceivable”
27 December 2005

“The governor, in giving his reasons, referred to the statement he had made during the September 2002 prefectural legislative session in which he stated, ﾔPrior consent (for MOX fuel utilization) has been withdrawn because the necessary conditions for granting it have collapsed.’ This statement by the governor was made after revelations in August (2002) that Tokyo Electric had concealed problems at its nuclear power plants. The governor (also) referred to the prefectural legislative assembly’s resolution in opposition and stated, ﾔWe have decided not to have the program implemented in our prefecture in accordance with the collective will of our citizens.’”

Excerpt from the Fukushima Minyu Newspaper article

“Pluthermal (MOX fuel utilization) Inconceivable”
27 December 2005

Meanwhile, due to the 2004 accident at Kansai Electric’s Mihama nuclear power plant, the utility itself admits implementing the MOX program is at present impossible.

Kansai Electric on MOX Program Status:

“At present we are concentrating fully on Mihama Unit 3 post-accident measures and are therefore not in the position to consider MOX fuel use.”

Kansai Electric
Osaka Headquarters
20 October 2005 (Repeated 20 December 2005)

[Informal English translation of news articles and statements are by Green Action.]

Status of Light Water Reactors using MOX Fuel in Japan

No electric utility in Japan has the go-ahead to consume MOX fuel.

Tables detailing the status for light water reactors using MOX fuel are available in English at:

”Japanese Nuclear Power Companies’ Pluthermal* Plans”

http://cnic.jp/english/topics/cycle/MOX/pluthermplans.html.

The tables have been compiled by Kakujoho (http://kakujoho.net/e/index.html) from publicly available documents and translated into English by Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center.

* In Japan, the program to use MOX (plutonium-urainum mixed oxide) fuel in light water reactors is called the “pluthernmal” program.

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75, Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku Kyoto, 606-8203, Japan
Phone: +81 75 701 7223 Facsimile: +81 75 702 1952 Email: amsmith@gol.com www.greenaction-japan.org

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The government of Japan made a written and unequivocal pledge to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in December 1997 to uphold the “principle of no surplus plutonium.”*1

Despite this commitment, Japan will separate out 4 tons of plutonium at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, if active testing using spent nuclear fuel begins as scheduled in February 2006. The stark fact is that the Japanese nuclear power program has no use for this plutonium, now or in the foreseeable future.

The “Plutonium Utilization Plan of Japan” presented to the IAEA in 1997 stated that mixed plutonium-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel in light water reactors would be the “principle way of utilizing plutonium in Japan over the next few decades.” The program, however, has never gotten off the ground due to public opposition, data falsification scandals in 1999 and 2002 and the fatal accident at the Mihama nuclear power plant in 2004. Today, not a single electric utility has the go ahead to consume MOX fuel.

Furthermore, a fundamental technical problem exists. Japan lacks the capability to turn any plutonium produced at Rokkasho into MOX fuel. There is only a government “expectation” that a MOX fuel fabrication plant be fully operational by fiscal 2012.*2 Therefore, if active testing begins at Rokkasho this year, any separated plutonium will languish at the facility.

Moreover, a massive cache of Japanese plutonium already exists: thirty-seven tons sit in Europe. Japan’s Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy issued in October 2005 gives priority to the consumption of this plutonium in Europe over any produced at Rokkasho.*3

Japan allowed the stockpile in Europe to grow even after the MOX program fell apart, although it was clear the plutonium could not be consumed. Now, it is set to accumulate more plutonium, this time in Japan.

Simply put, Japan already has tons of plutonium and no way to burn it. Further stockpiling is not only irresponsible but also a clear break with Japan’s pledge to produce no surplus plutonium.

Japan originally made this commitment in the interests of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, a field in which it is a valuable leader. Given the heightened political tension around disarmament and non-proliferation in North East Asia, and its role as Chair of the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan should not renege on this commitment.

For these reasons, Japan should indefinitely postpone active testing at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.

PETITION

To ensure that Japan does not breach its international commitment to the “principle of no surplus plutonium”, we urge the IAEA Secretariat and Board of Governors to immediately discuss this matter and quickly take appropriate action before active testing begins at Rokkasho and plutonium is accumulated.

5 January 2006

Hideyuki Ban (Co-Director)
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC)
3F Kotobuki Bldg., 1-58-15 Higashi-nakano
Nakano-ku, Tokyo, 164-0003, Japan
Phone: +81 3 5330 9520

Aileen Mioko Smith (Director)
Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75, Tanaka Sekiden-cho
Sakyo-ku Kyoto, 606-8203, Japan
Phone: +81 75 701 7223

Atsuko Nogawa (Nuclear Campaigner)
Greenpeace Japan
N F bldg. 2F 8-13-11 Nishi-Shinjuku
Shinjuku, Tokyo, 160-0023, Japan
Phone: +81 3 5338 9800

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*1 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Communication Received from Certain Member States Concerning their Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium”, INFCIRC/549/Add. 1, 31 March 1998. Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc549a1.pdf

*2 Japan Atomic Energy Commission, “Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy”, 14 October 2005, p.34.

Available at http://aec.jst.go.jp/jicst/NC/eng/index.htm

*3 Ibid, p.11.

Contact:
Aileen Mioko Smith (Green Action)
Cell: 090-3620-9251
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center
Tel: 03-5330-9520

5 January 2006 (Kyoto, Japan)—Japanese NGOs today sent a letter to IAEA Director

General Mohamed ElBaradei and the Board of Governors urging the inter-governmental body to discuss and take action to ensure Japan upholds its 1997 commitment made to the international organization not to produce surplus plutonium.

Testing scheduled to take place next month at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant will separate out 4 tons of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. This will violate the commitment Japan made to the IAEA because the plutonium cannot be consumed.

The petition sent to the IAEA by Green Action, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center and Greenpeace Japan states, “Japan originally made this commitment in the interests of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, a field in which it is a valuable leader. Given the heightened political tension around disarmament and non-proliferation in North East Asia, and its role as Chair of the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan should not renege on this commitment.”

Green Action director Aileen Mioko Smith stated, “Japanese utilities will shortly be going public with a fabricated plutonium utilization plan. The Japanese government is intending to approve it. Instead Japan should keep its promise to the IAEA and indefinitely postpone testing at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.”

Japan already has over 42 tons of surplus plutonium in Europe and Japan.

May 29, 2005 (Revised)

WHAT IS MONJU

Monju (280MW) is Japan’s prototype fast breeder reactor located at the tip of the Tsuruga Peninsula in Fukui Prefecture. On January 27, 2003, the Nagoya Court of Appeals (Kanazawa Branch) handed down a verdict in favor of Fukui citizens suing to stop the reactor from operating. The court found the license issued by the national government for Monju illegal due to serious deficiencies in the government’s safety review. On January 31, 2003, the national government appealed the decision.

The Supreme Court verdict on Monju is to be handed down May 30, 2005 in Tokyo.

Monju has been shut down since December 8, 1995 because of a sodium leak and fire accident. The accident occurred while the reactor was undergoing testing at low output before attaining full power.

The Japanese government and Monju’s owner and operator, Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) sought an early re-start of the reactor, and on February 6, 2005 Governor Nishikawa of Fukui gave approval for refurbishment work necessary for re-start. Construction work is underway.

Japan currently has 54 commercial nuclear power plants (light water reactors). These reactors use uranium for fuel and supply approximately 34% of Japan’s electricity demand. Fast breeder reactor technology which uses a mixture of plutonium and uranium fuel has been under development in Japan since the 1960’s with the aim of replacing the current inefficient nuclear technology. Plutonium, an element non-existent in nature, is created in conventional nuclear reactors as the uranium fuel fissions, and is extracted for use by reprocessing.

Advocates of the fast breeder claim that the technology would create a never-ending source of energy because it can convert uranium 238, an abundant isotope of uranium that could not be used as fuel in conventional reactors, into plutonium, thus breeding even greater quantities of plutonium than was put into the reactor.

However, in spite of being the main pillar of the Japanese government’s nuclear energy long-term development plan for decades, and costs exceeding 2 trillion yen, the fast breeder program has to date produced only one hour of electricity (at Monju in September 1995). (The Long Term Program for the Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy  is reviewed once every 5 years. The fast breeder program has to date been a part of nine Long Term Programs.)

Commercialization of the fast breeder is nowhere in site. The Japanese government’s Long Term Program [November 2000] now makes no mention of specific goals for commercialization. The current program nevertheless calls for the early re-start of Monju.

Nuclear weapon states such as the USA, Britain, and France spent decades developing fast breeder technology as part of their nuclear weapons and energy programs. However all three countries have since abandoned their programs. Germany also constructed a prototype fast breeder reactor at Kalkar but abandoned the program before the reactor went into operation.

WHY DO CITIZENS WANT TO STOP MONJU

Fast breeder reactor technology is dangerous because it uses immense quantities of plutonium. In addition the fast breeder is vulnerable to reactivity accidents (explosions). Monju requires 1.2 tons of plutonium. The half-life of plutonium is 24,000 years (i.e. it takes 24,000 years for plutonium’s radioactivity to halve). One millionth of 1 gram of plutonium entering the lungs can cause lung cancer.

Fast breeder reactors, unlike conventional nuclear reactors that use water as a source of coolant, use sodium to cool the reactor and transfer the heat for electricity generation. Sodium burns and explodes when it comes into contact with air and water. In Monju, the thickness of the pipes separating the sodium from the water is only 3.8 mm thick. Many fast breeder reactors that were under development in the world have suffered accidents involving sodium.

Although proponents state that the plutonium that fast breeder reactors would breed would provide a virtually never-ending source of energy, it is highly doubtful whether fast breeders could ever operate long enough without technical difficulties or accidents to produce enough plutonium to be worthwhile as an energy source.

Fast breeder reactors are particularly vulnerable to earthquakes since the high heat generated by the reactor has made it necessary for the pipes to be bent in many locations in order to absorb the expanding and shrinking of pipe materials, and pipes are strung up in this configuration. Monju is located in an area with several earthquake faults.

Commercial use of plutonium involves the handling of massive quantities of this nuclear weapon capable material. Only a few kilograms of plutonium are necessary to make a nuclear weapon. (The IAEA considers 8 kilograms to be an SQ, significant quantity, enough to make one nuclear weapon.) One commercial breeder would require approximately 10 tons of plutonium, five tons approximate in the reactor and an additional five tons approximate for refueling. If fast breeder reactors were to supply the same amount of nuclear energy as is currently supplied in Japan by conventional nuclear power plants, they would require more than twice the plutonium as is in all the nuclear weapons worldwide today.

The plutonium Monju would breed if operated, although not great in quantity, is super weapons-grade plutonium. One of the reasons nuclear weapon states developed fast breeder technology was to obtain this type of plutonium. Possession and development of such technology by Japan would be a detriment to Asian regional security.

ISN’T MONJU NECESSARY TO MEET JAPAN’S ENERGY NEEDS

Even if development of the fast breeder were to proceed according to hopes of advocates, the technology would not be capable of supplying 1% of Japan’s energy needs in the mid-21st century. (Five full size fast breeder reactors operating at capacity would supply little more than 1% of Japan’s total energy needs based on current demands. Commercialization by 2050 is considered to be difficult even by fast breeder advocates.)

WHY HAVE THE MONJU PROGRAM IF IT CAN’T SUPPLY ELECTRICITY

Without a fast breeder program or use of MOX (mixed plutonium and uranium) fuel at conventional nuclear power plants in Japan, the Japanese government and electric utilities would need to admit that there is no need to extract plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel of nuclear power plants. If there is no need for plutonium to be extracted from the spent nuclear fuel, it would become unnecessary to ship this fuel to the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Aomori for reprocessing. Without being able to ship the fuel to Rokkasho, the fuel would “overflow” at nuclear power plant sites and utilities would be forced to shut down their nuclear power plants because there would no longer be space to store the spent fuel.

The breeder program is a hoax energy program, and one of the reasons for continuing the program is to defer dealing with the nuclear waste problem. There is also concern that Japan continues the fast breeder program because the Japanese government wants to maintain and develop its plutonium technology with the intent of keeping the options open to some day possess nuclear weapons. Another reason given for the program continuing is bureaucratic stagnation and Diet inaction.

WHAT ARE CITIZENS DOING TO STOP MONJU

Citizens nationwide have submitted more than one million signatures calling on the Japanese government to initiate a moratorium on Monju. The civil and administrative lawsuit against Monju filed in September 1985 by Fukui Prefecture citizens although ending in plaintiffs’ defeat in March 2000, was reversed by victory in the Court of Appeals as mentioned above.

More than 200,000 Fukui Prefecture citizens are on record signing a petition seeking permanent closure of Monju. Another national petition drive is on-going demanding complete closure of Monju, and 980,000 signatures have been gathered to date.

END

Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center
1-58-15-3F, Higashi-nakano, Nakano-ku
Tokyo, Japan
Phone:+81-3-5330-9520
Fax: +81-3-5330-9530

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku
Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
Phone:+81-75-701-7223
Fax: +81-75-702-1952