Category: Documents

Interim Report

September 2002

I. Background

(How the Review came about.)

II. Concerning the Problem of "Falsification of Industry Inspections Records at Nuclear Power Plants"

"Of course the responsibility of the utilities [for having caused this situation] must be pursued vigorously, but the Japanese government’s responsibility for this situation is also extremely grave as well."

"This current problem is a problem of the national government’s constitution and disposition, conducting nuclear policy "like a bulldozer", and ‘belittling [holding in contempt] the residents where nuclear power plants are located".

"The Japanese government states, "Even though there may be slight delays as a result of the current problems, the basic plan of aiming for implementation of the pluthermal program remains unchanged." Also, "We will steadily go forward with the Pluthermal Program.’ Perhaps the national government doesn’t understand the basic nature of the current problems."

"The government is looking into the introduction of a new regulatory inspection regime —ASME-type standards. But, can this really result in effectively preventing the reoccurrence of the type of problems we are currently facing Questions remain as to whether these standards will lead to the upgrading of safety and credibility at nuclear power plants. Rather, isn’t it necessary now to take the time and undertake a careful deliberation of the issues

[Referring to the fact the government back in July had at first recognized the high marks for safety and reliability attained by the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Units 3 and 4 after their periodic safety reviews, then retracting these after the scandals erupted, the Fukushima Review states the following:]

"The government was forced into an extraordinary situation of withdrawing its approval because of the exposure of dishonest practices, and this it did without sufficient explanation as to what kind of assessment it had made to deem this judgment correct. If this is the state of affairs of the periodic safety review process which forms the basis of assuring the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants, isn’t it utterly impossible to say that the government’s inspection and assessment regime to assure safety is properly functioning"

III. Concerning "The Main Issues and Concerns"

1. Concerning the Changes in the Energy Supply-Demand Structure:

Considering the fact liberalization of the electricity market is moving forward and the supply-demand structure etc. is changing, will additional electricity-producing sites of electric utilities being built based on the assumption that electricity consumption will continue as before really be necessary

2. Concerning the Possibilities for New Sources of Energy:

The government has made the target for introducing new energy sources to be about 3% of total primary energy supply. However, isn’t it necessary to plan for an even greater increase by adopting policies to introduce each [energy source] area

3. Concerning the Decision Making Process for Formulation of Nuclear Policy:

1. Is Information Disclosure Sufficient:
   Nuclear Energy is a colossal scientific technology, its contents very difficult to understand. Also the promotion of nuclear policy relates to the issue of safety which is deeply connected to basic human rights. Because of this, the thorough disclosure of information is indispensable. However, is thorough disclosure of information taking place
2. Are the views of a wide range of the nation’s citizens being sufficiently heeded when formulating policy Rather than just listening to the views of the nation’s citizens, isn’t it necessary to create an infrastructure whereby, after supplying the nation’s citizens with sufficient information and knowledge to make their own judgments, the views of citizens are reflected when formulating nuclear policy etc.
3. Is assessment of nuclear policy being properly undertakenAfter the Monju accident, and from the point the fast breeder development plans that had been in place were revised, future plans for the utilization of plutonium have become uncertain. Wasn’t it necessary at that point to re-examine the policy of reprocessing all spent nuclear fuel
4. Where is nuclear policy actually decided
   It has been said that it is difficult for citizens to understand the decision making system for nuclear policy. Where is nuclear policy finally decided Who takes responsibility for this policy Also, nuclear policy is decided only by the bureaucracy. Isn’t it necessary instead to consider making the process democratic by having its formulation go through the legislative Diet process, etc.

4. The Position of Nuclear Energy in Overall Energy Policy

1. Is the promotion of nuclear power convincing to the nation’s citizens
2. "….While the fight to cut costs mounts, have proper countermeasures been put in place for assuring safety and undertaking the proper steps for the back-end
3. Are measures for the aging of nuclear power plants being properly undertaken
   Isn’t it necessary to undertake a drastic reconsideration of measures [countermeasures] for aging of reactors
4. What is going to happen with the outlook for disposal of high level radioactive waste Although the legislation and system for realizing a site has been established, isn’t it going to be considerably difficult to site a final repository

5. Concerning the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

1. Can it be said that the nuclear fuel cycle is at this point absolutely necessary If uranium resources can be supplied stably, is reprocessing which is undertaken in order to save on the consumption of uranium absolutely necessary
2. Will the nuclear fuel cycle not only save on resources, but will it likewise lead to a stable supply of energy
   During the Review it was pointed out that if there were no fast breeder reactors, then reprocessing once through would lead to approximately 10% of resource savings. At this level of savings, when considering the uncertainty of the costs of reprocessing and its back-end, can it really be said that reprocessing, for only this amount of resource savings, is really appropriate
3. Aren’t there problems with the cost
   The basis for the financial estimation of the cost of the nuclear fuel cycle within the backdrop of the liberalization of electricity has not, in spite of the fact it is an extremely important problem which affects the regions where nuclear power plants are located tremendously, been made sufficiently clear. Considering this, isn’t an assessment of the economic viability [of the nuclear fuel cycle difficult to make
4. What about plutonium balance
   If the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant begins operation, will it not produce yet more surplus plutonium — considering the fact fast breeder reactor realization is nowhere in sight, construction of the full MOX nuclear reactor at Ohma in Aomori Prefecture is behind schedule, and MOX fuel implementation in light water reactors has not been realized

   …….There are concerns that even the 30 some ton quantity of plutonium from overseas reprocessing will take a considerable time to use up.
   ……Under these circumstances, the plutonium balance in the long term plan for nuclear power is no longer realistic. Can’t it be said that we can no longer say our country’s plutonium utilization is transparent. And, will there not be a possibility that anxiety will be harbored internationally due to the existence of plutonium that is ‘in surplus’ as a result of undertaking reprocessing

5. What is the possibility of the realization of a fast breeder at this time ..Currently there is no outlook for the realization of the fast breeder. Under these circumstances, is it really appropriate to continue promoting the reprocessing path
6. Does reprocessing really greatly reduce the amount of high level radioactive waste …….but it increases the volume of low level waste vastly…….etc., therefore aren’t the merits cancelled out……Isn’t it necessary to re-examine the policy of reprocessing all nuclear waste considering the problems with the cost and back end of reprocessing, the reality that there is no outlook for the fast breeder reactor, and in addition, when evaluating the overall issue of waste volumes of high level radioactive waste
7. What will happen with spent MOX fuel
   ……The chances of a second reprocessing plant becoming reality is extremely small.

6. Considering the Future of Electric Power Plant Sites

1. …… A monoculture economy…….
2. Isn’t it time to think about the future of the regions which now face the reality of the decommissioning of nuclear power plants.IV CONCLUSION[Summary in bullet point form Only parts relevant to nuclear fuel cycle translated here.]

   Especially, as far as the nuclear fuel cycle is concerned, isn’t it necessary to stop once and, moving ahead with information disclosure while undertaking a comparison between the reprocessing of all spent nuclear fuel and the options of direct disposal etc., ask the citizens of the nation what path should be taken from henceforth.
   Finally, we hope and expect that the national government will listen to our views with humility, and, based upon the rights and responsibilities bestowed upon it, carry out the responsibility of explaining the concerns and doubts we have addressed here to the citizens of the nation. We hope and expect that the government will not be bound to the past but indicate to the citizens of this nation a new nuclear energy policy in concrete form, bringing forward a nuclear power administration based on safety and security which can be understood and trusted by the citizens of this nation.

Placed on home page

Green Action
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19 September 2002

Consultation Procedures for Citizens of Fukushima Prefecture and Others on the "Interim Report"

Administrative Office
Energy Policy Review

1. Purpose: A consultation is being undertaken to seek views on the "Interim Report" of this Energy Policy Review in order that the views of Fukushima Prefectural citizens etc. will be reflected in future energy policy [of this nation].
2. Who Can Submit: Citizens and organizations not limited to Fukushima
3. Prefecture.
4. How the "Interim Report" will be made public[Libraries, home page, through the media, etc.]
5. Consultation Period: October 1 – November 30, 2002
6. Method of Submission: Mail, fax, email : energy-g@pref.fukushima.jp
7. How Submissions Will Be Handled.

Placed on home page

Green Action
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Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 17
Date: October 26, 2002

Contents:

1. METI to order one year shutdown of Fukushima Dai-Ichi Unit 1
2. Operation status of TEPCO reactors
3. Leaked documents reveal alpha nuclide emissions from Fukushima Dai-Ichi Unit 1 & 2 between 1979 and 1981

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 16
Date: October 11, 2002

Contents:

• Aomori governor threatens to halt SNF imports
• Fukushima legislature passes motion declaring: "Pluthermal Program will not be implemented in Fukushima"
• Tokyo Electric announces damaged CRDM guide tubes in Fukushima Dai-Ichi Unit 4 reactor

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 15
Date: October 9, 2002

Contents:

1. (1) Fukushima governor meets Prime Minister Koizumi and calls for reconsideration of nuclear fuel cycle policy
2. (2) Chugoku Electric failed to report shroud cracks
3. (3) Asahi opinion poll finds 90% fear nuclear accident
4. (4) METI received six allegations of impropriety in September

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 14
Date: September 30, 2002

Contents:

1. Meti will not prosecute TEPCO for falsifications of voluntary inspection data
2. TEPCO regularly manipulated compulsory inspection data. Will METI prosecute

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 13
Date: September 25, 2002

Contents:

1. Japco admits to falsifying reports
2. Shroud cracking found at two more utilities
3. Tepco failed to report CDRM damage from 1988
4. Aomori newspaper editorial calls for moratorium on SNF shipments to Rokkasho

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 12
Date: September 20, 2002

Contents:

1. TEPCO publishes report about falsification of GEII findings
2. Hitachi and Toshiba implicated in falsification of inspection results of recirculation pumps and pipes at TEPCO reactors
3. Chubu Electric fails to report cracks at Hamaoka Units 1 and 3. Shut down of Unit 3 means all four reactors to be shut down
4. Tohoku Electric fails to report cracks at Onagawa Unit 1

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 11
Date: September 13, 2002

Contents:

1. TEPCO consults with METI about illegal repair method
2. METI misinformed public about whistle-blowers intent in order to justify
3. two-year delay
4. Committee meets to scrutinize METI’s two year investigation

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 10
Date: September 12, 2002

Contents:

1. Niigata leaders simultaneously annul prior permission for pluthermal program
2. Fukushima governor expresses indisposition with METI
3. TEPCO illegally repaired ECCS at Fukushima I-1, camouflaged repaired area to avoid detection

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 9
Date: September 10, 2002

Contents:

1. METI establishes two committees to investigate TEPCO scandal
2. Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 8
Date: September 6, 2002

Contents:

1. Kashiwazaki city legislature passes motion calling for cancellation of the pluthermal program
2. Shroud cracks discovered much earlier, internal rules revised to decrease frequency of shroud inspections
3. Fukui governor decides against giving permission for JAPCO to build new reactors

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 7
Date: September 5, 2002

Contents:

1. Shroud cracks at Fukushima II-3 known for years
2. METI visits Aomori Prefecture, stresses no change in nuclear energy policy
3. New nuclear power plant construction plans put on hold
4. TEPCO employees based falsification decisions on US standards
5. Niigata leaders visit Tokyo, call for impovements in nuclear safety supervision

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 6
Date: September 4, 2002

Contents:

1. TEPCO falsified shroud replacement application forms
2. METI minister informed one day before public announcement
3. TEPCO vice-president admits knowledge of shroud problems during tenure as head of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
4. TEPCO conducts door-to-door apologies in Fukushima
5. TEPCO to refrain from advertising

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 5
Date: September 3, 2002

Contents:

1. Radioactive Leak at Fukushima II-2
2. TEPCO president resignation press conference
3. Employees’ motive for falsification
4. METI’s excuse for taking two years to investigate

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 4
Date: September 2, 2002

Contents:

1. Pluthermal permission retracted

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 3
Date: September 1, 2002

Contents:

1. TEPCO announces resignations
2. Fukushima municipalities vote to request withdrawl of pluthermal program permission
3. TEPCO aware of falsification in March 2002
4. Shroud Damage: "Nothing abnormal"
5. Reactors to be shutdown and inspected

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 2
Date: August 31, 2002

Contents:

1. Former GE employee sent letter to METI in July 2000

Tokyo Electric Scandal

Update Number 1
Date: August 31, 2002

Contents:

1. METI’s investigation reveals more falsification
2. Possibility of systematic falsification
3. TEPCO president and chairman to resign

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
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—Fukushima Governor Formally Announces Rescinding of Prior Approval for Pluthermal Program, declares, “On this occasion, we should rethink [Japan’s] nuclear power policy itself, taking it back to the starting point.”

—Asahi reports it is now certain that there will be a push for reconsideration of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Asahi Web Site. 2002 September 26th 13:24
English translation by Green Action
(Note words in brackets are by translator.)

At the prefectural legislative session held [September] 26, Fukushima Governor Eisaku Sato, stating that the precondition for implementing the Pluthermal Program had collapses as a result of Tokyo Electric’s cover-up of nuclear power plant problems, formally declared his decision to rescind prior approval for implementing the program he had granted in 1998 for the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Unit 3 reactor. “My understanding is that Pluthermal is a program which has been withdrawn. On this occasion, we should rethink [Japan’s] nuclear power policy itself, taking it back to the starting point.”

Earlier this month, Niigata Prefecture, Kashiwazaki City, etc. had already rescinded their prior approval in connection to the Pluthermal Program at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3. The [Pluthermal] program being put forward by the national government and Tokyo Electric has been brought to a standstill, and it is now certain that there will be a push for reconsideration of the nuclear fuel cycle.

In February of 2001, after the Tokaimura criticality accident in Ibaragi Prefecture, Governor Sato had declared, “Pluthermal is unthinkable for the time-being.”

Fukushima Prefecture began its own Energy Policy Review, and on the 19th of this month made public its report that stated, “The problem is the national government’s innate characteristic [predisposition] of pushing forward nuclear policy like a bulldozer, slighting the residents of the region where power plants are located.”

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
T + 81 75 701 7223
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Environmental NGO Resolution

Eighth International Energy Forum Osaka, Japan
20 September 2002

The 20th century was the fossil fuel century. To the middle of the century, most energy came from coal, and after the 1960’s the use of oil increased rapidly.

Today’s worldwide consumption in energy continues to be dependent on fossil fuels, predominantly oil. These precious fossil fuels have contributed to the development of humanity, easing the burden of daily life. At the same time however, dependence on fossil fuels has caused or contributed to further aggravating the unequal distribution of the world’s wealth, energy wars or civil wars related to energy access, serious environmental destruction as a result of mining, drilling, or accidents at sea, and global warming as a result of emissions of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide.

During the past decade, there has been a slight decrease in the role of coal and oil in overall worldwide energy consumption. However, total overall consumption of these fossil fuels continues to rise. Moreover, of serious concern, is that these sources of energy are being consumed by only a small portion of the overall worldwide population. As much as 2 billion people on this earth have yet to have access to this energy.

Dear energy ministers, in order to protect limited precious sources of energy, in order to maintain a world environment where human beings can survive, in order to prevent further global warming, please work to free the world from dependence on fossil fuels. At the same time, keeping in mind that energy sources such as nuclear power and large hydroelectric dams cause serious adverse effects upon the environment and future generations, please select a path not dependent on these but one that will lead to the development of energy policies centered upon renewable green energy sources and energy conservation. Please direct the greatest possible care so that the peoples of the world will have access to the use of energy on a fair basis. We must not make oil the excuse for war.

As environmental NGOs working on energy and environmental issues in an industrialized country, we will also work for the realization of sustainable energy policies, and will continue our efforts to protect the environment.

Kiko Network
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC)
FoE Japan
Green Action
Green Energy "law" Network (GEN)
Greenpeace Japan
WWF Japan

High Cost of Power Generation and Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing is Strangling the UK’s Largest Power Generator Lessons for Japanese Electric Utilities

British Energy plc is the United Kingdom’s largest electric utility, producing one fifth of the country’s electricity. The company owns and operates 15 nuclear reactors in the UK with a combined generating capacity of approximately 9600 megawatts. The company also operates reactors in the United States and Canada.

On 12 August 2002, British Energy was forced to shut down reactor 1 at the Torness Nuclear Power Station in East Lothian because of vibrations in the gas circulation system which cools the reactor. Reactor 2 at the same station has been shut down since May because of a similar problem. The two reactors account for 12% of British Energy’s annual energy output, and according to the company, this and other unplanned outages will reduce forecast annual output by 4.5 terrawatt hours and cost the company 25 million pounds in maintenance costs. News of the Torness reactor shut down caused British Energy shares to fall 30% after analysts claimed a long-term shutdown will lead to reduced profits and dividends.

When British Energy was privatised in 1996 it acquired it’s fleet of 15 reactors from the UK government for just half the cost of constructing it’s newest reactor, Sizewell B. Following recent stock declines, the company’s market value is now a mere 370 million pounds, whereas Sizewell B cost around 2 billion pounds to construct.

Since privatization, British Energy has increased production of it’s nuclear units by 10%, and reduced costs by a full 30%. Nevertheless, the company is still having problems competing in a free-market environment. As a direct result of electricity market liberalization, the wholesale price of electricity has decreased by 30% in the UK in recent years. Power prices are now below 12 pounds a megawatt hour– 7 pounds below the price which British Energy needs for making a profit. Executive Chairman Robin Jeffery recently acknowledged that a further 10% cut in power prices this year will erode 140 million pounds off British Energy’s earnings.

In addition to high nuclear power generating costs, spent fuel management costs have severely hurt British Energy’s financial position since privatization. In November 2001, British Energy executives criticized the company’s reprocessing contracts with BNFL as ruining the profitability and competitiveness of the company. The company’s executives pointed out that reprocessing spent nuclear fuel was costing the company more than six times as much as the cost to store spent nuclear fuel. By simply storing the spent fuel BE estimates it could save 250 million pounds per year.

In its submission on future radioactive waste policy to the House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, British Energy described reprocessing as an unecessary and expensive exercise that it cannot afford, and called for an immediate moratorium on any further reprocessing of its spent nuclear fuel at BNFL’s THORP reprocessing plant in Sellafield.

When announcing its semi-annual results on 7 November 2001 a British Energy spokesman stated, "We simply do not believe in reprocessing because of its huge costs and we want to renegotiate this contract. We are paying six times as much to deal with our spent fuel as American generators do at a time when electricity costs have fallen markedly." Michael Kirwan, British Energy’s financial director, claimed, "As far as we are concerned, reprocessing is an economic nonsense and should stop straight away."

Lesson’s for Japanese Electric Utilities Japan’s electricity market is currently in the process of being deregulated, and a recent Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry guideline calls for full-scale market liberalization to take place in 2005. Japanese electric utilities have already started to reduce costs in order to remain competetive in a deregulated market environment.

There are many lessons Japanese electric utilities can learn from British Energy’s current financial situation. For example, Japanese electric utilties currently have contracts with Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd (JNFL) to reprocess 10,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel at a reprocessing plant under construction in Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture. According to newspaper reports in Japan, the price of reprocessing one ton of spent nuclear fuel at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant will be four times the amount of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel at BNFL’s THORP reprocessing plant in the United Kingdom. Japanese electric utilities should heed British Energy’s warnings and cancel their reprocessing contracts with JNFL.

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
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Fukushima Prefecture is currently carrying out a review of Japan’s national energy policy from the point of view of an energy producing prefecture. Since the December 1999 BNFL MOX data falsification scandal, governor Sato has refused to give his consent to the loading of MOX fuel into Tokyo Electric’s Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 3 nuclear power plant. Tokyo Electric is seeking to load 32 MOX fuel assemblies during the current scheduled outage, but it is expected that Sato will continue to refuse implementation of the pluthermal program.

Reported on June 4, 2002 The following comments were made by governor Sato at a meeting with regional mayors at the Fukushima Prefecture Office in Fukushima City on June 3, 2002. During this meeting the pro-pluthermal mayors called on the governor to allow loading of MOX fuel into the Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 3 reactor.

• "(The prefecture) is pursuing a review of energy policy from various angles. The pluthermal program, however, is costly and will lead to the separation of more plutonium, and I don’t see why it is necessary to implement this program." (NHK)
• "From an economic point of view, I don’t understand why it is necessary to implement (such a program)." (NHK)
• "I don’t understand your demands to push forward the pluthermal program, given that terrorism and the three non-nuclear principles are in the news now." (Asahi)
• "(If the nuclear fuel cycle is implemented), plutonium will rapidly build up. At some point in time we need to really think about this." (Asahi)
• "With the prospects for Monju fast breeder reactor development still far from certain, and the nuclear fuel cycle in the unsatisfactory state it is in, (reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel) will only lead to a rapid increase in plutonium." (Kahoku)
• "For approximately 50 years (while there are still reserves of uranium) another method would be to pursue a once through fuel cycle policy, and if an energy crisis occurs, consider the project at that point in time. The national government should disclose this to the public and both sides should think about this option." (Kahoku)
• "In a deregulated electricity market, if the costly pluthermal program is implemented, it might lead to worker layoffs." (Kahoku)
• "One option is for Fukushima Prefecture to say, ‘We’re freezing this program.’" (Mainichi)
• "For 50 years a once through policy could be implemented, and in that time if there is an energy crisis, then the pluthermal program could be implemented." (Mainichi)
• "Is this program really necessary Freezing (the program) should also be considered." (Yomiuri)
• "I gave advance permission for the [pluthermal] program, but is [the program] really necessary Opinions have been given which point out that the outlook for Monju and the nuclear fuel cycle is unclear, and that the [pluthermal] program will not solve the surplus plutonium problem." (Yomiuri)
• "I do not understand why such a costly project is necessary." (Jiji)
• "In the absence of a firm recycling plan, it will only result in a huge amount of excess plutonium." (Jiji)
• "If someone doesn’t think seriously about this issue, then something unfortunate will happen." (Fukushima Minpo)
• "It is not hard for me to understand demands for building more nuclear power plants, but I can not understand demands for implementing the pluthermal program." (Fukushima Minpo)

Reported on June 5, 2002 The following comment is an excerpt from an interview published in Fukushima Minpo on June 5, 2002.

• "The national government’s nuclear energy administration is a black box, and there is no civil sector control." (Fukushima Minpo)Reported on Aug 6, 2002 The following comments were made by governor Sato at a meeting with all five commissioners of Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in Fukushima City on August 5, 2002.
• "In 1998 Fukushima was the first prefecture to give prior consent to the pluthermal program and we have cooperated with government policy. However, even though the time and state of affairs has changed, nuclear policy has not changed. From the point of view of an electricity producing region, I am concerned about the future. Has not atomic energy policy, including the pluthermal program, entered into a second stage" (Denki Newspaper)
• "The central government’s nuclear energy policy is decided without listening to regional opinion, and the grounds for nuclear energy being cheap have not been clarified." (Kyodo)
• "If reprocessing is continued, surplus plutonium will pile up. Shouldn’t reprocessing be considered after abundant supplies of uranium have been used up" (Kyodo)
• "Not enough is being done to provide information to the public and allow everyone to think about what should be done." (Kyodo)
• "Society as a whole is going through a period of change. Hasn’t the time come for nuclear energy policy to be returned to the drawing boards and rethought" (Kahoku Shinpo)
• "(The Atomic Energy Commission) should make public information such as whether nuclear power is expensive or cheap. This should be explained to the public and the public’s views should be sought." (Asahi)
• "The nuclear fuel cycle is different from the recyling of other resources. It imposes a burden on the environment because of issues such as nuclear waste." (Denki Shimbun)

Compiled

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
T + 81 75 701 7223
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E-mail amsmith@gol.com

Environmental NGO Resolution

Eighth International Energy Forum Osaka, Japan
20 September 2002

Green Action Press Release and Briefing
On Eve of Return Shipment of Falsified BNFL MOX Fuel

3 July 2002

For immediate release
Contact: Aileen Mioko Smith or Stephen Ready
Mobile 090-3620-9251

Kyoto, Japan – BNFL and Kansai Electric are in the final stages of preparation for loading 8 falsified MOX fuel assemblies onto the Pacific Pintail for a return shipment to the United Kingdom. The falsified MOX has already been loaded into the transport cask, and the cask is expected to be loaded onto the Pacific Pintail on 4 July 2002.

Green Action’s message is: ‘BNFL never again in Japan! Japan’s plutonium utilization plans should be scrapped.’ BNFL continues to cover up the real extent of the 1999 safety data falsification scandal and is attempting to use this shipment to re-start its business in Japan. En route countries strongly oppose this shipment.

MOX Fuel Scandal Cover Up Continues – BNFL has not improved

In December 1999, BNFL and Kansai Electric admitted quality control safety data for the Takahama Unit 4 MOX fuel had been falsified after citizens’ groups analyzing the data and found it falsified, and 212 residents of Fukui and Kansai took Kansai Electric to court seeking an injunction on the use of the fuel.

A February 2000 report by the British government’s Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) determined that falsification at BNFL had taken place since 1996, and that ’systematic management failures’ allowed data falsification to take place. In July 2000, BNFL formally agreed to Japanese demands to return the falsified MOX fuel to the United Kingdom at it’s own expense.

BNFL’s objective for taking back the fuel is to pave the way for negotiations with Japanese electric utilities for new MOX fuel fabrication contracts at the company’s Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP) which was given permission to operate in October 2001, in spite of a lack of contracts.

BNFL claims that it has learned from the data falsification incident and has taken steps to improve it’s management but this is far from the truth. BNFL has neglected to get to the bottom of the 1999 MOX scandal including refusing to examine evidence that it deliberately falsified safety data for the Takahama nuclear power plant in order to pass sub-standard fuel on to Japan. BNFL has also never pursued an investigation to get to the bottom of who and how the Kansai Electric fuel was sabotaged where screw and concrete were mixed in with the fuel. Since 1999, BNFL has been prosecuted for various violations at Sellafield and the company has continued to cover up incidents and accidents at their facilities.

JAPAN’S MOX FUEL UTILIZATION (PLUTHERMAL) PROGRAM AT A STANDSTILL

Since the December 1999 data falsification scandal, Japan’s MOX fuel utilization plans, commonly referred to as the pluthermal program, have been suspended in all three prefectures (Fukui, Niigata, and Fukushima) scheduled to implement the program.

Niigata:

In a May 2001 referendum in Kariwa, Niigata Prefecture, a majority voted against implementation of the pluthermal program in Tokyo Electric’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 3 reactor. Following the referendum, the mayor of the village and the mayor of neighboring Kashiwazaki City and the governor of Niigata determined that the program could not go forward without a change in the will of the people. On the one-year anniversary of the Kariwa referendum, an opinion poll conducted by the Niigata Nippo newspaper concluded that there had been little change in opinion since the referendum, and that a majority of people is still opposed to MOX utilization.

Fukushima:

In February 2001 Fukushima Prefecture governor Eisaku Sato decided that he would not allow the loading of Belgonucleaire fabricated MOX fuel stored at the reactor site into the Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 3 Reactor. Instead, he announced that the prefecture would carry out a fundamental review of the national government’s energy policy, including reprocessing and the pluthermal program.

Governor Sato recently announced that the review committee will issue its interim report prior to the September 2002 legislative session. On 3 June 2002, Governor Sato met with regional Fukushima mayors, and suggested the review will conclude that the pluthermal program should be frozen. The governor pointed out the high cost of implementing the program, and questioned the national government’s policy of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel when fast breeder reactor development plans have collapsed and uranium resources are plentiful. He has suggested a ‘once-through cycle’ where there is no MOX fuel utilization and spent nuclear fuel is stored rather than reprocessed.

Fukui:

The falsification scandal put a complete stop to the pluthermal program in Fukui. Governor Yukiio Kurita’s position has been that only after the return of the shipment would Fukui even deliberate on the pluthermal program again.

In Fukui, in November 1999 just before the Takahama Unit 4 fuel was officially found to be falsified, 21% of the population of Takahama had signed a petition seeking a referendum on the pluthermal program. Although in January 2000 the town legislature turned down this request, subsequent actions taken by the Fukushima governor and in Kariwa, Niigata by citizen referendum have most likely had an effect on stalling the program further in Fukui.

One thing is clear. Trust in BNFL has been destroyed in Fukui Prefecture. On 1 July Takahama and Obama residents from the prefecture visited the British Embassy in Tokyo. Their message, ‘ We, the residents of Takahama, are against the pluthermal programme itself, but above and beyond this even more anxious about having fuel used in our town which is manufactured by a company like BNFL. We also cannot believe the British government’s claim that ‘BNFL has improved’. We will adamantly refuse MOX fuel to be brought into Japan from a company such as BNFL, and this resolution will never change.’

CASK CORROSION AND TRANSPORT VESSEL CORROSION CONCERNS PLAGUE FALSIFIED MOX FUEL SHIPMENT

On 2 July, Green Action and Mihama-no-Kai submitted a letter to Japan’s Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transportation (MLIT) not to use the MOX transport cask for the BNFL falsified fuel, because safety checks on the cask have not been performed. Of particular concern is corrosion of the cask. Kansai Electric has also skipped the ‘cask approval’ application. MLIT admits skipping this approval for a nuclear transport cask is ‘unprecedented’.

On 27 June, MLIT issued an official notification instructing Tokyo Electric and Kansai Electric to refrain from using ‘TN model’ MOX transport casks until a corrosion inspection has been carried out to guarantee safety of the casks. This notification follows an investigation by the two utilities which determined that metal corrosion may be the cause of the rising of heat radiation fins on these the TN model MOX transport casks currently stored in France.

Kansai Electric claims that there is no corrosion on the Excellox model cask which is to be used in the upcoming BNFL MOX fuel return shipment because the ’structure of the cask is different.’ However, the company admitted that Excellox model casks were regularly exposed to water during their use as a spent nuclear fuel transport casks, and that no tests for corrosion have taken place on the current Excellox transport cask since it was modified to be used as a MOX fuel transport cask six years ago.

There are also concerns that the nuclear transport freighters the Pacific Pintail and Pacific Teal to be used for the imminent shipment themselves have serious corrosion problems.

GREEN ACTION CALLS ON PLUTONIUM TO BE IMMOBILIZED, NOT UTILIZED

Japanese electric utilities currently have more than 32 tons of separated plutonium, and no realistic plans to consume it. Utilization of MOX fuel in light water reactors reduces the safety margin of these reactors, and there are proliferation concerns involved with the fabrication and transportation of plutonium fuel. For these reasons, Green Action is calling for the immediate immobilization of all Japanese civil plutonium.

EN ROUTE COUNTRY PROTESTS

Over 50 countries are on record as having protested shipments of Japanese nuclear materials. The upcoming shipment is taking place without prior notification of the transport route and consent of en route countries. No environmental assessment has been undertaken, and there is no adequate liability regime or contingency plans in case of emergency. Kansai Electric is on record stating there will be no additional ‘post September 11′ security for the shipment. The utility also states, ‘It would take a lawsuit to substantiate who is the owner of these MOX fuel assemblies.’

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
T + 81 75 701 7223
F + 81 75 702 1952
E-mail amsmith@gol.com

Suspicions of Corrosion of Transport Cask and Transport Vessel

It was reported in 29 June Fukui Newspaper that 8 MOX fuel assemblies with falsified quality control data could leave Takahama, Fukui Prefecture as early as 4 July 2002. However, there are suspicions about corrosion of the transport cask and corrosion of the steel plate tank tops of the transport vessel.

An investigation by Tokyo Electric and Kansai Electric showed that metal corrosion led to the rising of the heat radiation fins on TN model transport casks currently stored in France. On 27 June, Japan’s Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport issued an official notification instructing the companies to refrain use the TN model transport casks until a corrosion inspection has been carried out to guarantee safety of the casks.

The transport cask to be used in the imminent return shipment is an excellox model cask. Kansai Electric claims that “the structure is different therefore there is no corrosion.” However, Green Action and Mihama-no-Kai met with Kansai Electric officials at the companies headquarters in Osaka on 1 July 2002, and confirmed that the Excellox casks were also exposed to water when they were used as spent nuclear fuel transport casks. In order to use the casks as MOX fuel transport casks, the company carried out a series of modifications including installing a layer of resin around the body of the cask and an outer metal layer to cover the resin. Prior to these installations six years ago, the company carried out a visual inspection of the cask to check for corrosion. However, since the modifications have been completed no inspections for corrosion have taken place.

Green Action and Mihama-no-Kai submitted a list of demands to MLIT Minister Chikage Ogi on 2 July, calling for MLIT to act on the ministry’s own official notification of 27 July, and instruct Kansai Electric not to use the Excellox cask to return MOX fuel until an inspection for corrosion has been carried out by the company. This evening, Green Action and Mihama-no-Kai will attend a meeting with MLIT officials organized by Japanese Diet members. We will continue to keep you posted about details concerning the transport cask issue and other issues concerning this return shipment of MOX fuel.

With regards to corrosion of the transport vessels, on 27 June 2002, UK Parliamentarian David Chaytor sent a letter to British Secretary of State for Transport which points out that initial results of tests on vessels owned and operated by Pacific Nuclear Transport Ltd (PNTL) indicate the possibility of serious corrosion problems affecting all ships within the PNTL fleet. We have enclosed a copy of the letter for your convenience.

If you have any questions please contact Aileen Mioko Smith at 090-3620-9251.

Encl.

1. Nuclear Fuel June 24, 2002 ‘Fukushima, Intervenors Query Integrity of Cask On Eve of MOX Transport to UK
2. David Chaytor, Member of Parliament, Bury North, 27 June 2002 letter to Rt. Hon. Alistair Darling MP, Secretary of State for Transport

Green Action
Suite 103, 22-75 Tanaka Sekiden-cho, Sakyo-ku Kyoto 606-8203 Japan
T + 81 75 701 7223
F + 81 75 702 1952
E-mail amsmith@gol.com

H.M.. Ambassador Stephen Gomersall
British Embassy in Japan
1 Ichiban-cho,Chiyoda-ku Tokyo 〒102-8381 Japan

1 July 2002

Dear Ambassador Stephen Gomersall:

On 14 June, a BNFL vessel from the United Kingdom arrived in Takahama to take back the “falsified data MOX fuel”. To us in Takahama, we feel as though this will break our hearts. The reason is, if the falsified MOX fuel is returned to the United Kingdom, it could result in further MOX fuel fabrication which could then lead to forced implementation of the pluthermal programme at the Takahama nuclear power plant, and as a result of BNFL fabricating new fuel, the Sellafield region will be, as in the past, forced to be exposed further to environmental contamination from worsening radioactivity. Furthermore, there is also anxiety about terrorist attacks and accidents during the shipment, and many en route countries have voiced opposition due to these concerns.

Our town Takahama has a population of 12,200 people, and is located in an area of scenic beauty within the Wakasa Bay National Park. There are four nuclear power plants in our town. There are 15 nuclear power plants of various design, including those in Takahama, concentrated in a straight line of only 60 kilometres along Wakasa Bay. We, the residents, have no choice but to live with this danger twenty-four hours a day.

We are sure you already know that the Japanese government has to date promoted the nuclear fuel cycle as a fundamental part of its atomic energy policy. However, seven years ago (in 1995) the Monju fast breeder reactor which was a central part of this policy had a fateful accident, and as a result of opposition from a large number of prefectural residents, the national government’s fast breeder reactor development plans have reached a deadlock. Since then, plans to use plutonium in light water reactors, the pluthermal programme, which had previously played only a secondary role, has been forced upon us. We the local residents don’t understand difficult technical issues. However, scientists around the world warn about the dangers of the pluthermal programme, and it is said the programme is not economic. Also the world trend, even among the small number of countries which have implemented pluthermal programmes, is to withdraw from them. The Japanese government is clinging to the nuclear fuel cycle, going against this widespread trend. For this reason, Japan’s atomic energy policy is becoming more contradictory and chaotic, and is leading the Japanese public into an irreconcilable quagmire even on into the future. We residents absolutely refuse by all means to become foolish victims of such government policies.

The people who are promoting nuclear power and the pluthermal programme say that “electricity is necessary.” Yes, electricity is necessary. However, why is electricity necessary It is needed to make human lives more convenient and comfortable. If for that reason, danger or disaster is brought about including into future generations, then what is the reason for doing it in the first place Isn’t what is necessary now the search for safer ways of generating the necessary electricity And already there are many new energy development and research programmes being promoted throughout the world. We are praying from our hearts that the Japanese government will also make a fundamental policy shift toward the direction being taken by the rest of the world.

In your country there are also probably various circumstances surrounding your atomic energy policy. Although it is presumptuous for us to say this, BNFL’s state of operations is extremely terrible. The other day we invited to our town Mr. Martin Forwood, a resident of Sellafield in your country, and we heard him speak about various things. We participants were all shocked to hear what he had to say. This is because his region was even more contaminated with radioactivity than we had imagined, and that cancer and leukemia has increased among the local people. And he said that the people have no choice but to live in these conditions. Even though it is clear that this is the effect of long term discharges of radioactivity from BNFL, why has the government or the company not stood in the shoes of the residents and made changes for the better Listening to Mr. Forwood’s presentation, we could clearly understand how the innate characteristics of the company BNFL lead to the dishonest fabrication of MOX fuel bound for use at the Takahama nuclear power plant. We, the residents of Takahama, are against the pluthermal programme itself, but above and beyond this even more anxious about having fuel used in our town which is manufactured by a company like BNFL. We also cannot believe the British government’s claim that ‘BNFL has improved’. We will adamantly refuse MOX fuel to be brought into Japan from a company such as BNFL, and this resolution will never change.

We believe that science is for human progress and happiness. Nuclear power still has many unresolved problems and is an incomplete technology. No matter which way it is looked upon, it will not bring about human happiness. The pluthermal programme only increases these dangers. Please don’t allow the use of this material for commercial trade. Please don’t push forward the sales of MOX fuel in Japan. Please don’t subject the Takahama people to further danger. And at the same time, please help the people of Sellafield. Speaking for the people of Takahama, we call on you from the bottom of our hearts.

Sincerely yours,

Toujiro OKUMURA

Member, Representative Committee
Group to Realize a Takahama Town Local Referendum Ordinance
1-46-4 Kotoshiro, Takahama-cho, Fukui-ken 〒919-2221

Takashi WATANABE

Member, Representative Committee
Group to Realize a Takahama Town Local Referendum Ordinance

Kayoko WATANABE

Member, Representative Committee
Group to Realize a Takahama Town Local Referendum Ordinance

Tetsuen NAKAJIMA

Permanent Board Member
Fukui Prefectural Citizens’ Organization Against Nuclear Power Plants

Masaharu IKENO

Obama Citizens Against Nuclear Reactor Establishment